Knowledge that Transforms

Research Summary This paper investigates the corporate parenting advantage, the extent to which corporate parents improve the performance of their subsidiaries. Despite the importance of this concept for corporate strategy, researchers have yet to quantify it empirically. I measure the corporate parenting advantage by comparing the performance of utilities that were legally classified into one of two types of holding companies: regulated holding companies, which faced limits on their ability to parent, and exempt holding companies, which did not. I find that observationally similar utilities that were owned by exempt holding companies outperform utilities that were owned by regulated holding companies, and that this performance differential attenuates once the legal restrictions on parenting were lifted. These results provide the first large‐scale empirical evidence of the corporate parenting advantage. Managerial Summary By how much do corporate parents improve the performance of their subsidiaries? Despite the importance of this question of the “corporate parenting advantage,” it does not yet have a clear answer. In this paper, I measure the corporate parenting advantage by comparing the performance of utilities that were legally grouped into one of two types of holding companies: regulated holding companies, which faced limits on their ability to parent, and exempt holding companies, which did not. I find that comparable utilities that were owned by regulated holding companies have lower return on assets than utilities that were owned by exempt holding companies, and that this performance difference disappears once the legal restrictions on parenting were lifted. These results provide evidence of the corporate parenting advantage.

Research Summary The market for acquiring technology companies is rife with information frictions. Although such frictions can stifle trading activity, they also provide room for strategic gain. We investigate this dual role of information frictions by exploiting an institutional reform that releases technological information to the public domain. Leveraging cross‐sectoral variation in the magnitude of disclosure, we find an increase in acquisition activity and in the technological distance between matched pairings. In line with predictions from strategic factor market theory, however, we also find a disproportionate decline in acquirer returns on average. Our findings suggest that information disclosed through the reform‐facilitated exchange in the takeover market yet had a leveling effect on the returns to acquirers. Managerial Summary Firms acquire technology‐oriented companies to complement internal R&D projects and accelerate the innovation process. But identifying promising targets is challenging, not least due to the lack of information about the value of acquired technologies. This study investigates an information shock and tests its effects on the market for acquiring technology‐intensive companies. We find that greater disclosure of technological information to the public domain intensifies trading activity and allows acquirers to better identify and assess targets outside their core technological domains. But it also reduces the returns to acquirers. In combination, our findings illuminate a dual role of information disclosure: placing more information into the public domain may facilitate trade in corporate takeover markets while simultaneously restricting acquirer opportunities for strategic gain.

Research Summary Whereas prior innovation and strategy literature studied how attentional and search dynamics influence the creation of inventions, we examine how these same processes affect the impact of inventions after their creation. We theorize that inventions classified in “high‐contrast” technological categories garner more attention by potential users and, hence, accrue more citations than otherwise‐equivalent inventions classified in “low‐contrast” categories. We test this hypothesis via three studies. First, we estimate citation‐count models among all USPTO patents granted between 1975 and 2010. Second, we conduct a twin patents test comparing inventions patented both at the USPTO and at the EPO. Third, we examine minute‐by‐minute search logs from a sample of USPTO examiners. These studies support our hypothesis and extend current understandings of attentional and search dynamics in the innovation process. Managerial Summary Patents that receive more citations tend to have greater economic value and greater impact on future technological developments. We show that the number of citations a patent receives does not only depend on its inherent technological value, but also on seemingly neutral classification decisions affecting the likelihood that it will be noticed by potential future users. We test our arguments via three related studies. Our results demonstrate that inventions classified in “high‐contrast” technology classes garner considerably more attention—and hence citations—than twin‐inventions classified in “low‐contrast” classes. The key managerial implication is that, whenever feasible, nudging an invention towards higher‐contrast classes will increase its future worth. The key policy implication is that maximizing categorical contrast across technology classes will help users identify relevant prior patents.

