Knowledge that Transforms

[Research summary: While research has shown that good stakeholder relations increase the value of a firm, less is known about how specific types of stakeholder governance affect firm value. We examine the value of one such governance mechanism—community benefits agreements (CBAs) signed by firms and local communities—intended to minimize social conflict that disrupts access to valuable resources. We argue that shareholders evaluate more positively CBAs with local communities with strong property rights and histories of institutional action and extra-institutional mobilization because these communities are more likely to cause costly disruptions and delays for a firm. We evaluate these arguments by analyzing the cumulative abnormal returns associated with the unexpected announcement of 148 CBAs signed between mining companies and local indigenous communities in Canada. Managerial summary:With firms across many industries facing escalating costs associated with social conflict, new tools are emerging to help firms mitigate these risks by seeking the support of the local communities in which they operate. Community benefits agreements (CBAs) are contracts in which a community provides consent for a new investment in return for tangible benefits, such as local hiring and revenue sharing. We argue that although CBAs are costly for the firm, they are particularly valuable when communities can cause costly disruptions and delays for a firm. Our study of investor reactions to the announcement of 148 CBAs signed between mining companies and local indigenous communities in Canada shows that investors value more CBAs signed with communities with strong property rights and histories of protest.]

[Research summary: In this study we examine how an emerging market firm’s inward international activities (“inward activities”) are related to its outward international activities (“outward activities”) by focusing on the role of the firm’s gain from its inward activities. On the one hand, drawing upon the organizational learning perspective, we propose that a firm’s gain from inward activities may facilitate its outward activities through improving its resource fungibility. On the other hand, we draw upon the prospect theory to propose that a firm’s gain from inward activities may hinder its outward activities by discouraging the firm’s top managers from taking risks that are inherent in outward activities. With detailed data from a sample of manufacturing firms in China, we find empirical support for both lines of arguments. Managerial summary:Are emerging market firms with higher inward gain more likely to engage in outward internationalization activities? We argue that it depends upon how a firm uses its gain from inward activities. If the firm can improve its resource fungibility (particularly organizational resource fungibility) from its inward gain, it is more likely to engage in outward activities. If the firm cannot improve its resource fungiblity, the answer is no. Our findings suggest that for emerging market firms, internationalization is not just a path toward new markets; instead, it reflects how these firms exploit and explore what they have learned from their interactions with foreign firms at home in foreign markets. Therefore, managers must think more strategically on developing (organizational) resource fungibility from their inward activities.]

[Research summary: This article examines the role of competitive shocks in creating opportunities for new firm foundings. I argue that the sudden dissolution of rival firms may release resources that create opportunities for firm formation, particularly among employees facing impediments to capturing value in their current organizations. Analyzing microdata from the legal services industry, I use unexpected deaths of solo-practicing attorneys as quasi-exogenous sources of rival dissolution. Results indicate that these shocks increase the odds of founding by about 30%, with stronger effects among attorneys with weaker social connections or higher competition for promotion. The article thus highlights the role that founders play in reallocating dissolved rivals’ resources while demonstrating that founding may be an important outlet for “blocked” employees to capture value from opportunities. Managerial summary:This article finds that the shutdown and dissolution of a rival organization may spur employees to found new firms. As a consequence, managers may find it valuable to pay attention to employees’ turnover intentions following the dissolution of a rival. Findings suggest that employees who are having trouble advancing in the firm may be the most likely to found a new organization when a rival dissolves, so managers may want to focus retention efforts on these individuals. To the extent that managers wish to capture customers, employees, and other resources that were formerly attached to a dissolved rival, managers may wish to be aware that they could be in competition with their own employees for these resources and opportunities.]

