I use U.S. Census microdata to analyze the effect of stronger creditor rights on productivity. Following the adoption of antirecharacterization laws that give lenders greater access to the collateral of firms in financial distress, treated plants’ total factor productivity increases by 2.6%. This effect is concentrated among plants belonging to financially constrained firms. I explore the underlying mechanism and find that treated plants change the composition of their investments and their workforce toward newer capital and skilled labor. My results suggest that stronger creditor rights relax borrowing constraints and help firms adopt more efficient production technologies.

We examine entrepreneurial activity following the staggered adoption of modern-day fraudulent transfer laws in the United States. These laws strengthen unsecured creditors’ rights and are particularly important for entrepreneurs whose personal assets commingle with the firm’s. Using administrative data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we document declines in startup entry—particularly among riskier entrants—and closures of existing firms after these laws pass. Firm financial data shows that entrepreneurs lower leverage by reducing demand for unsecured credit. Our results suggest that strong creditor protections can limit entrepreneurs’ appetite for risk, which may reduce churning along the extensive margin among the smallest firms in the economy.

Previous research shows that incentives to meet short-term earnings targets can cause firms to increase share buybacks, leading to cuts in investments and employment. Using plant-level census data, we find that incentives to engage in earnings-per-share-motivated buybacks result in lower productivity at both the plant and firm level. We attribute this productivity drop to two mechanisms: reduced investment in productivity-augmenting technology, and inefficient allocation of resources across a firm’s plants. We identify multiple frictions—including labor unions, financial constraints, agency problems, and adjustment costs—that can constrain efficient reallocations across plants and thus exacerbate the consequences of firms’ short-term incentives.