[We compare the stability and timeliness of credit ratings produced by a traditional issuer-paid rating agency (Moody's Investors Service) and a subscriber-paid rater (Rapid Ratings). Moody's ratings exhibit less volatility but are slower to identify default risk. We control for Moody's aversion to ratings volatility and still find its ratings lag Rapid Ratings'. More importantly, accuracy ratios indicate that Rapid Ratings provides a better ordinal ranking of credit risk. We quantify the loss avoidance associated with Rapid Ratings' signals to estimate costs associated with regulatory and contractual systems based on issuer-paid ratings.]

We compare the stability and timeliness of credit ratings produced by a traditional issuer-paid rating agency (Moody's Investors Service) and a subscriber-paid rater (Rapid Ratings). Moody's ratings exhibit less volatility but are slower to identify default risk. We control for Moody's aversion to ratings volatility and still find its ratings lag Rapid Ratings'. More importantly, accuracy ratios indicate that Rapid Ratings provides a better ordinal ranking of credit risk. We quantify the loss avoidance associated with Rapid Ratings'signals to estimate costs associated with regulatory and contractual systems based on issuer-paid ratings.

We examine the relationship between credit rating levels and rating agency fees in a public finance market in which rating agencies earn lower fees and face higher disclosure requirements relative to corporate bond and structured finance markets. Controlling for variation in the complexity of credit analysis at the issue level, we find evidence that rating agency conflicts of interest distort credit ratings in the municipal bond market. Unexpectedly expensive ratings are more likely downgraded, and inexpensive ratings are more likely upgraded. The relationship between credit ratings and rating agency fees is driven by issuers who lose access to AAA insurance.

A common belief held among researchers and policy makers is that regulatory reliance has inflated market demand for credit ratings, despite their decreasing informational value. Advances in information technology, coupled with reputation losses following the subprime crisis, renew the question of whether investors still rely on ratings to assess credit risk. Using Moody’s 2010 scale recalibration, which was unrelated to changing issuer fundamentals, we find that ratings still matter to investors and to issuers—apart from any regulatory implications. Our results commend improved disclosure to mitigate mechanistic reliance on ratings and inefficiencies due to rating standards that vary across asset classes. Received October 9, 2015; editorial decision June 7, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.