Knowledge that Transforms

[Research summary: We examine the role of firm strategy in the global effort to combat pollution. We find that U.S. plants release less toxic emissions when their parent firm imports more from low-wage countries (LWCs). Consistent with the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, goods imported by U.S. firms from LWCs are in more pollution-intensive industries. U.S. plants shift production to less pollution-intensive industries, produce less waste, and spend less on pollution abatement when their parent imports more from LWCs. The negative impact of LWC imports on emissions is stronger for U.S. plants located in counties with greater institutional pressure for environmental performance, but weaker for more-capable U.S. plants and firms. These results highlight the role of local institutions and firm capability in explaining firms’ offshoring and environmental strategies. Managerial summary:Using confidential trade, production, and pollution data of more than 8,000 firms and 18,000 plants from the U.S. Census Bureau for years 1992–2009, we find that U.S. plants release less toxic emissions when their parent firm imports more from low-wage countries (LWCs). In addition, goods imported by U.S. firms from LWCs are in more pollution-intensive industries. U.S. plants shift production to less pollution-intensive industries, produce less waste, and spend less on pollution abatement when their parent imports more from LWCs. However, not all U.S. firms choose to “offshore pollution.” U.S. plants located in counties with greater institutional pressure for environmental performance offshore more, but more-capable U.S. plants and firms offshore less.]

Research summary : Multi‐party alliances rely on partners' willingness to commit and pool their efforts in joint endeavors. However, partners face the dilemma of how much to commit to the alliance. We shed light on this issue by analyzing the relationship between partners' free‐riding—defined as their effort‐withholding—and their perceptions of alliance effectiveness and peers' collaboration. Specifically, we posit a U‐shaped relationship between partners' subjective evaluations of alliance effectiveness and their free‐riding. We also hypothesize a negative relation between partners' perceptions of the collaboration of peer organizations and their free‐riding. Results from a mixed‐method study—combining regression analysis of primary data on a major inter‐organizational research consortium and evidence from two experimental designs—support our hypotheses, bearing implications for the multi‐party alliances literature . Managerial summary : Free‐riding is a major concern in multi‐party alliances such as large research consortia, since the performance of these governance forms hinges on the joint contribution of multiple partners that often operate according to different logics (e.g., universities, firms, and government agencies). We show that, in such alliances, partners' perceptions have relevant implications for their willingness to contribute to the consortium's shared goals. Specifically, we find that partners free‐ride more—that is, contribute less—when they perceive the effectiveness of the overall alliance to be either very low or very high. Partners also gauge their commitment to the alliance on the perception of the effort of their peers—that is, other organizations similar to them. These findings provide managers of multi‐party alliances with additional levers to motivate partners to contribute fairly to such joint endeavor .

How much of the variance in firm performance can be attributed to CEOs? This question has been the focus of a long debate in management research. In a recent study, I showed that a large portion of the performance differences that are often attributed to CEOs might in fact be due to chance. In a recent article, Quigley and Graffin argue that my conclusions can be avoided if more advanced methodological approaches are applied. Here I show that this is not the case, in fact if more realistic assumptions of how chance can affect firm performance are made, the effect of CEO leadership is almost indistinguishable from the effect of chance, independent of the estimation methodology.

Research summary : D espite a number of studies highlighting the important impact C hief E xecutive O fficers ( CEOs) have on firms, several theoretical and methodological questions cloud existing findings. This study takes an alternative approach by examining how shareholders' perceptions of CEO significance have changed over time. Using an event study methodology and a sample of 240 sudden and unexpected CEO deaths, we show that absolute (unsigned) market reactions to these events in U.S. public firms have increased markedly between 1950 and 2009. Our results indicate that shareholders act in ways consistent with the belief that CEOs have become increasingly more influential in recent decades . Managerial summary : W ith C hief E xecutive O fficers ( CEOs) facing increased scrutiny and receiving ever‐increasing pay packages, substantial debate exists about their overall contribution to firm outcomes. While prior research has sought to calculate the proportion of firm outcomes attributable to the CEO , this study takes an alternative approach by using the “wisdom of the crowds” to assess how shareholders think about the importance of CEOs . Our study finds that shareholders, perhaps the most financially motivated stakeholder, view CEOs as increasingly important drivers of firm outcomes, good and bad, versus their peers from decades earlier. Notably, market reaction to the unexpected death of a CEO has increased steadily over the last six decades, highlighting the importance of succession planning and supporting, at least partially, the increased compensation given today's top executives .

Research summary : We argue that firms with greater specificity in knowledge structure need to both encourage their CEOs to stay so that they make investments with a long‐term perspective, and provide job securities to the CEOs so that they are less concerned about the risk of being dismissed. Accordingly, we found empirical evidence that specificity in firm knowledge assets is positively associated with the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation design (indicating the effort of CEO retention) and negatively associated with CEO dismissal (indicating the job securities the firm committed to CEOs). Furthermore, firm diversification was found to mitigate the effect of firm‐specific knowledge on both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal, as CEOs are more removed from the deployment of knowledge resources in diversified firms . Managerial summary : A firm's knowledge structure, that is, the extent to which its knowledge assets are firm‐specific versus general, has implications for both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal. In particular, we find that a firm with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge has the incentive to retain its CEO through the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation. Such a firm is also likely to provide job security for its CEO, leading to a lower likelihood of CEO dismissal. These arguments, however, are less likely to hold in diversified corporations as CEOs in such corporations are more removed from the deployment of knowledge assets. A key managerial implication is that CEO compensation and job security design should be made according to the nature of firm knowledge assets .

