[This article examines the stock-price effects of top management turnover announcements for 432 Japanese corporations from 1985 to 1990. We find that these announcements are associated with significantly positive abnormal returns. The returns are greater when turnover is forced than when turnover represents normal succession. The stock-price effects are also significantly positive when turnover is forced and the successor is appointed from outside the firm. We find that large shareholders play an important role during outside succession. This evidence suggests that the disciplinary decisions of Japanese governance mechanisms are consistent with shareholder wealth maximization.]

[This article studies the shareholder wealth effects associated with 875 new security issues in Japan from January 1, 1985, to May 31, 1991. The announcement of convertible debt issues has a significant positive abnormal return of 1.05 percent. There is an abnormal return of 0.45 percent at the announcement of equity issues that is offset by an abnormal return of 1.01 percent on the issue day. Abnormal returns are negatively related to firm size, so that large Japanese firms have abnormal returns less different from those of U.S. firms than small Japanese firms. Our evidence is consistent with the view that Japanese managers decide to issue shares based on different considerations than American managers.]

This paper studies the shareholder wealth effects associated with 875 new security issues in Japan from January 1, 1985 to May 31, 1991. The sample includes public equity, private equity, rights offerings, straight debt, warrant debt and convertible debt issues. Contrary to the U.S., the announcement of convertible debt issues is accompanied by a significant positive abnormal return of 1.05%. The announcement of equity issues has a positive abnormal return ofO.45%, significant at the 0.10 level, but this positive abnormal return can be attributed to one year in our sample and is offset by a negative issue date abnormal return of -1.01%. The abnormal returns are negatively related to firm size, so that for equity issues (but not for convertible debt issues), large Japanese firms have significant negative announcement abnormal returns. Our evidence is consistent with the view that Japanese managers decide to issue shares based on different considerations than American managers.