We hypothesize that a source of commonality in a stock's liquidity arises from the correlated liquidity demand of the stock's investors. Focusing on correlated trading of mutual funds, we find that stocks with high mutual fund ownership have comovements in liquidity about twice as large as those for stocks with low mutual fund ownership. Further analysis shows that the channels for these comovements derive from both common ownership across funds and funds' correlated liquidity shocks. We obtain inferences supporting causality from an exogenous flow shock for mutual funds in the aftermath of the 2003 mutual fund scandal.

[This article examines potential explanations for the wealth effects surrounding dividend change announcements. We find that new information concerning managers' investment policies is not revealed at the time of the dividend announcement. We also find that dividend increases (decreases) are associated with subsequent significant increases (decreases) in capital expenditures over the three years following the dividend change, and that dividend change announcements are associated with revisions in analysts' forecasts of current earnings. These results are consistent with the cash flow signaling hypothesis rather than the free cash flow hypothesis as an explanation for the observed stock price reactions to dividend change announcements.]

Although institutional investors have a preference for large capitalization stocks, over time they have shifted their preferences toward smaller, riskier securities. These changes in aggregate preferences have arisen primarily from changes in the preferences of each class of institution, rather than changes in the importance of different classes. Evidence also suggests that recent growth in institutional investment combined with this shift in preferences helps explain why markets in general, and smaller stocks in particular, have exhibited greater firm-specific risk and liquidity in recent years. Additional analyses suggest that institutional investors moved toward smaller securities because such securities offer "greener pastures."

This article examines potential explanations for the wealth effects surrounding dividend change announcements. We find that new information concerning managers' investment policies is not revealed at the time of the dividend announcement. We also find that dividend increases (decreases) are associated with subsequent significant increases (decreases) in capital expenditures over the three years following the dividend change, and that dividend change announcements are associated with revisions in analysts' forecasts of current earnings. These results are consistent with the cash flow signaling hypothesis rather than the free cash flow hypothesis as an explanation for the observed stock price reactions to dividend change announcements.

We document that backfilling in the ExecuComp database introduces a data-conditioning bias that can affect inferences and make replicating previous work difficult. Although backfilling can be advantageous due to greater data coverage, if not addressed, the oversampling of firms with strong managerial incentives and higher subsequent returns leads to a significant upward bias in abnormal compensation, pay-for-performance sensitivity, and the magnitudes of several previously established relations. The bias also can lead to one misinterpreting the appropriate functional form of a relation and whether the data support one compensation theory over another. We offer methods to address this issue.

We hypothesize that a source of commonality in a stock’s liquidity arises from the correlated liquidity demand of the stock’s investors. Focusing on correlated trading of mutual funds, we find that stocks with high mutual fund ownership have comovements in liquidity about twice as large as those for stocks with low mutual fund ownership. Further analysis shows that the channels for these comovements derive from both common ownership across funds and funds’ correlated liquidity shocks. We obtain inferences supporting causality from an exogenous flow shock for mutual funds in the aftermath of the 2003 mutual fund scandal.

Although institutional investors have a preference for large capitalization stocks, over time they have shifted their preferences toward smaller, riskier securities. These changes in aggregate preferences have arisen primarily from changes in the preferences of each class of institution, rather than changes in the importance of different classes. Evidence also suggests that recent growth in institutional investment combined with this shift in preferences helps explain why markets in general, and smaller stocks in particular, have exhibited greater firm-specific risk and liquidity in recent years. Additional analyses suggest that institutional investors moved toward smaller securities because such securities offer “greener pastures.”

According to our survey about climate risk perceptions, institutional investors believe climate risks have financial implications for their portfolio firms and that these risks, particularly regulatory risks, already have begun to materialize. Many of the investors, especially the long-term, larger, and ESG-oriented ones, consider risk management and engagement, rather than divestment, to be the better approach for addressing climate risks. Although surveyed investors believe that some equity valuations do not fully reflect climate risks, their perceived overvaluations are not large.

We document that backfilling in the ExecuComp database introduces a data-conditioning bias that can affect inferences and make replicating previous work difficult. Although backfilling can be advantageous due to greater data coverage, if not addressed, the oversampling of firms with strong managerial incentives and higher subsequent returns leads to a significant upward bias in abnormal compensation, pay-for-performance sensitivity, and the magnitudes of several previously established relations. The bias also can lead to one misinterpreting the appropriate functional form of a relation and whether the data support one compensation theory over another. We offer methods to address this issue. Received May 12, 2014; editorial decision May 10, 2016 by Editor David Hirshleifer.

Through a survey and analyses of observational data, we provide systematic evidence that institutional investors value and demand climate risk disclosures. The survey reveals the investors have a strong demand for climate risk disclosures, and many actively engage their portfolio firms for improvements. Empirical analyses of holdings data corroborate this evidence by showing a significantly positive association between climate-conscious institutional ownership and better firm-level climate risk disclosure. We establish further evidence of institutional investors’ influence on firms’ climate risk disclosures by examining a shock to the climate risk disclosure demand of French institutional investors (French Article 173).