Olecranon apophyseal fractures in children are uncommon. The bulk of these injuries are nondisplaced and therefore can be treated nonoperatively. Few published reports of children with displaced fractures of the olecranon apophysis exist, and the large majority of reports describe children with osteogenesis imperfecta. We report our experience with the case of an 11-year-old, healthy, male patient without osteogenesis imperfecta who sustained a displaced olecranon apophyseal fracture during a fall.
We use a formal value‐based model to study how frictions—incomplete linkages in the industry value chain that keep some parties from meeting and transacting—affect value creation and value capture. Frictions arise from search and switching costs and moderate the intensity of industry rivalry and the efficiency of the market. We find that firms with a competitive advantage prefer industries with less, but not zero, frictions. We show that rivalry interacts nontrivially with other competitive forces to affect industry attractiveness. Firm heterogeneity emerges naturally when we introduce resource development. Heterogeneity falls with frictions, but the sustainability of competitive advantage increases. Overall, we show that introducing frictions makes value‐based models very effective at integrating analyses at the industry, firm, and resource levels.
Many strategic investments require firms to make upfront outlays to generate profits at a later date. When firms have limited access to external capital, they have to rely on internally generated funds for these investments. In this case, their strategic investments are constrained by cash flow. I predict that by geographically diversifying sales (i.e., exporting), firms can relax this constraint because exporting signals more stable expected cash flows and firm quality, which can increase external capital providers' willingness to fund investments. Examining a representative sample of Spanish manufacturers from 1990 to 1998, I find support that exporting mitigates investment liquidity constraints allowing firms to make strategic investments they would not otherwise be able to make. This highlights how diversification can be a strategy to create and maintain competitive advantage.
We examine the performance implications of selecting alternate modes of governance in interorganizational alliance relationships. While managers can choose from a range of modes to govern alliances, prior empirical evidence offers limited guidance on the performance impact of this choice. We use an agent‐based simulation of interfirm decision making to complement empirical studies in this area. Our results point to a complex interplay between interdependencies, governance structures, and firms' search capabilities. Different patterns of interdependence create varying needs with respect to coordination and exploration, while at the same time different governance modes, coupled with organizational search capabilities, supply varying degrees of these factors. Firm performance in an alliance relationship improves when the needs and supplies of coordination and exploration are matched. We find situations in which stronger organizational search capabilities can backfire, leading to lower exploration within the alliance relationship, and hence to lower firm performance. Moreover, we show that for higher levels of interdependence, coordination can become more critical for firm performance than exploration: unless it is tied to coordination, exploration can be ineffective in alliance settings.
This study extends work on independent directors to examine the influence of their human capital and social capital on investor reactions to the board's CEO selection decision. We predict that human capital, as represented by the board's CEO experience and industry experience, and social capital, as represented by directors' co‐working experience on the board and external directorship ties to other corporate boards, will influence the stock market reactions to new CEO appointments. In a sample of 208 new CEO appointment events in U.S. manufacturing firms between 1999 and 2003, we found that the stock market reacted favorably to the appointments made by boards with higher levels of human and social capital. We also found that the effect of internal social capital was stronger when the new CEO was an insider rather than an outsider. The implications of the results for director selection and CEO succession are discussed.
Accepted practices for survey research in medium and large firms in developed economies are well established. However, as scholars explore fine‐grained phenomena in nontraditional contexts, sampling, survey design, and administration tasks may need adjusting. Through three case studies and an analysis of a decade of published work, we find that sample frame creation and survey administration require the greatest degree of adaptation, while survey instrument creation most closely follows established practices. We recommend using context‐specific sampling frames and administration techniques, though established survey instruments and scales may be used. The conclusions highlight the importance of overlaying unique adaptations onto established practices to achieve acceptable response rates, obtain accurate and robust data, and provide the basis for subsequent meaningful analysis.
This paper contributes to multiple agency theory by examining how the compensation schemes awarded to outside directors and the CEO jointly affect firm‐level risk taking. Using data of the S&P 1500 firms from 1997 to 2006, we find support for earlier arguments that providing the CEO, the outside directors, or both with stock options increases risk taking. More importantly, we find that compensating outside directors with stock options has significantly stronger effects than CEO stock options. Finally, contrary to what one would expect, we find that these effects are mutually substituting; that is, if both the outside directors and the CEO are provided with stock option compensation, outside directors' incentives weaken the effect of the CEO's incentives on firms' risk taking.
Strategy scholars have argued that capabilities can influence firm performance through a variety of means and mechanisms. However, the role of capabilities and their proposed contributions have been narrowly theorized and insufficiently tested. We contribute to resolving these issues by considering the conditions under which ordinary and dynamic capabilities contribute to higher relative firm performance. We do so by examining the positive and negative contributions of capabilities to relative firm performance as well as the effects of environmental dynamism and the degree of capability heterogeneity. We utilize measures of relative firm performance at both the process and firm level within a sample of Chilean firms, which due to a dynamic environment allows for a clearer link between the environment and the use of capabilities. We find that environmental dynamism negatively affects the contribution of ordinary capabilities and positively affects the contribution of dynamic capabilities to relative firm performance. Further, heterogeneity strengthens the contribution of dynamic capabilities to relative firm performance, but is less important for ordinary capabilities. Interestingly, we find support for the direct effects of capabilities to be stronger with a process‐level performance measure, whereas the influences of environmental dynamism and heterogeneity are stronger with a firm‐level measure.
To answer the question of when are assets complementary, we investigate specific resource combinations along the value chain, focusing on two mechanisms that are central to combining resources for innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: recruitment and retention of star scientists, and 2) engagement in strategic alliances. We propose that resource combinations that focus on the same parts of the value chain are substitutes due to knowledge redundancies. Conversely, we hypothesize that resource combinations that link different parts of the value chain are complements due to integration of nonredundant knowledge. To test these hypotheses, we empirically track the innovative performance of 108 global pharmaceutical firms over three decades (1974–2003).
In this paper we use novel survey data on 1,790 Australian inventions to estimate the average patent premium, which provides an important benchmark for technology managers and IP professionals. Our data are drawn from the Australian Inventor Survey, which was sent to all Australian applicants who submitted a patent application to the Australian Patent Office from 1986 to 2005. Since some patent applications were unsuccessful, we have information about the private value of both patented and unpatented inventions. Our results suggest that the presence of a patent increases the returns to an invention by around 40 to 50 percent regardless of how we define ‘value.’