Knowledge that Transforms

The assumption that economic actors behave in a boundedly self‐interested manner promises fruitful new insights for strategic management. A growing literature spanning multiple disciplines indicates most actors' selfish utility maximizing behaviors are bounded by norms of fairness. Rather than being purely self‐interested, people behave reciprocally by rewarding others whose actions they deem fair and willingly incurring costs to punish those they deem unfair. Economists show that employers who are perceived as distributionally fair by their employees generate comparatively more value due to the positively reciprocal behavior of those employees. The organizational justice literature distinguishes two additional types of fairness assessed by employees. Drawing from both these bodies of work, we employ stakeholder theory to propose how perceptions of fairness result in reciprocity (1) extending to all stakeholders of the firm and (2) affecting firm performance.

As a direct result of the corporate scandals that started with Enron and led to general unrest in the financial markets, the Securities and Exchange Commission required chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers of large publicly traded companies to certify their financial statements. Using market signaling theory, we propose that attributes of the CEO send important signals to the investment community as to the credibility of the CEO certification and thus the quality of the firm's financial statements, which in turn impact the stock market reaction to the CEO certification. We find that a CEO's shareholdings and external directorships are positively related to the abnormal returns of CEO certification. Further, the stock market penalizes a firm with a CEO who is associated with the firm's prior financial restatement and rewards a firm with a CEO who is appointed after the firm's prior financial restatement.

The literature suggests that established firms need to balance their exploration and exploitation activities in order to achieve superior performance. Yet, previous empirical research has modeled this balance as the interaction of orthogonal activities. In this study, we show that there is a trade‐off between exploration and exploitation and that the optimal balance between exploration and exploitation depends upon environmental conditions. Using a novel methodology to measure the relative exploration versus exploitation orientation, we find an inverted U‐shaped relationship between the relative share of explorative orientation and financial performance. This relationship is positively moderated by the R&D intensity of the industry in which the firm operates.

Formal and relational governance mechanisms are used in strategic alliances to coordinate resources and mitigate the risk of opportunistic behavior. While recent work has shown that these approaches are not mutually exclusive, we understand little about when one approach is superior to the other. Using data on the governance choices and subsequent performance of alliances in the German telecommunications industry, we find that the optimal configuration of formal and relational governance mechanisms depends on the assets involved in an alliance, with formal mechanisms best suited to property‐based assets and relational governance best suited to knowledge‐based assets. Furthermore, a mismatch between governance mechanisms and asset type can harm the performance of the alliance. Our findings contribute to transaction cost economics, the literature on relational governance, and recent work studying their interaction.

Recent research shows that preexisting network structure constrains the formation of new interorganizational alliances. Firms that are poorly embedded in a network structure are less likely than richly embedded firms to form alliances, because they lack informational and reputational benefits. This study examines the types of ties that poorly embedded firms can form to overcome the constraints that their structural positions impose, in turn helping to explain how firms' actions can transform existing network structures. We argue that poorly embedded firms are more likely to participate in ties characterized by social asymmetry than in ties characterized by structural homophily. We analyze the terms of trade that socially asymmetric partners negotiate for alliance governance and discuss how such alliances influence network dynamics. To test our arguments, we use longitudinal data on the alliance activities of 97 global chemical firms from 1979 to 1991.

Outsourcing plays an important role for firms adopting new technologies. Although outsourcing provides access to a new technology, it does not guarantee that a firm can subsequently integrate the technology with existing business processes and leverage it in the marketplace. This distinction, however, has rarely been made in the literature. In the context of business process enhancing technologies, this study builds on the resource‐based and knowledge‐based views to study the impact of outsourcing on firms' subsequent performance in the market and their integrative capabilities, that is, a firm's capacity to use and assimilate a new technology with its business processes and build upon it. The study argues that greater reliance on outsourcing may reduce a firm's learning by doing, internal investment, and tacit knowledge applications, thereby impeding a firm's integrative capabilities and performance in the market. The study uses survey and archival data on banks' outsourcing strategies for Internet adoption to test for the performance consequences of outsourcing, which are found to be negative. However, the findings also show that outsourcing is less detrimental for firms with experience in prior related technology.

This study aims to provide a better understanding of the effect of social networks on innovation through the analysis of territorial agglomerations of firms. Critical voices argue that the same mechanisms that form the basis of efficient, continuous improvements of clustered firms can also be considered as limitations. We suggest that the impact of social capital decreases beyond a certain point of development. In fact, the effect of social interactions and trust on firm value creation can be described as an inverted U‐shaped curve. The study is based on a sample of 154 firms in the Valencia region of Spain. Implications of the study have relevant prescriptions for regional planners and individual entrepreneurs.

This study examines why and under what conditions firms will make unilateral relationship‐specific investments to their transaction partners. We propose that firms are more likely to make such investments when the investment yields positive economic spillover values for other transactions with the same exchange partners as well as for third‐party transactions. We also model two types of positive inter‐project spillover effects that a transaction may generate: knowledge spillovers and reputation spillovers. We find empirical support for our developed theory in the context of Taiwanese suppliers of original equipment manufacturers.

The challenges associated with climate change will require governments, citizens, and firms to work collaboratively to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, a task that requires information on companies' carbon risks, opportunities, strategies, and emission levels. This paper explores the conditions under which firms participate in this endeavor. Building on theories of how social activists inspire changes in organizational norms, beliefs, and practices, we hypothesize that shareholder actions and regulatory threats are likely to prime firms to adopt practices consistent with the aims of a broader social movement. We find empirical evidence of direct and spillover effects. In the domain of private politics, shareholder resolutions filed against a firm and others in its industry increase a firm's propensity to engage in practices consistent with the aims of the related social movement. Similarly, in the realm of public politics, threats of state regulations targeted at a firm's industry as well as regulations targeted at other industries increase the likelihood that the firm will engage in such practices. These findings extend existing theory by showing that both activist groups and government actors can spur changes in organizational practices, and that challenges mounted against a single firm or a single industry can inspire both firm and field‐level changes.

We investigate the impact of market‐supporting institutions on business strategies by analyzing the entry strategies of foreign investors entering emerging economies. We apply and advance the institution‐based view of strategy by integrating it with resource‐based considerations. In particular, we show how resource‐seeking strategies are pursued using different entry modes in different institutional contexts. Alternative modes of entry—greenfield, acquisition, and joint venture (JV)—allow firms to overcome different kinds of market inefficiencies related to both characteristics of the resources and to the institutional context. In a weaker institutional framework, JVs are used to access many resources, but in a stronger institutional framework, JVs become less important while acquisitions can play a more important role in accessing resources that are intangible and organizationally embedded. Combining survey and archival data from four emerging economies, India, Vietnam, South Africa, and Egypt, we provide empirical support for our hypotheses.