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Blockholder Heterogeneity, Multiple Blocks, and the Dance between Blockholders

Review of Financial Studies 2019 32(11), 4196-4227
[We study blockholder presence in a large panel and document substantial heterogeneity in holding periods, position sizes, and positions taken across blockholder types. Nonfinancial blocks are more likely to be observed in smaller, riskier, younger, and less-liquid firms. These patterns are either not evident or reversed for financial blocks. For all but small financial blocks, we detect significant negative interdependence in blockholder investment decisions, with the presence of one blockholder crowding out others, a behavior that appears causal. Small financial blocks often coexist in the same firm, an outcome that appears to reflect correlated investment styles.]

Blockholder Heterogeneity, Multiple Blocks, and the Dance between Blockholders

Review of Financial Studies 2019 32(11), 4196-4227
We study blockholder presence in a large panel and document substantial heterogeneity in holding periods, position sizes, and positions taken across blockholder types. Nonfinancial blocks are more likely to be observed in smaller, riskier, younger, and less-liquid firms. These patterns are either not evident or reversed for financial blocks. For all but small financial blocks, we detect significant negative interdependence in blockholder investment decisions, with the presence of one blockholder crowding out others, a behavior that appears causal. Small financial blocks often coexist in the same firm, an outcome that appears to reflect correlated investment styles. Received April 30, 2018; editorial decision November 23, 2018 by Editor David Denis.

When Shareholders Disagree: Trading after Shareholder Meetings

Review of Financial Studies 2022 35(4), 1813-1867
This paper analyzes how trading after shareholder meetings changes the composition of the shareholder base. Analyzing daily trades, we find that mutual funds reduce their holdings if their votes are opposed to the voting outcome. Trading volume is high even when stock prices do not change, peaks on the meeting date, and remains high up to four weeks after shareholder meetings. The results support models based on differences of opinion that predict that shareholders’ beliefs may diverge more after observing voting outcomes. Hence, trading after meetings creates a more homogeneous shareholder base, which has important implications for corporate governance.