[We develop a measurement theory of market integration, based on two notions of "integrated markets." First, two markets cannot be perfectly integrated in any sense if one can construct two portfolios, one from each market, that have identical payoffs but different prices. In that case, the law of one price is violated across the markets. Second, they cannot be integrated in a stronger sense if there are cross-market arbitrage opportunities. Two measures of market integration are developed, respectively reflecting these notions. The smaller the measures, the more closely integrated (in the respective senses) the markets. Among other things, they are interpreted as measuring pricing discrepancy between markets.]

[Corporate finance researchers have long been puzzled by low corporate debt ratios given debt's corporate tax advantage. This article recognizes that firm value typically reflects a growing stream of earnings, while current debt reflects a nongrowing stream of interest payments. Debt to value is therefore a distorted measure of corporate tax shielding. Even with very small debt-related costs, this may explain the observed magnitude and cross-sectional variation of debt ratios. Since this variation may be independent of tax shielding, debt ratios provide an inappropriate framework for empirically examining the trade-off theory of capital structure.]

Corporate finance researchers have long been puzzled by low corporate debt ratios given debt's corporate tax advantage. This article recognizes that firm value typically reflects a growing stream of earnings, while current debt reflects a nongrowing stream of interest payments. Debt to value is therefore a distorted measure of corporate tax shielding. Even with very small debt-related costs, this may explain the observed magnitude and cross-sectional variation of debt ratios. Since this variation may be independent of tax shielding, debt ratios provide an inappropriate framework for empirically examining the trade-off theory of capital structure.

[Financial market regulations require various "insiders" to disclose their trades after the trades are made. We show that such mandatory disclosure rules can increase insiders' expected trading profits. This is because disclosure leads to profitable trading opportunities for insiders even if they possess no private information on the asset's value. We also show that insiders will generally not voluntarily disclose their trades, so for disclosure to be forthcoming, it must be mandatory. Key to the analysis is that the market cannot observe whether an insider is trading on private information regarding asset value or is trading for personal portfolio reasons.]

We develop a measurement theory of market integration, based on two notions of “integrated markets”. First, two markets cannot be perfectly integrated in any sense if one can construct two portfolios, one from each market, that have identical payoffs but different prices. In that case, the law of one price is violated across the markets. Second, they cannot be integrated in a stronger sense if there are cross-market arbitrage opportunities. Two measures of market integration are developed, respectively reflecting these notions. The smaller the measures, the more closely integrated (in the respective senses) the markets. Among other things, they are interpreted as measuring pricing discrepancy between markets.

[In this article we provide econometric tools for the evaluation of intertemporal asset pricing models using specification-error and volatility bounds. We formulate analog estimators of these bounds, give conditions for consistency, and derive the limiting distribution of these estimators. The analysis incorporates market frictions such as short-sale constraints and proportional transactions costs. Among several applications we show how to use the methods to assess specific asset pricing models and to provide nonparametric characterizations of asset pricing anomalies.]

Financial market regulations require various “insiders” to disclose their trades after the trades are made. We show that such mandatory disclosure rules can increase insiders’ expected trading profits. This is because disclosure leads to profitable trading opportunities for insiders even if they possess no private information on the asset’s value. We also show that insiders will generally not voluntarily disclose their trades, so for disclosure to be forthcoming, it must be mandatory. Key to the analysis is that the market cannot observe whether an insider is trading on private information regarding asset value or is trading for personal portfolio reasons.

In this article we provide econometric tools for the evaluation of intertemporal asset pricing models using specification-error and volatility bounds. We formulate analog estimators of these bounds, give conditions for consistency, and derive the limiting distribution of these estimators. The analysis incorporates market frictions such as short-sale constraints and proportional transactions costs. Among several applications we show how to use the methods to assess specific asset pricing models and to provide non-parametric characterizations of asset pricing anomalies.