[Using a sample of municipal bond offerings, I find that "local" investment banks have substantial comparative and absolute advantages over nonlocal counterparts--locals charge lower fees and sell bonds at lower yields. Local investment banks' strongest comparative advantage is at underwriting bonds with higher credit risk and bonds not rated by rating agencies. These findings suggest that high-risk bonds and nonrated bonds are more difficult to evaluate and market, and that investment banks with a local presence are better able to assess "soft" information and place difficult bond issues.]

Institutional investors' demand for a security this quarter is positively correlated with their demand for the security last quarter. We attribute this to institutional investors following each other into and out of the same securities ("herding") and institutional investors following their own lag trades. Although institutional investors are "momentum" traders, little of their herding results from momentum trading. Moreover, institutional demand is more strongly related to lag institutional demand than lag returns. Results are most consistent with the hypothesis that institutions herd as a result of inferring information from each other's trades.

Over the past decade several countries, including the US, have introduced or redesigned legislation that confers priority in bankruptcy upon all or some bank deposits. We argue that in the presence of contracting costs such rules can increase efficiency. We first show in a private information model that a borrower can reduce overall costs of finance by letting informationally heterogeneous lenders choose between junior and senior debt. In particular, we find that debt priorities reduce socially wasteful information gathering by investors. We then argue why, particularly in banking, legal standardization of debt priorities may be superior to bilateral private arrangements.

Over the past decade several countries, including the US, have introduced or redesigned legislation that confers priority in bankruptcy upon all or some bank deposits. We argue that in the presence of contracting costs such rules can increase efficiency. We first show in a private information model that a borrower can reduce overall costs of finance by letting informationally heterogeneous lenders choose between junior and senior debt. In particular, we find that debt priorities reduce socially wasteful information gathering by investors. We then argue why, particularly in banking, legal standardization of debt priorities may be superior to bilateral private arrangements.

Examination of 41 closed-end fund intial public offerings (IPOs) during the period from January 1986 to June 1987 reveals that the mean intial day's return is not significantly different from zero in contrast to previous findings for nonfund IPOs. New funds also show significant negative after- market returns unlike other new issues. Despite the disparity between our findings and previous results, our results are consistent with existing models. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

[Examination of 41 closed-end fund initial public offerings (IPOs) during the period from January 1986 to June 1987 reveals that the mean initial day's return is not significantly different from zero in contrast to previous findings for nonfund IPOs. New funds also show significant negative after-market returns unlike other new issues. Despite the disparity between our findings and previous results, our results are consistent with existing models.]

We use the 2003 NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules for board and committee independence as a quasinatural experiment to examine the causal relations between board structure and CEO monitoring. Noncompliant firms forced to raise board independence or adopt a fully independent nominating committee significantly increased their forced CEO turnover sensitivity to performance relative to compliant firms. Nominating committee independence is important even when firms had an independent board, and the effect is stronger when the CEO is on the committee. We conclude that greater board independence and full independence of nominating committees lead to more rigorous CEO monitoring and discipline.

[We solve for a firm's optimal cash holding policy within a continuous time, contingent claims framework using dividends, short-term borrowing, and equity issues as controls assuming mean reversion of earnings. Optimal cash is non-monotone in business conditions and increasing in the level of long-term debt. The model matches closely a wide range of empirical benchmarks and predicts cash and leverage dynamics in line with the empirical literature. Firm value is quite insensitive to changes in the level of long-term debt. The model has interesting implications for asset substitution, hedging, and pecking order. Growth opportunities do not greatly affect cash holding policy.]

[This article examines the issue of cross-sectional correlation in event studies. When there is event-date clustering, we find that even relatively low cross-correlation among abnormal returns is serious in terms of over-rejecting the null hypothesis of zero average abnormal returns. We propose a new test statistic that modifies the ¿ -statistic of Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) to take into account cross-correlation and show that it performs well in competition with others, including the portfolio approach, which is less powerful than other alternatives under study. Also, our statistic is readily useable to test multiple-day cumulative abnormal returns.]

[Previous studies document that the stock returns of bond-issuing firms significantly underperform matched peers over the three to five years following issuance. We revisit this phenomenon and show that the underperformance is the result of an omitted return factor (a "bad model problem"). Debt issuers have significantly higher stock market liquidity than size and book-to-market matched counterparts, and differences in liquidity are largest for the worst-performing groups of issuers. When we additionally match on liquidity or when we include a liquidity factor in the model for expected returns, the evidence of underperformance disappears.]