This article develops a direct filtration-based maximum likelihood methodology for estimating the parameters and realizations of latent affine processes. Filtration is conducted in the transform space of characteristic functions, with a version of Bayes’ rule used for recursively updating the joint characteristic function of latent variables and the data conditional upon past data. An application to daily stock returns over 1953-96 reveals substantial divergences from EMM-based estimates; in particular, more substantial and time-varying jump risk. The implications for stock index options ’ prices are discussed.

This article develops a direct filtration-based maximum likelihood methodology for estimating the parameters and realizations of latent affine processes. Filtration is conducted in the transform space of characteristic functions, using a version of Bayes' rule for recursively updating the joint characteristic function of latent variables and the data conditional upon past data. An application to daily stock market returns over 1953-1996 reveals substantial divergences from estimates based on the Efficient Methods of Moments (EMM) methodology; in particular, more substantial and time-varying jump risk. The implications for pricing stock index options are examined.

This article illustrates an incentive-aligning role of debt in the presence of optimal compensation contracts. Owing to information asymmetry, value-maximizing compensation contracts allow managerial rents following high investment outcomes. The manager has an incentive to increase these rents by choosing investments that generate greater information asymmetry. An aptly chosen debt level mitigates this incentive, because investments that generate greater information asymmetry have more volatile outcomes. The greater volatility would make the debt risky, causing the shareholders to focus on high outcomes and therefore compensation contracts that reduce managerial rents. At the optimum, the manager avoids opportunistic investments, and the shareholders offer value-maximizing compensation contracts. Empirically, the analysis predicts a negative relationship between leverage and market-to-book that is reversed at extreme market-to-book ratios, a negative relationship between leverage and profitability, a negative relationship between leverage and pay-for-performance, and a positive relationship between pay-for-performance and investment opportunities.

This article illustrates an incentive-aligning role of debt in the presence of optimal compensation contracts. Owing to information asymmetry, value-maximizing compensation contracts allow managerial rents following high investment outcomes. The manager has an incentive to increase these rents by choosing investments that generate greater information asymmetry. An aptly chosen debt level mitigates this incentive, because investments that generate greater information asymmetry have more volatile outcomes. The greater volatility would make the debt risky, causing the shareholders to focus on high outcomes and therefore compensation contracts that reduce managerial rents. At the optimum, the manager avoids opportunistic investments, and the shareholders offer value-maximizing compensation contracts. Empirically, the analysis predicts a negative relationship between leverage and market-to-book that is reversed at extreme market-to-book ratios, a negative relationship between leverage and profitability, a negative relationship between leverage and pay-for-performance, and a positive relationship between pay-for-performance and investment opportunities.