[We analyze a comprehensive set of mergers and acquisitions from SDC data from 1992 through 2009. We do not impose common restrictions such as excluding private bidders, small targets, or deals without a deal value. We show a broader scope of mergers and acquisitions activity than that implied in the literature, which generally oversamples larger deals involving public firms. Further, some of our results differ from the extant literature. For example, the finding that mergers occur in waves is attenuated with a greater presence of smaller and/or non-public firms. Also, acquirers gain in most takeovers despite a threefold decline over the sample period in acquirer returns.]

[Using eight thousand public companies, we study the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 and other contemporary reforms on directors and boards, guided by their impact on the supply and demand for directors. SOX increased directors' workload and risk (reducing the supply), and increased demand by mandating that firms have more outside directors. We find both broad-based changes and cross-sectional changes (by firm size). Board committees meet more often post-SOX and Director and Officer (D&O) insurance premiums have doubled. Directors post-SOX are more likely to be lawyers/consultants, financial experts, and retired executives, and less likely to be current executives. Post-SOX boards are larger and more independent. Finally, we find significant increases in director pay and overall director costs, particularly among smaller firms.]

Using 8,000 public companies we study the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and other contemporary reforms on directors and boards, guided by their impact on the supply and demand for directors. SOX increased director workload and risk (reducing the supply), and increased demand by mandating that firms have more outside directors. We find both broad-based changes and cross-sectional changes (by firm size). Board committees meet more often post SOX and Director and Officer (D&O) insurance premiums doubled. Directors post SOX are more likely to be lawyers/consultants, financial experts and retired executives, and less likely to be current executives. Post-SOX boards are larger and more independent. Finally, we find significant increases in director pay and overall director costs, particularly among smaller firms.?

We analyze a comprehensive set of mergers and acquisitions from SDC data from 1992 through 2009. We do not impose common restrictions such as excluding private bidders, small targets, or deals without a deal value. We show a broader scope of mergers and acquisitions activity than that implied in the literature, which generally oversamples larger deals involving public firms. Further, some of our results differ from the extant literature. For example, the finding that mergers occur in waves is attenuated with a greater presence of smaller and/or non-public firms. Also, acquirers gain in most takeovers despite a threefold decline over the sample period in acquirer returns.