The unique regulation of U.S. public pension funds links their liability discount rate to the expected return on assets, which gives them incentives to invest more in risky assets in order to report a better funding status. Comparing public and private pension funds in the United States, Canada, and Europe, we find that U.S. public pension funds act on their regulatory incentives. U.S. public pension funds with a higher level of underfunding per participant, as well as funds with more politicians and elected plan participants serving on the board, take more risk and use higher discount rates. The increased risk-taking by U.S. public funds is negatively related to their performance.

Banks’ exposure to large-scale asset purchases, as measured by the relative prevalence of mortgage-backed securities on their books, affects lending following unconventional monetary policy shocks. Using a difference-in-differences identification strategy, this paper finds strong effects of the first and third round of quantitative easing (QE1 and QE3) on credit. Highly affected commercial banks increase lending by 2% to 3% relative to their counterparts. QE2 had no significant impact, consistent with its exclusive focus on Treasuries sparsely held by banks. Overall, banks respond heterogeneously, and the type of asset being targeted is central to QE. Received January 13, 2016; editorial decision January 18, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.

We exploit Medicare national coverage reimbursement approvals as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate how the financing decisions of private and publicly traded firms respond to changes in investment opportunities. We find that publicly traded companies increase their external financing and their subsequent product introductions by more than private companies in response to national coverage approvals. Private equity financing is the primary source of the increased financing for public firms. We show that the stock characteristics of publicly traded firms, such as liquidity and price informativeness, and product market competition are important factors in explaining their financing advantage.

This paper studies how expected returns interact with product market competition. The model predicts that (1) competition erodes markups, such that firms are more exposed to systematic risk; (2) the threat of entry by new firms lowers exposure to systematic risk of incumbents; and (3) higher industry aggregate risk represents a barrier to entry, such that riskier industries become less competitive. We provide empirical evidence consistent with these three channels and for an overall negative relation between returns and competition. We also consider a sample selection correction for publicly listed firms and use it to construct an alternative concentration measure.

Banks’exposure to large-scale asset purchases, as measured by the relative prevalence of mortgage-backed securities on their books, affects lending following unconventional monetary policy shocks. Using a difference-in-differences identification strategy, this paper finds strong effects of the first and third round of quantitative easing (QE1 and QE3) on credit. Highly affected commercial banks increase lending by 2% to 3% relative to their counterparts. QE2 had no significant impact, consistent with its exclusive focus on Treasuries sparsely held by banks. Overall, banks respond heterogeneously, and the type of asset being targeted is central to QE.

We examine how banks use loan sales to manage liquidity during periods of marketwide stress and the associated spillovers to market prices. We track the dynamics of loan share ownership in the secondary market using data from a U. S. supervisory register of syndicated loans. Controlling for loan quality using loan-year fixed effects, we find that banks reliant on wholesale funding were more likely to exit syndicates through sales during 2007/08. This effect is stronger for banks dependent on short-term funding and holding fewer liquid securities. In addition, secondary market prices decrease significantly more for loans funded by liquidity-strained banks.

We develop a dynamic agency model of a public corporation. Managers underinvest because of risk aversion. They smooth rents and payout. They do not exploit interest tax shields fully. The interactions of investment, debt, and payout decisions can change drastically depending on managers’preferences. Managers with power utility set investment, debt, and payout proportional to the firm’s net worth, generating a constant (possibly negative) net debt ratio. With exponential utility, investment decisions are separated from decisions about debt and payout. More profitable firms become cash cows, and less profitable firms accumulate debt, as in a pecking-order model.

We examine how banks use loan sales to manage liquidity during periods of marketwide stress and the associated spillovers to market prices. We track the dynamics of loan share ownership in the secondary market using data from a U.S. supervisory register of syndicated loans. Controlling for loan quality using loan-year fixed effects, we find that banks reliant on wholesale funding were more likely to exit syndicates through sales during 2007/08. This effect is stronger for banks dependent on short-term funding and holding fewer liquid securities. In addition, secondary market prices decrease significantly more for loans funded by liquidity-strained banks. Received November 16, 2015; editorial decision January 9, 2017 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

Following surprise independent director departures, affected firms have worse stock and operating performance, are more likely to restate earnings, face shareholder litigation, suffer from an extreme negative return event, and make worse mergers and acquisitions. The announcement returns to surprise director departures are negative, suggesting that the market infers bad news from surprise departures. We use exogenous variation in independent director departures triggered by director deaths to test whether surprise independent director departures cause these negative outcomes or whether an anticipation of negative outcomes is responsible for the surprise director departure. Our evidence is more consistent with the latter.

Financial regulators and investors have expressed concerns about high pay inequality within firms. Using a proprietary data set of public and private firms, this paper shows that firms with higher pay inequality—relative wage differentials between top-and bottom-level jobs—are larger and have higher valuations and stronger operating performance. Moreover, firms with higher pay inequality exhibit larger equity returns and greater earnings surprises, suggesting that pay inequality is not fully priced by the market. Our results support the notion that differences in pay inequality across firms are a reflection of differences in managerial talent.