Research Summary We introduce an innovative method of identifying the risk‐management benefit of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Option‐implied volatility captures the financial markets' expectations of a firm's future risk, so if CSR is related to risk‐management benefits, it should be related to lower implied volatility. We find that CSR is associated with low implied volatility and that CSR's insurance benefit is larger for firms that have high leverage, growth opportunities, or uncertainty. However, CSR as an insurance mechanism is less beneficial to firms that are already sound (i.e., those that have high market value and good accounting and financial performance). The results reveal the “terms” of a CSR‐as‐insurance contract, confirm that CSR creates risk‐management benefits, and suggest that financial markets price this benefit in economically significant ways. Managerial Summary We suggest a practical technique of evaluating a firm's CSR policy. For example, a manager would simply check how a firm's implied volatility changes as its CSR policy changes. Or, the manager can compare a firm's and its comparable firms' implied volatilities to knowhow financial markets perceive the firm's CSR differently. Option implied volatilities could guide a firm to identify proper CSR‐based risk‐management policies because they have the advantage of being ex ante, real‐time, and objectively observable market‐pricing information in identifying the risk‐management benefit of CSR. Our results also illustrate how a financial expert can use the valuable insight of strategic management literature about CSR‐as‐insurance to price derivative contracts.

Research Summary Scholars have long recognized the theoretical and practical implications of firm‐specific human capital . However, we highlight that firm‐specific incentives (i.e., worker incentives that provide more utility to workers in the focal firm than similar incentives available at other employers) provide an important pathway to competitive advantages that has not been comprehensively examined in the extant organizational research. We address this gap by (a) defining firm‐specific incentives and showing why they are different from incentive conceptualizations and typologies in the extant literature, (b) articulating potential origins of firm‐specific incentives, and (c) formally proposing the conditions under which firm‐specific incentives facilitate human capital‐based competitive advantages. In so doing, we develop a cohesive theoretical framework of incentive‐based competitive advantage that integrates across multiple literatures. Managerial Summary Just as companies differentiate their products by creating unique value for customers, they also create unique value for their employees. Some companies do this by offering employee incentives, perks, and benefits that are highly unique to the company and difficult for other companies to imitate. These unique incentives, perks, and benefits can help these companies to attract, motivate, and retain top talent at a financial discount and, accordingly, can help these companies realize competitive advantages over their rivals.

Research summary Combining insights from research on firm‐level stakeholders with the well‐established micro literature on social categorization, we develop and test a theory regarding the relative survivorship of female‐owned and male‐owned businesses. The theory is based on proportional representation within geographic areas, defined as each area's female‐owned proprietorship count divided by its total proprietorship count. Analyzing survivorship of over one million proprietorships, we find a robust positive relationship between proportional representation and survival. We then examine effects of local stakeholders such as banks, customers, and network opportunities, in combination with proportional representation. Our research suggests that the effects of female proportional representation are more pervasive than previously considered, influenced by communities of business stakeholders, and, in some cases, leveling the playing field for female entrepreneurs. Managerial summary We analyzed relative survival duration of one million female‐ and male‐owned proprietorship businesses. We argued that a higher proportional representation of female business owners among all owners in a geographical area would combat negative stereotypes about women's business competence. We found that female‐owned businesses survived relatively longer than their male‐owned counterparts in areas with substantial proportional representation of female owners and that the relative benefits for women were magnified in the presence of local banks (which provide capital) as well as in customer‐rich and network‐rich areas. Business ownership has been proposed to be a “great equalizer” for women frustrated by the glass ceilings of corporate employment. We find this is true, but only in areas with a high proportional representation of women among business owners.

Research Summary Features of the institutional environment influence the performance of firms. In this research, I examine how one aspect of the institutional environment, competition between parties within legislatures, relates to young firm mortality. I argue that higher legislative competition provides legislators with more power to reward favored interests and thus contributes to a competitive environment that benefits well‐connected incumbents and imposes negative consequences on young firms. Using data on state legislature composition in the United States and both an ordinary least squares and instrumental variables empirical strategy, I find that legislative competition has a positive relationship with young firm mortality and this relationship is partially mediated by incentives that favor incumbents. In doing so, I highlight that political competition can have negative consequences for some firms. Managerial Summary In this research, I examine how competition between parties within state legislatures affects the survival of young firms. I argue that higher interparty competition provides legislators with greater bargaining power to obtain policy rewards for favored constituents and that this can lead to a competitive environment that favors well‐connected incumbent firms and disadvantages younger firms. I find that interparty legislative competition has a positive relationship with young firm mortality and that this relationship is partially accounted for by the use of subsidies and incentives that favor incumbents. Through this research, I show that political competition may be harmful to some firms and highlight the importance of government institutions on firms and markets.