[Research summary: This study proposes that CEOs may undertake intensive acquisition activities to increase their social recognition and status after witnessing their competitors’ winning CEO awards. Using a sample of U.S. S&P 1,500 firm CEOs, we find that CEOs engage in more intensive acquisition activities in the period after their competitors won CEO awards (i.e., postaward period), compared to the preaward period. Moreover, this effect is stronger when focal CEOs themselves had a high likelihood of winning CEO awards. Our findings also show that acquisitions by focal CEO firms in the postaward period realize lower announcement returns compared to acquisitions by the same CEOs in the preaward period. Managerial summary: Each year a few CEOs receive CEO awards from business media and CEOs who receive such awards become instant celebrities, that is, superstar CEOs. This study explores how superstar CEOs’ competitors react to not winning CEO awards. We find that superstar CEOs’ competitors undertake more intensive acquisition activities in the postaward period compared to the preaward period. This is particularly true for competitors who were close, yet did not win CEO awards. In addition, acquisitions by superstar CEOs’ competitors are associated with lower announcement returns in the postaward compared to the preaward period. These findings collectively indicate that acquisitions may be used as a channel for superstar CEOs’ competitors to elevate their own social status, but at a cost to shareholders.]

Research summary: We examine whether top managers engage in misconduct, such as illegal insider trading, illegal stock option backdating, bribery, and financial manipulation, in response to the presence, or absence, of governance provisions that impose constitutional constraints on shareholder power. Within the agency framework, shareholders typically oppose governance provisions that limit their power because those provisions could undermine shareholder influence and increase agency costs. However, when shareholders support provisions that constrain their power, managers could respond positively by refraining from self‐interested behavior in the form of managerial misconduct. We find this to be especially true in industries where these governance provisions are particularly relevant to managers and in scenarios where CEOs do not also serve as board chair . Managerial summary: In recent years, shareholders have become central to organizations and the managers who run them. Shareholders and managers establish a rapport with one another, such that the behavior of one affects the behavior of the other. One of the most consequential decisions shareholders can make pertains to the reach of their influence: They can choose to impose strict governance over firms they own or they can allow for constitutional constraints that limit shareholder power. When they act in the mutual interest of managers by allowing such constraints, we find that managers respond in kind by refraining from bad behavior, such as illegal stock options backdating, insider trading, and financial manipulation. This is especially true in industries and scenarios in which shareholder pressure is most relevant to managers .

Research summary : When faced with a new technological paradigm, incumbent firms can opt for internal development and/or external sourcing to obtain the necessary new knowledge. We explain how the effectiveness of external knowledge sourcing depends on the properties of internal knowledge production. We apply a social network lens to delineate interpersonal, intra‐firm knowledge networks and capture the emergence of two important firm‐level properties: the incumbent's internal potential for knowledge recombination and the level of knowledge coordination costs. We rely on firm‐level internal knowledge networks to dynamically track the emergence of these properties across 106 global pharmaceutical companies over a 25‐year time period. We find that a firm's success in developing knowledge in a new technological paradigm using external knowledge sourcing is contingent on these internal knowledge properties . Managerial summary : Incumbent firms in high‐tech industries often face competence‐destroying technological change. In their effort to adapt and develop new knowledge in a novel paradigm, incumbent firms have several corporate strategy options available to them: internal knowledge development and a wide array of external knowledge sourcing strategies, including alliances and acquisitions. In this study, we make an effort to address a critical question: How effective is external knowledge sourcing under different internal knowledge generation regimes? We find that external sourcing strategies are less effective when firms can already internally generate new knowledge or if they have high internal coordination costs. Therefore, when considering external sourcing, managers must carefully weigh the benefits of it vis‐à‐vis its commensurate costs as the benefits of external sourcing may be overstated .

[Research summary: This article explores the distribution of alliances across firms’ internal structure. Focusing on multinational companies, we examine the impact of alliance portfolio concentration—i.e., the extent to which alliances are concentrated within a limited number of geographic units—on focal firms’ performance. Relying on Knowledge-Based View (KBV) insights, we hypothesize that an increase in alliance portfolio concentration positively influences firm performance and that alliance portfolio size negatively moderates this relationship. Our empirical results enrich the emerging capability perspective on alliance portfolios, point to the relevance of conceptualizing focal firms in alliance portfolio research as polylithic entities instead of monolithic ones, and provide new insights into how firms create value by potentially recombining externally accessed knowledge. Managerial summary:In the setting of multinational companies, we examine whether alliance activities are concentrated in a limited number of subsidiaries or are highly dispersed across multiple subsidiaries. We find that, over time, firms exhibit different patterns in terms of alliance portfolio concentration. In addition, the results show that, for MNCs with a relatively small alliance portfolio, an increase in alliance portfolio concentration is positively related to their financial performance. However, when MNCs’ alliance portfolios are relatively large, the relationship between alliance portfolio concentration and firm performance becomes negative. Jointly, these findings suggest that the distribution of alliances across firms’ internal structure is an important factor in shaping potential knowledge recombination benefits from alliance portfolios.]

