Knowledge that Transforms

[Research summary: Employee mobility can erode competitive advantage by facilitating interfirm knowledge and relationship transfer. This study investigates the latter and identifies factors that influence the likelihood of its occurrence. Using a novel database that tracks the employment and client attachments of U.S. federal lobbyists, I show that repeated exchange with employees (firms) increases (decreases) the likelihood clients follow employees who switch firms. Structurally, multiplexity reduces the likelihood of client transfer and weakens the effect of employee–client repeated exchange, with the multiplexity effect strongest when team members have specialized expertise. By examining the main and interactive effects of repeated exchange, multiplexity, and specialized human capital, this study extends prior work by demonstrating how individual, organizational, and structural relationship characteristics affect client transfer and retention ex-post employee mobility. Managerial summary: When do clients follow employees who switch firms? What can firms do to guard against it? These questions are important in service-based industries where clients may become loyal to individual employees within the firm rather than to the firm itself. This study provides evidence that helps practicing managers: (a) identify which clients are most at risk of defecting if employees exit, and (b) structure relationships in ways that mitigate the likelihood that employee exit results in client loss. Findings suggest that a client is more likely to defect when she has extensive history working with the exiting employee, particularly if the employee was the sole link between the client and firm. Managers, however, can reduce the risk of client loss following employee exit by structuring relationships so that clients work with teams of employees rather than exclusively with an individual and by increasing the degree of specialization within these teams.]

Research summary: Cross‐border acquisitions may raise legitimacy concerns by host‐country stakeholders, affecting the acquisition outcomes of foreign firms. We propose that theorization by local regulatory agencies is a key mechanism that links legitimacy concerns with acquisition outcomes. Given that theorization is time consuming and its outcome is uncertain, we argue that state‐owned foreign firms experience a lower likelihood of acquisition completion and a longer duration for completing a deal than other foreign firms. Moreover, we introduce a set of firm characteristics (target public status, target R&D alliances, and acquirer acquisition and alliance experiences) that may affect the threshold level of legitimacy, thereby altering the proposed relationships. Our framework and findings provide useful implications for institutional theory on its core concept of legitimacy . Managerial summary: Cross‐border acquisitions by state‐owned foreign firms may lead to national security concerns and thus debates and discussions among local regulatory agencies. We argue that such institutional processes may reduce the likelihood of acquisition completion and prolong the duration of acquisition completion. Using cross‐border acquisitions in the United States, we find that acquisitions by state‐owned foreign firms are not less likely to be completed than acquisitions by other foreign firms, but they take more time to be completed. Moreover, state‐owned foreign firms are less likely to complete an acquisition when the target firm has more R&D alliances. However, their acquisition experience and alliance experience in the host country increase the likelihood of acquisition completion, whereas their alliance experience alone shortens the acquisition duration .

Research summary: Competitors' experiences of prior interactions shape patterns of rivalry over time. However, mechanisms that influence learning from competitive experience remain largely unexamined. We develop a computational model of dyadic rivalry to examine how time delays in competitors' feedback influence their learning. Time delays are inevitable because the process of executing competitive moves takes time, and the market's responses unfold gradually. We analyze how these lags impact learning and, subsequently, firms' competitive behavior, industry profits, and performance heterogeneity. In line with the extant learning literature, our findings reveal that time delays hinder learning from experience. However, this counterintuitively increases rivals' profits by reducing their investments in costly head‐to‐head competition. Time delays also engender performance heterogeneity by causing rivals' paths of competitive behavior to diverge . Managerial summary: While competitive actions such as new product launches, geographical expansion, and marketing campaigns require up‐front resource commitments, the potential lift in profits takes time to materialize. This time delay, combined with uncertainty surrounding the outcomes of competitive actions, makes it difficult for managers to learn reliably from previous investment decisions. This results in systematic underinvestment in competitive actions. The severity of the underinvestment grows as the time delay between an investment and its positive results increases. Counterintuitively, however, competitors' collective underinvestment increases profit‐making opportunities. In industries with large time delays, companies that do invest in competitive actions are likely to enjoy high returns on investment. It is also likely that rivals' paths of competitive behavior bifurcate. Together, these mechanisms generate large differences in competitors' profits .

