We study how Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) affect firms’ engagement with shareholders. Our analyses exploit a quasi-natural experiment using say-on-pay voting outcomes near a threshold that triggers ISS to review engagement activities. Firms receiving ISS treatment exhibit swift and substantive increases in extensive and intensive margins of engagement, especially when their boards have higher agency conflicts and directors are more likely to lose voting support from ISS. Increases in engagement persist over time, and shareholders appear to value the increased engagement. Collectively, we shed light on an unexplored channel through which ISS positively influences firms’ governance and information environments.

We estimate the effect of carbon pricing policy on bank credit to greenhouse-gas-emitting firms. Our analyses exploit the geographic restrictions inherent in California’s cap-and-trade bill and a discontinuity in the embedded free permit threshold of the federal Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill. Affected high emission firms face shorter loan maturities, lower access to permanent forms of bank financing, higher interest rates, and higher participation of shadow banks in their lending syndicates. These effects are concentrated among private firms, while credit terms of public firms are largely unaffected. Overall, we show that banks respond quickly to realizations of transition risk.

Amid an aging population and a growing role for private equity (PE) in the care of older adults, this paper studies how PE ownership affects U.S. nursing homes using patient-level Medicare data. We show that PE ownership leads to a patient cohort with lower health risk. However, after instrumenting for the patient-nursing home match, we find that PE ownership increases mortality by 11%. Declines in measures of patient well-being, nurse staffing, and compliance with care standards help to explain the mortality effect. Overall, we conclude that PE has nuanced effects with adverse outcomes for a subset of patients.