Research summary : In this paper, we theorize and empirically investigate how a long‐term orientation impacts firm value. To study this relationship, we exploit exogenous changes in executives' long‐term incentives. Specifically, we examine shareholder proposals on long‐term executive compensation that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. The passage of such “close call” proposals is akin to a random assignment of long‐term incentives and hence provides a clean causal estimate. We find that the adoption of such proposals leads to (1) an increase in firm value and operating performance—suggesting that a long‐term orientation is beneficial to companies—and (2) an increase in firms' investments in long‐term strategies such as innovation and stakeholder relationships. Overall, our results are consistent with a “time‐based” agency conflict between shareholders and managers . Managerial summary : This paper shows that corporate short‐termism is hampering business success. We show clear, causal evidence that imposing long‐term incentives on executives—in the form of long‐term executive compensation—improves business performance. Long‐term executive compensation includes restricted stocks, restricted stock options, and long‐term incentive plans. Firms that adopted shareholder resolutions on long‐term compensation experienced a significant increase in their stock price. This stock price increase foreshadowed an increase in operating profits that materialized after two years. We unpack the reasons for these improvements in performance, and find that firms that adopted these shareholder resolutions made more investments in R&D and stakeholder engagement, especially pertaining to employees and the natural environment .

Research summary : Recent research rooted in the resource‐based view of the firm suggests that resources are more likely to create value if they are effectively managed. An underlying assumption of the literature is that firms manage their resources on their own. However, many firms hire consultants to help them do so. In this study, I develop and test hypotheses regarding the impact of technical consultants on the quality of their clients' products. Using data from the B ordeaux wine industry, I find evidence that the use of technical consultants has a positive impact on relative product quality and a negative impact on the extremeness of relative product quality. Moreover, the positive impact of technical consultants on relative product quality is stronger at lower levels of relative resource quality . Managerial summary : Findings from a study in the B ordeaux wine industry indicate that the decision to hire consultants should depend on a firm's strategy. If a firm wants to improve its performance, it should hire consultants. Indeed, the “best practices” of technical consultants are generally more valuable than internally generated knowledge. If a firm wants to achieve outstanding performance, hiring consultants may not be the right decision. Because the “best practices” of technical consultants have more certain performance implications than internally generated knowledge, they decrease the likelihood of extremely low performance. However, their lack of uniqueness also decreases the likelihood of extremely high performance. Finally, the decision to hire consultants should depend on the quality of a firm's resources. Firms with low‐quality resources tend to benefit more from the “best practices” of technical consultants .

Research summary : In family businesses, investment decisions often involve both socioemotional wealth and economic considerations. Focusing on new technology adoption, we argue that multiple dimensions of socioemotional wealth contribute to complex effects within different types of family firms—depending on the level of family control—as well as in contrast to non‐family firms. Results based on cable TV operators from 1983 to 1987 confirm that family ownership correlates negatively with technology adoption, especially when family owners hold a minority rather than majority position. We also show contingencies based on performance improvements and competitive threats. Our arguments contribute new insights about the tensions between economic and socioemotional factors within minority family ownership that are absent from non‐family firms and more pronounced than in majority family firms. Managerial summary : We find evidence of greater reluctance toward new technology adoption among firms with minority family influence than majority family influence. This suggests that goals related to socioemotional wealth only partly explain the cautious decision‐making observed in family firms, with further caution arising from conflicting priorities between family and non‐family owners. Recent performance improvements help offset the reluctance to adopt new technology, albeit to a lesser degree among firms with minority family ownership. High levels of competitive threats also offset the reduction in new technology adoption, and contrary to expectations, to a greater extent among minority family firms .

Research summary : In this article, we review, integrate, and extend the literature on markets, competition, and categories as it applies to strategic management theory. Developments in the literatures of economics and organizational theory have shed new light on market categories and category dynamics. These developments highlight the fact that boundary questions are fundamental to the competitive process, and represent a fertile area for research and theory. The objective is to encourage a theoretically grounded rapprochement between current strategic management research and both older and newer research on categories and competition . Managerial summary : One of the key problems for business strategists is understanding the competitive environment and interpreting the effects of competition on a business. This article attempts to integrate various literatures in the study of competition by suggesting that strategists play a crucial role in linking abstract categories of firms and products that have become part of an industry's terminology with real‐time competitive processes taking place among firms and buyers. Strategists interpret cues such as cross‐elasticities of demand among their own and competing products and connect these cues to taken‐for‐granted categories demarcating the boundaries of markets. Simultaneously, strategists are introducing new categories by reformulating old nomenclatures and introducing new ones. We also trace the possible effects of this ‘competitive sensemaking’ on firm behaviors .

Research summary : Because employees can provide a firm with human capital advantages over competitors, firms invest considerably in employee recruiting and retention. Departing from the retention imperative of strategic human capital management, we propose that certain employee departures can enhance a firm's competitiveness in the labor market. Specifically, increased rates of career‐advancing departures by a firm's employees can signal to potential future employees that the firm offers a prestigious employment experience that enhances external mobility opportunities. Characterizing advancement based on subsequent employers and positions, we analyze data on U.S. law firm hiring and industry surveys of perceived firm status between 2004 and 2013. We find that increased rates of employee departures lead to increases in a firm's prestige when these departures are for promotions with high‐status competitors . Managerial summary : Firms often emphasize employee retention. Employee departures, especially as a result of being hired away by competitors, are often viewed as threats to a firm's competitive advantage. We propose, however, that employee retention need not be an unconditional strategic imperative. We argue that certain employee departures can enhance a firm's competitiveness in the market for human capital by signaling to potential employees that the firm offers a prestigious employment experience, which can help them obtain attractive positions with other employers. Analyzing data on U.S. law firm hiring and industry surveys of firm associates between 2004 and 2013, we find that increased rates of employee departures lead to increases in a firm's prestige when these departures are for promotions with high‐status competitors .