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A New Dividend Forecasting Procedure that Rejects Bubbles in Asset Price: The Case of 1929's Stock Crash

Review of Financial Studies 1996 9(2), 333-383
[We develop a new procedure to forecast future cash flows from a financial asset and then use the present value of our cash flow forecasts to calculate the asset's fundamental price. As an example, we construct a nonlinear ARMA-ARCH-Artificial Neural Network model to obtain out-of-sample dividend forecasts for 1920 and beyond, using only in-sample dividend data. The present value of our forecasted dividends yield fundamental prices that reproduce the magnitude, timing, and time-series behavior of the boom and crash in 1929 stock prices. We therefore reject the popular claim that the 1920s stock market contained a bubble.]

Control Rights, Debt Structure, and the Loss of Private Benefits: The Case of the U.K. Insolvency Code

Review of Financial Studies 1996 9(4), 1165-1210
[We show how the efficiency of reorganization is affected by the distribution of control rights under the U.K. insolvency code. Control rights raise particular problems when creditors have different incentives to keep the firm as a going concern. Such differences may arise from the possession of private benefits by particular creditors which are lost if the debtor firm is liquidated. The incidence of inefficient liquidations is influenced by the size and seniority of creditors' claims. The current U.K. code is widely thought to give rise to inefficient liquidations. We show, however, that inefficiency depends upon the debt structure and whether the controlling creditor in formal bankruptcy has private benefits.]

Survivorship Bias and Mutual Fund Performance

Review of Financial Studies 1996 9(4), 1097-1120
[Mutual fund attrition can create problems for a researcher because funds that disappear tend to do so due to poor performance. In this article we estimate the size of the bias by tracking all funds that existed at the end of 1976. When a fund merges we calculate the return, taking into account the merger terms. This allows a precise estimate of survivorship bias. In addition, we examine characteristics of both mutual funds that merge and their partner funds. Estimates of survivorship bias over different horizons and using different models to evaluate performance are provided.]

A New Dividend Forecasting Procedure that Rejects Bubbles in Asset Prices: The Case of 1929’s Stock Crash

Review of Financial Studies 1996 9(2), 333-383
We develop a new procedure to forecast future cash flows from a financial asset and then use the present value of our cash flow forecasts to calculate the asset’s fundamental price. As an example, we construct a nonlinear ARMA-ARCH-Artificial Neural Network model to obtain out-of-sample dividend forecasts for 1920 and beyond, using only in-sample dividend data. The present value of our forecasted dividends yield fundamental prices that reproduce the magnitude, timing, and time-series behavior of the boom and crash in 1929 stock prices. We therefore reject the popular claim that the 1920s stock market contained a bubble.

Survivor Bias and Mutual Fund Performance

Review of Financial Studies 1996 9(4), 1097-1120
Mutual fund attrition can create problems for a researcher because funds that disappear tend to do so due to poor performance. In this article we estimate the size of the bias by tracking all funds that existed at the end of 1976. When a fund merges we calculate the return, taking into account the merger terms. This allows a precise estimate of survivorship bias. In addition, we examine characteristics of both mutual funds that merge and their partner funds. Estimates of survivorship bias over different horizons and using different models to evaluate performance are provided.

Control Rights, Debt Structure, and the Loss of Private Benefits: The Case of the UK Insolvency Code

Review of Financial Studies 1996 9(4), 1165-1210
We show how the efficiency of reorganization is affected by the distribution of control rights under the U.K. insolvency code. Control rights raise particular problems when creditors have different incentives to keep the firm as a going concern. Such differences may arise from the possession of private benefits by particular creditors which are lost if the debtor firm is liquidated. The incidence of inefficient liquidations is influenced by the size and seniority of creditors’ claims. The current U.K. code is widely thought to give rise to inefficient liquidations. We show, however, that inefficiency depends upon the debt structure and whether the controlling creditor in formal bankruptcy has private benefits.