Research summary : Many studies use research and development ( R & D) intensity or R & D spending as a proxy for risk taking, but we have little evidence that either associates positively with firm risk. We analyze the relations between R & D intensity ( R & D spending to sales) and R & D spending on the one hand and 11 different indicators of firm risk on the other, using data from 1,907 to 3,908 firms in various industries over 13 years. The analysis finds a general lack of consistent positive association between R & D and firm risk, making the use of R & D as an indicator of risk taking questionable. Furthermore, R & D intensity and spending do not correlate positively, suggesting they measure different constructs. We discuss potential reasons for these nonsignificant results. Our study demonstrates that researchers should avoid casual use of R & D as a proxy for risk taking without explicitly providing a clear definition and measurement model for risk . Managerial summary : Risk is a key construct in strategic management research. Many studies in this area measure risk taking by research and development ( R & D) intensity (the ratio of R & D spending to sales) or R & D spending. However, since R & D intensity and spending have also been used to measure various other things such as information processing demands, this raises the question of whether R & D intensity and spending are valid indicators of firm risk. We examine this issue by considering the associations of R & D intensity and R & D spending with conventional measures of firm risk. We find a general lack of consistent positive association between R & D and firm risk, making the use of R & D as an indicator of risk taking questionable. Furthermore, R & D intensity and spending do not correlate positively, suggesting they measure different things .

Research summary : Prior research focused on cultural differences and their impact on foreign direct investment ( FDI ), neglecting other potentially relevant variables attesting to the cultural interaction between a multinational enterprise and its host environment. In this article, we draw on interpersonal attraction research to develop a positive approach to cross‐cultural interaction with the cultural attractiveness ( CA ) construct, whereby members of a focal culture view another culture as desirable. We create a CA measure and establish its predictive validity with country reputation data. Using FDI data for 41 nations from 1985 to 2012 and performance data for 8,519 cross‐border acquisitions ( CBA ) for 40 nations from 1990 to 2009, we find that CA is a predictor of FDI inflows and CBA outcomes, whose explanatory power is superior to cultural difference measures . Managerial summary : Practitioners have traditionally emphasized potential difficulties of cross‐cultural interaction when dealing with culturally distant countries. In contrast, our study addresses the positive aspects of cultural differences and suggests that a lot can be gained from dealing with attractive cultures, even when they are different. This insight can be helpful, for example, in contemplating/managing international M & A s. Managers of acquiring/merging firms can use our approach to identify whether their employees find the partner's culture desirable, and if they do, proceed with the takeover and then adopt the partner's organizational routines during post‐merger integration. This approach can help avoid conflicts, improve performance of home country expatriates, and ultimately, create value for acquiring firms .

Research summary : We provide evidence that founder chief executive officers (CEOs) of large S&P 1500 companies are more overconfident than their nonfounder counterparts (“professional CEOs”). We measure overconfidence via tone of CEO tweets, tone of CEO statements during earnings conference calls, management earnings forecasts, and CEO option‐exercise behavior. Compared with professional CEOs, founder CEOs use more optimistic language on Twitter and during earnings conference calls. In addition, founder CEOs are more likely to issue earnings forecasts that are too high; they are also more likely to perceive their firms to be undervalued, as implied by their option‐exercise behavior. We provide evidence that, to date, investors appear unaware of this “overconfidence bias” among founders. Managerial summary : This article helps to explain why firms managed by founder chief executive officers (CEOs) behave differently from those managed by professional CEOs. We study a sample of S&P 1500 firms and find strong evidence that founder CEOs are more overconfident than professional CEOs. To date, investors appear unaware of this overconfidence bias among founders. Our study should help firm stakeholders, including investors, employees, suppliers, and customers, put the statements and actions of founder CEOs in perspective. Our study should also help members of corporate boards make more informed decisions about whether to retain (or bring back) founder CEOs or hire professional CEOs .

