Competitive predictions regarding the relationships between: (a) monitoring and agent tenure, and (b) performance-contingent compensation are derived from agency theory and collaborative perspectives. These results are tested in a within-industry (trucking) sample and in a cross-industry sample. The results partially support both perspectives, particularly with respect to monitoring and agent tenure. Implications of the results for theory and practice are discussed.
We revisit the relationship between two theoretical perspectives on joint ventures—the asymmetric information view and the indigestibility view. The former emphasizes the ex ante valuation challenges firms confront in combining resources, while the latter attends to ex post transaction costs arising from the extraction and integration of indivisible resources. We argue that these two views are complementary, rather than competing, in explaining the usefulness of joint ventures. We also suggest that the perspectives are overlapping inasmuch as resource indivisibility contributes to asymmetric information.
We investigate whether firms learn to manage interfirm alliances as experience accumulates. We use contract-specific experience measures in a data set of over 2000 joint ventures and licensing agreements, and value creation measures derived from the abnormal stock returns surrounding alliance announcements. Learning effects are identified from the effects of unobserved heterogeneity in alliance capabilities. We find evidence of large learning effects in managing joint ventures, but no such evidence for licensing contracts. The effects of learning on value creation are strongest for research joint ventures, and weakest for marketing joint ventures. These results are consistent with the view that learning effects are more important in situations characterized by greater contractual ambiguity.
We analyze the longevity of foreign entrants explicitly considering two possible ways of exit: firm closure and capital divestiture. We find that entry and post-entry strategies affect the longevity of firms and of foreign equity holdings, but in different manners. While the ownership arrangements and organizational structure affect the likelihood of divestment, they exert no significant effect upon closure. The entry mode exerts opposite effects on the two modes of exit, greenfield entrants being more likely to shutdown, but less likely to be divested. Only human capital affects closure and divestment in the same manner. Firms with large endowments of human capital are less likely to exit, irrespective of the exit mode considered.
This paper develops a model for assessing options in joint ventures. The model is used specifically to examine the option to acquire or divest a joint venture, both in the case where the acquisition/divestiture price is specified ex ante in the initial contract and in the case where the price is to be negotiated ex post. The results derived from the model show how the value of the option and each partner's pay-off from the venture vary with the structure of the option and how the presence of the option may affect the structuring of the joint venture. The main theoretical insights are stated in 12 potentially testable propositions, and possible ways to operationalize some of the propositions for empirical testing are also explored.
Four entrants into the early semiconductor industry—Sprague Electric, Motorola, Shockley Semiconductor Laboratories, and Fairchild Semiconductor—displayed remarkably different performance and behavior. Case studies of the firms demonstrate that the key differences stemmed from the firms' technological goals and activities and their abilities to integrate R&D and manufacturing. These differences can in turn be related to the firms' origins and their different conditions upon entry into the semiconductor industry, which had lasting effects due to constraints on change. While the cases offer limited prescriptions for management, they underscore the importance of technological diversity for an industry's rate of technical advance and, in turn, public policies that support such diversity.
Firms often lose their competitive advantage when a technological change renders their existing capabilities obsolete. An important question that has received little or no attention is, what happens to these firms’ competitive advantage when the technological change instead renders obsolete the capabilities of their co-opetitors—the suppliers, customers, and complementors whose very success may underpin that of the firm and with whom it must collaborate and compete. This paper explores the effects on a firm of the impact of a technological change on its co-opetitors. It argues that a firm’s post-technological change performance decreases with the extent to which the technological change renders co-opetitors’ capabilities obsolete. It uses detailed data on the adoption of RISC (Reduced Instruction Set Computer) technology by computer workstation makers to demonstrate the need to view resources as residing in a network and not in the firm alone.
This paper investigates the outcomes and durations of strategic alliances among competing firms, using alliance outcomes as indicators of learning by partner firms. We show that alliance outcomes vary systematically across link and scale alliances. Link alliances are interfirm partnerships to which partners contribute different capabilities, while scale alliances are partnerships to which partners contribute similar capabilities. We find that partners are more likely to reorganize or take over link alliances than scale alliances. By contrast, scale alliances are more likely to continue without material changes. The two types of alliances are equally likely to shut down, at similar ages. These results support the view that link alliances lead to greater levels of learning and capability acquisition between the partners than do scale alliances.
This paper focuses on dynamic capabilities and, more generally, the resource-based view of the firm. We argue that dynamic capabilities are a set of specific and identifiable processes such as product development, strategic decision making, and alliancing. They are neither vague nor tautological. Although dynamic capabilities are idiosyncratic in their details and path dependent in their emergence, they have significant commonalities across firms (popularly termed ‘best practice’). This suggests that they are more homogeneous, fungible, equifinal, and substitutable than is usually assumed. In moderately dynamic markets, dynamic capabilities resemble the traditional conception of routines. They are detailed, analytic, stable processes with predictable outcomes. In contrast, in high-velocity markets, they are simple, highly experiential and fragile processes with unpredictable outcomes. Finally, well-known learning mechanisms guide the evolution of dynamic capabilities. In moderately dynamic markets, the evolutionary emphasis is on variation. In high-velocity markets, it is on selection. At the level of RBV, we conclude that traditional RBV misidentifies the locus of long-term competitive advantage in dynamic markets, overemphasizes the strategic logic of leverage, and reaches a boundary condition in high-velocity markets.
Disappointed by the lack of consistent and robust findings, scholars suspect that the problems may be related to our research methods and have frequently called for longitudinal, clinical, and psychometric studies of succession. This article compares the findings from one such study with representative studies in the literature. Examining the operationalization of key variables used to study succession antecedents, processes, and organizational consequences, it reveals possible reasons for the disappointing results and suggests ways of strengthening those operationalizations. In addition to suggesting refinements in the measurement of performance, the comparative exercise demonstrates why current proxies for personality and power may create difficulty. It concludes that both field and large-sample research stand to benefit from a closer collaboration.