Using both a linear regression method and a probability-based method, we find that on average, analysts place larger than efficient weights on (i.e., they overweight) their private information when they forecast corporate earnings. We also find that analysts overweight more when issuing forecasts more favorable than the consensus, and overweight less, and may even underweight, private information when issuing forecasts less favorable than the consensus. Further, the deviation from efficient weighting increases when the benefits from doing so are high or when the costs of doing so are low. These results suggest that analysts' incentives play a larger role in misweighting than their behavioral biases.

[The article shows that two measures of the amount of private information in stock price-price nonsynchronicity and probability of informed trading (PIN)-have a strong positive effect on the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price. Moreover, the effect is robust to the inclusion of controls for managerial information and for other information-related variables. The results suggest that firm managers learn from the private information in stock price about their own firms' fundamentals and incorporate this information in the corporate investment decisions. We relate our findings to an alternative explanation for the investment-to-price sensitivity, namely that it is generated by capital constraints, and show that both the learning channel and the alternative channel contribute to this sensitivity.]

[The average cash holdings of Chinese-listed firms decreased significantly after the split share structure reform in China, which specified a process that allowed previously nontradable shares held by controlling shareholders to be freely tradable on the exchanges. The reduction in cash holdings is greater for firms with weaker governance and firms facing more financial constraints prior to the reform. The reform also significantly reduced the average corporate savings rate, as measured by cash-to-cash-flow sensitivity. These findings are consistent with the premise that the reform removed a significant market friction, which led to better incentive alignment between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and relaxed financial constraints. Additional analyses show that the reform affects firms' cash management policies, investment decisions, dividend payout policies, and financing choices differently in private firms than in state-owned enterprises.]

Using both a linear regression method and a probability-based method, we find that on average, analysts place larger than efficient weights on (i.e., they overweight) their private information when they forecast corporate earnings. We also find that analysts overweight more when issuing forecasts more favorable than the consensus, and overweight less, and may even underweight, private information when issuing forecasts less favorable than the consensus. Further, the deviation from efficient weighting increases when the benefits from doing so are high or when the costs of doing so are low. These results suggest that analysts' incentives play a larger role in misweighting than their behavioral biases.

The article shows that two measures of the amount of private information in stock price—price nonsynchronicity and probability of informed trading (PIN)—have a strong positive effect on the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price. Moreover, the effect is robust to the inclusion of controls for managerial information and for other information-related variables. The results suggest that firm managers learn from the private information in stock price about their own firms’ fundamentals and incorporate this information in the corporate investment decisions. We relate our findings to an alternative explanation for the investment-to-price sensitivity, namely that it is generated by capital constraints, and show that both the learning channel and the alternative channel contribute to this sensitivity.

The average cash holdings of Chinese-listed firms decreased significantly after the split share structure reform in China, which specified a process that allowed previously nontradable shares held by controlling shareholders to be freely tradable on the exchanges. The reduction in cash holdings is greater for firms with weaker governance and firms facing more financial constraints prior to the reform. The reform also significantly reduced the average corporate savings rate, as measured by cash-to-cash-flow sensitivity. These findings are consistent with the premise that the reform removed a significant market friction, which led to better incentive alignment between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and relaxed financial constraints. Additional analyses show that the reform affects firms' cash management policies, investment decisions, dividend payout policies, and financing choices differently in private firms than in state-owned enterprises.