Research summary: Building on research in strategic management that has found that high levels of pay dispersion are detrimental to firm performance; we examine the potential dependence of those findings on similar dispersion in the latent potential of those resources to contribute to performance. We find that congruence between resource value dispersion and pay dispersion is positively related to organizational performance. Additionally, we find that this congruence moderates the effects of both organizational resources and organizational pay levels on organizational performance. These findings contribute to a growing line of research that explores the implications of key human resource value and pay combinations for organizational performance. Managerial summary: While differences in income between key employees (i.e., dispersed pay) can instill feelings of inequity and be detrimental to organizational performance, such differences may also increase the odds of attracting star talent and help performance. In the context of Major League Baseball (MLB), we find that performance improves when dispersions in pay are congruent with the dispersion in the contributions that team members make to their organizations. We also find that the positive effects on performance of higher total pay and of level of organizational talent are enhanced by congruent pay and contribution dispersions. These findings suggest organizations may benefit from consistent dispersions in pay and talent and that important contributions by key organizational members need to be visible when organizations have dispersed pay structures .

[Research summary: Corporate scandals of the previous decade have heightened attention on board independence. Indeed, boards at many large firms are now so independent that the CEO is “home alone” as the lone inside member. We build upon “pro-insider” research within agency theory to explain how the growing trend toward lone-insider boards affects key outcomes and how external governance forces constrain their impact. We find evidence among S&P 1500 firms that having a lone-insider board is associated with (a) excess CEO pay and a larger CEO-top management team pay gap, (b) increased likelihood of financial misconduct, and (c) decreased firm performance, but that stock analysts and institutional investors reduce these negative effects. The findings raise important questions about the efficacy of leaving the CEO “home alone.” Managerial summary:Following concerns that insider-dominated boards failed to protect shareholders, there has been a push for greater board independence. This push has been so successful that the CEO is now the only insider on the boards of more than half of S&P 1500 firms. We examine whether lone-insider boards do in fact offer strong governance or whether they enable CEOs to benefit personally. We find that lone-insider boards pay CEOs excessively, pay CEOs a disproportionately large amount relative to other top managers, have more instances of financial misconduct, and have lower performance than boards with more than one insider. Thus, it appears that lone-insider boards do not function as intended and firms should reconsider whether the push towards lone-insider boards is actually in shareholders’ best interests.]

Research summary : Since N ickerson and Z enger (2002) proposed how vacillation may lead to organizational ambidexterity, large‐sample empirical tests of their theory have been missing. In this paper, we empirically examine the performance implications of vacillation. Building upon vacillation theory, we predict that the frequency and scale of vacillation will have inverted U ‐shaped relationships with firm performance. We test our hypotheses using patent‐based measures of exploration and exploitation in the context of technological innovation and knowledge search . Managerial summary : Firms often shift their focus on technological innovation and knowledge search from seeking new and novel knowledge (i.e., exploration) to extending and refining existing knowledge (i.e., exploitation) or vice versa. We examine how the frequency and scale of firms vacillating between exploration and exploitation may affect their performance. We find that both too infrequent or too frequent changes and a too small or too large scale of changes are not desirable .

Research summary> : W e take a microfoundational approach to understanding the origin of heterogeneity in firms' capacity to adapt to technological change. We develop a computational model of individual‐level learning in an organizational setting characterized by interdependence and ambiguity. The model leads to organizational outcomes with the canonical properties of routines: constancy, efficacy, and organizational memory. At the same time, the process generating these outcomes also produces heterogeneity in firms' adaptive capacity to different types of technological change. An implication is that exploration policy in the formative period of routine development can influence a firm's capacity to adapt to change in maturity. This points to a host of strategic trade‐offs, not only between performance and adaptive capacity, but also between adaptive capacities to different forms of change . Managerial summary : W hy are firms differentially effective at adapting to technological change? We argue that firms differ in the adaptive capacity of the routines that underlie their capabilities. These differences arise well before change occurs, and result because firms build routines that are differentially responsive to signals of performance decline associated with technological change. Thus, early managerial efforts to build superior productive efficiency must be complemented by efforts to build superior adaptive capacity. Our theory suggests that managers can prepare for technological change by implementing policies, in the formative period of organizational development, that promote individuals' exploration of novel actions. However, there are trade‐offs because preparation aimed at building adaptive capacity to one type of technological change may limit adaptive capacity to other types of change .