Research summary : A firm's strategic investments in knowledge‐based assets through research and development ( R&D ) can generate economic rents for the firm, and thus are expected to affect positively a firm's financial performance. However, weak protection of minority shareholders, weak property rights, and ineffective law enforcement can allow those rents to be appropriated disproportionately by a firm's powerful insiders such as large owners and top managers. Recent data on Chinese publicly listed firms during 2007–2012 were used to demonstrate that the expected positive relationship between knowledge assets and performance is weaker in transition economies when a firm's ownership is highly concentrated and its managers have wide discretion. Moreover, rent appropriation by insiders was shown to vary with the levels of institutional development in which a firm operates . Managerial summary : Investing in knowledge‐based intangible assets (e.g., R&D ) is an important value‐creation activity for the firm. Such value creation process can be facilitated by large shareholders and powerful managers, who can then take an advantageous position with critical insider information on these valuable intangible assets and therefore enjoy more opportunities to appropriate more value from them, leaving less value for other minority shareholders. The value distribution becomes increasingly skewed against minority shareholders when the institutional protection for them is weak. Indeed, in a large sample of Chinese publicly listed firms, we found that R&D investment becomes less positively associated with firm financial performance with the presence of large shareholders, high managerial equity, or CEO / C hairman duality, especially in Chinese provinces with weak institutional development .

[Research summary: This article examines the capability antecedents of firm entry into nascent industries. Because a firm’s technological investments in nascent industries typically occur before market entry, this study makes a distinction between firm capabilities at the time of market entry and at the time of initial investment. At the time of market entry, core technical capabilities and complementary assets influence the likelihood of entry. However, at the time of investment, a firm’s integrative capabilities as well as the initial stocks of related technical capabilities and complementary assets become critical, as they enable endogenous development of core technical capabilities and complementary assets by the time of entry. The empirical sample consists of firms involved in field experiments in agricultural biotechnology during the period 1980–2010. Managerial summary: New product commercialization in a nascent industry typically requires access to not only core technologies of the focal industry, but also supporting commercialization assets. However, firms may not possess these critical capabilities when they first invest in the industry. Instead, empirical evidence from the context of agricultural biotechnology shows that at the time of first investment, a firm’s integrative capabilities partly explain their likelihood of entry. Integrative capabilities encompass a set of practices that enable effective coordination and communication, and in turn put firms in an advantageous position to develop the needed capabilities by the time of entry.]

Research summary: Combining the concept of resource relatedness with the economic notion of sunk costs, we assess how the potential for resource redeployment affects market entry and exit by multi‐business firms. If the performance of a new business falls below expectations, a diversified firm may be able to redeploy its resources back into related businesses. In effect, relatedness reduces the sunk costs associated with a new business, which facilitates exit. This, in turn, has implications for entry: By decreasing the cost of failure, the potential for redeployment justifies the undertaking of riskier entries and greater experimentation. These dynamic benefits of relatedness are distinct from standard notions of “synergy.” To show support for this idea, we provide a mathematical model, descriptive data, and company examples . Managerial summary: The ability to redeploy resources inside the firm reduces the cost of entry “mistakes.” If a new business turns out to have poor profitability, the ability to redeploy more of its resources back into the firm's other businesses allows recycling of investment and can speed up the retreat. This reduces not only the cost of exit, but also the cost of entry. Managers should therefore be more willing to experiment and take risks in developing businesses that are more related to the firm's existing businesses, whereas if redeployment is likely to be difficult, managers should be cautious about entering. New businesses should be chosen in ways that facilitate redeployment, and managers should consider the implications of redeployment when setting the performance thresholds that justify entry and exit .