Research Summary Extant research rarely explores the relationship between executive compensation and chief executive officer (CEO) succession planning, despite practitioner claims that executive pay disparities indicate succession planning (in)effectiveness. Leveraging signaling theory, we use 830 succession events from 2010 to 2017 to show that pay disparity between the CEO and the highest paid non‐CEO executive is positively related to the likelihood of outside CEO succession. Thus, boards need to be aware of the implications of possible unintentional signals sent via executive compensation decisions. We do not find evidence of an interactive effect when compensation and CEO succession are co‐managed using linking pin directors—directors with compensation and CEO succession responsibilities—but supplemental analyses suggest a positive main effect of linking pin directors on the likelihood of inside CEO succession. Managerial Summary Powerful watchdog agencies assert that high pay differences between a firm's CEO and its next highest paid executive ( CEO–HPE pay disparity ) indicate succession planning challenges. This assertion has profound implications for stakeholders, but evidence supporting it is unclear. Our study examines the relationship between CEO–HPE pay disparity and the board's choice of an outside CEO, an indicator of ineffective succession planning. We find evidence that higher pay disparity signals an increased likelihood of choosing an outside CEO successor. We also find that boards who co‐manage compensation and succession may be more likely to hire an inside CEO successor. Our findings suggest that boards need to understand how compensation decisions may be inadvertently signaling future CEO succession choices.

Research Summary This article analyzes the relationship between sales growth and variance for diversified firms. Distinguishing product niches linked by scale free versus non‐scale free resources, this study predicts that the more a firm diversifies leveraging on a non‐scale free resource, the more likely its sales growth and variance are positively correlated. However, this relationship is negatively moderated by the presence of a scale‐free resource such that the presence of scale‐free resources of high value implies a negative correlation. These theoretical intuitions are consistent with data from 2008 to 2013, reflecting firm sales growth rates in five industries spanning 45 product niches in seven EU countries and the United Kingdom. These industries prioritize shelf space as a non‐scale free resource, and brand as a scale free resource. Managerial Summary Diversifiers may base their value creation either in pursuing synergies or in exploiting the benefits derived by internal resource redeployment across products or across industries. Here, we highlight the different managerial implications on risk/performance structure derived from diversification based on resource redeployment compared to diversified companies exploiting synergies. Can the disparity of sales growth between products of the same firm's portfolio be good for the corporate performance? Here, we show that diversification based on resource redeployment goes hand in hand with a positive relation between overall firm growth and variance of results within the same firm. On the contrary, firm diversification based on synergies implies a negative relationship between within firm disparity and overall firm growth.

Research summary This study analyzes whether and how the disruption of top management turnovers can affect not only turnover firms but also their intra‐industry rivals. It thus adds to the literature on both leader life cycles and competitive dynamics. Using a U.S. sample of 857 CEO turnovers, we find a period of relative stagnation for announcing companies following top management turnovers. We also find that intra‐industry rivals can use this period to their advantage. Semi‐structured interviews with seasoned CEOs, CFOs, and a board member from large publicly listed firms, as well as an extensive news search, support this notion. Intra‐industry rivals gain a competitive advantage that can result in positive abnormal stock returns and accounting performance. The intra‐industry outperformance is greater for forced turnovers. Managerial summary The departure of a company's CEO, forced or not, is usually a disruptive event for a company, as the successor must adapt to the new environment before undertaking any major strategic changes. Rivals can seize an opportunity during the transition period of the announcing company because they remain fully operational. They can thus actively exploit the relative inability of turnover companies to react by, for example, launching sales initiatives or increasing M&A activity. This interpretation is supported by internal and external evidence. Investors on average also recognize this situation, and stock prices react accordingly.