We show how optimal household decisions regarding work, retirement, saving, portfolio allocations, and life insurance are shaped by the complex financial options embedded in U.S. Social Security rules and uncertain family transitions. Our life cycle model predicts sharp consumption drops on retirement, an age-62 peak in claiming rates, and earlier claiming by wives versus husbands and single women. Moreover, life insurance is mainly purchased on men's lives. Our model, which takes Social Security rules seriously, generates wealth and retirement outcomes that are more consistent with the data, in contrast to earlier and less realistic models.

This paper documents the existence of a CEO investment cycle, in which disinvestment decreases over a CEO's tenure, while investment increases, leading to "cyclical" firm growth in assets and employment. The estimated variation in investment rate over the CEO investment cycle is of the same order of magnitude as the differences caused by business cycles or financial constraints. Results from a number of tests generally support the view that the investment cycle is caused by agency problems, leading to increasing investment quantity and decreasing investment quality over time as the CEO gains more control over his board.

We show how optimal household decisions regarding work, retirement, saving, portfolio allocations, and life insurance are shaped by the complex financial options embedded in U.S. Social Security rules and uncertain family transitions. Our life cycle model predicts sharp consumption drops on retirement, an age-62 peak in claiming rates, and earlier claiming by wives versus husbands and single women. Moreover, life insurance is mainly purchased on men's lives. Our model, which takes Social Security rules seriously, generates wealth and retirement outcomes that are more consistent with the data, in contrast to earlier and less realistic models.

This paper documents the existence of a CEO investment cycle, in which disinvestment decreases over a CEO's tenure, while investment increases, leading to “cyclical” firm growth in assets and employment. The estimated variation in investment rate over the CEO investment cycle is of the same order of magnitude as the differences caused by business cycles or financial constraints. Results from a number of tests generally support the view that the investment cycle is caused by agency problems, leading to increasing investment quantity and decreasing investment quality over time as the CEO gains more control over his board. Received February 17, 2015; accepted October 1, 2015 by Editor David Denis.