The return premium associated with the Amihud (2002) measure is generally considered a liquidity premium that compensates for price impact. We find that the pricing of the Amihud measure is not attributable to the construction of the return-to-volume ratio intended to capture price impact, but is driven by the trading volume component. Additionally, the high-frequency price impact and spread benchmarks are priced only in January and do not explain the pricing of the trading volume component of the Amihud measure. Additional analyses suggest that the volume effect on stock return is likely caused by mispricing, not by compensation for illiquidity.

[This paper examines the relationship between default probability and stock returns. Using the Expected Default Frequency (EDF) of Moody' s KMV, we document that higher default probabilities are not associated with higher expected stock returns. Within a model of bargaining between equity holders and debt holders in default, we show that the relationship between default probability and equity return is (i) upward sloping for firms where shareholders can extract little benefit from renegotiation (low "shareholder advantage") and (ii) humped and downward sloping for firms with high shareholder advantage. This dichotomy implies that distressed firms with stronger shareholder advantage should exhibit lower expected returns in the cross section. Our empirical evidence, based on several proxies for shareholder advantage, is consistent with the model's predictions.]

[Institutions often have access to corporate inside information through their connections, but relatively little is known about the extent to which they exploit their informational advantage through short-term trading. We employ broker-level trading data to systematically examine possible cases of connected trading. Despite examining the issue from multiple angles, we are unable to find much evidence to support that investment bank clients take advantage of connections through takeover advising, IPO and SEO underwriting, or lending relationships. In contrast to recent academic literature and popular press, our findings suggest that institutional investors are reluctant to use inside information in traceable manners.]

The return premium associated with the Amihud (2002) measure is generally considered a liquidity premium that compensates for price impact. We find that the pricing of the Amihud measure is not attributable to the construction of the return-to-volume ratio intended to capture price impact, but is driven by the trading volume component. Additionally, the high-frequency price impact and spread benchmarks are priced only in January and do not explain the pricing of the trading volume component of the Amihud measure. Additional analyses suggest that the volume effect on stock return is likely caused by mispricing, not by compensation for illiquidity. Received September 20, 2014; editorial decision April 16, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

Institutions often have access to corporate inside information through their connections, but relatively little is known about the extent to which they exploit their informational advantage through short-term trading. We employ broker-level trading data to systematically examine possible cases of connected trading. Despite examining the issue from multiple angles, we are unable to find much evidence to support that investment bank clients take advantage of connections through takeover advising, IPO and SEO underwriting, or lending relationships. In contrast to recent academic literature and popular press, our findings suggest that institutional investors are reluctant to use inside information in traceable manners.

This paper examines the relationship between default probability and stock returns. Using the Expected Default Frequency (EDF) of Moody's KMV, we document that higher default probabilities are not associated with higher expected stock returns. Within a model of bargaining between equity holders and debt holders in default, we show that the relationship between default probability and equity return is (i) upward sloping for firms where shareholders can extract little benefit from renegotiation (low “shareholder advantage”) and (ii) humped and downward sloping for firms with high shareholder advantage. This dichotomy implies that distressed firms with stronger shareholder advantage should exhibit lower expected returns in the cross section. Our empirical evidence, based on several proxies for shareholder advantage, is consistent with the model's predictions.