[This article interprets the well-known value effect through the implications of standard Q-theory. An investment growth factor, defined as the difference in returns between low-investment stocks and high-investment stocks, contains information similar to the Fama and French (1993) value factor (HML), and can explain the value effect about as well as HML. In the cross-section, portfolios of firms with low investment growth rates (IGRs) or low investment-to-capital ratios have significantly higher average returns than those with high IGRs or high investment-to-capital ratios. The value effect largely disappears after controlling for investment, and the investment effect is robust against controls for the marginal product of capital. These results are consistent with the predictions of a standard Q-theory model with a stochastic discount factor.]

This article interprets the well-known value effect through the implications of standard Q-theory. An investment growth factor, defined as the difference in returns between low-investment stocks and high-investment stocks, contains information similar to the Fama and French (1993) value factor (HML), and can explain the value effect about as well as HML. In the cross-section, portfolios of firms with low investment growth rates (IGRs) or low investment-to-capital ratios have significantly higher average returns than those with high IGRs or high investment-to-capital ratios. The value effect largely disappears after controlling for investment, and the investment effect is robust against controls for the marginal product of capital. These results are consistent with the predictions of a standard Q-theory model with a stochastic discount factor. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

Economists have long recognized that investors care differently about downside losses versus upside gains. Agents who place greater weight on downside risk demand additional compensation for holding stocks with high sensitivities to downside market movements. We show that the cross section of stock returns reflects a downside risk premium of approximately 6% per annum. Stocks that covary strongly with the market during market declines have high average returns. The reward for beasring downside risk is not simply compensation for regular market beta, nor is it explained by coskewness or liquidity risk, or by size, value, and momentum characteristics.

Economists have long recognized that investors care differently about downside losses versus upside gains. Agents who place greater weight on downside risk demand additional compensation for holding stocks with high sensitivities to downside market movements. We show that the cross section of stock returns reflects a downside risk premium of approximately 6% per annum. Stocks that covary strongly with the market during market declines have high average returns. The reward for beasring downside risk is not simply compensation for regular market beta, nor is it explained by coskewness or liquidity risk, or by size, value, and momentum characteristics.