[This article examines the stock-price effects of top management turnover announcements for 432 Japanese corporations from 1985 to 1990. We find that these announcements are associated with significantly positive abnormal returns. The returns are greater when turnover is forced than when turnover represents normal succession. The stock-price effects are also significantly positive when turnover is forced and the successor is appointed from outside the firm. We find that large shareholders play an important role during outside succession. This evidence suggests that the disciplinary decisions of Japanese governance mechanisms are consistent with shareholder wealth maximization.]

[This article studies the shareholder wealth effects associated with 875 new security issues in Japan from January 1, 1985, to May 31, 1991. The announcement of convertible debt issues has a significant positive abnormal return of 1.05 percent. There is an abnormal return of 0.45 percent at the announcement of equity issues that is offset by an abnormal return of 1.01 percent on the issue day. Abnormal returns are negatively related to firm size, so that large Japanese firms have abnormal returns less different from those of U.S. firms than small Japanese firms. Our evidence is consistent with the view that Japanese managers decide to issue shares based on different considerations than American managers.]

[Using earnings announcement events made by firms belonging to Korean chaebols, we examine propping within a chaebol. Consistent with the market's ex ante valuation of intragroup propping, we find that the announcement of increased (decreased) earnings by a chaebol-affiliated firm has a positive (negative) effect on the market value of other nonannouncing affiliates. The sensitivity of the change in the market value of nonannouncing affiliates to abnormal returns for the announcing firms is higher if the cash flow right of the announcing firm's controlling shareholder is higher. The sensitivity is also higher if the announcing firm is larger, performs well, and has a higher debt guarantee ratio.]

[This article investigates the long-term equity performance of Japanese firms issuing convertible debt and equity. We find that issuing firms perform poorly (except for equity rights issues) compared to nonissuing firms even though the stock-price reaction to convertible debt and equity issues is not negative for Japanese firms. This underperformance is strongest for firms issuing public convertible debt. In contrast to the United States, poor performance is not concentrated in smaller firms and in firms with a high market-to-book ratio. Simple behavioral explanations advanced for the new issue puzzle in the United States do not seem consistent with the Japanese experience.]

This paper studies the shareholder wealth effects associated with 875 new security issues in Japan from January 1, 1985 to May 31, 1991. The sample includes public equity, private equity, rights offerings, straight debt, warrant debt and convertible debt issues. Contrary to the U.S., the announcement of convertible debt issues is accompanied by a significant positive abnormal return of 1.05%. The announcement of equity issues has a positive abnormal return ofO.45%, significant at the 0.10 level, but this positive abnormal return can be attributed to one year in our sample and is offset by a negative issue date abnormal return of -1.01%. The abnormal returns are negatively related to firm size, so that for equity issues (but not for convertible debt issues), large Japanese firms have significant negative announcement abnormal returns. Our evidence is consistent with the view that Japanese managers decide to issue shares based on different considerations than American managers.

Using Chinese data, we examine whether synchronous remote board meetings, which facilitate status equalization among directors and alleviate their pressure for conformity, affect board monitoring effectiveness. We find that compared to face-to-face meetings, synchronous remote meetings are associated with directors’ better meeting attendance behavior, a higher likelihood of director dissent on monitoring-related proposals, higher forced CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, and more effective investments. These results hold when we use remote meetings that include both synchronous and asynchronous remote meetings. Proposal-director level analysis further shows that remote meetings reduce the pressure to conform faced by young first-term directors and socially connected directors.

Using earnings announcement events made by firms belonging to Korean chaebols, we examine propping within a chaebol. Consistent with the market's ex ante valuation of intragroup propping, we find that the announcement of increased (decreased) earnings by a chaebol-affiliated firm has a positive (negative) effect on the market value of other nonannouncing affiliates. The sensitivity of the change in the market value of nonannouncing affiliates to abnormal returns for the announcing firms is higher if the cash flow right of the announcing firm's controlling shareholder is higher. The sensitivity is also higher if the announcing firm is larger, performs well, and has a higher debt guarantee ratio.

This article investigates the long-term equity performance of Japanese firms issuing convertible debt and equity. We find that issuing firms perform poorly (except for equity rights issues) compared to nonissuing firms even though the stock-price reaction to convertible debt and equity issues is not negative for Japanese firms. This underperformance is strongest for firms issuing public convertible debt. In contrast to the United States, poor performance is not concentrated in smaller firms and in firms with a high market-to-book ratio. Simple behavioral explanations advanced for the new issue puzzle in the United States do not seem consistent with the Japanese experience.