Knowledge that Transforms

We examine how the learning, along several dimensions (environment, task, process, skills, goals), that takes place in strategic alliances between firms mediates between the initial conditions and the outcomes of these alliances. Through a longitudinal case study of two projects in one alliance, replicated and extended in another four projects in two alliances, a framework was developed to analyze the evolution of cooperation in strategic alliances. Successful alliance projects were highly evolutionary and went through a sequence of interactive cycles of learning, reevaluation and readjustment. Failing projects, conversely, were highly inertial, with little learning, or divergent learning between cognitive understanding and behavioral adjustment, or frustrated expectations. Although strategic alliances may be a special case of organizational learning, we believe analyzing the evolution of strategic alliances helps transcend too simple depictions of inertia and adaptation, in particular by suggesting that initial conditions may lead to a stable ‘imprinting’ of fixed processes that make alliances highly inertial or to generative and evolutionary processes that make them highly adaptive, depending on how they are set.

For firms seeking to strategically combine their resources with those of other firms, two popular alternative governance structures emerge: alliance or acquisition. In this paper, we propose a dyadic perspective to examine how and why configurations of two firms' resources and capabilities affect the costs and benefits associated with each governance structure. More specifically, we posit that factors such as (1) the resource similarity and complementarity between a pair of firms, (2) the combined relational capabilities of a pair of firms, and (3) the partner‐specific knowledge between a pair of firms will affect the likelihood of observing that pair of firms forming an alliance vs. engaging in an acquisition. We test and find support for our hypotheses using extensive longitudinal data from a sample of the largest firms in the United States from 1991 to 2000.

Combining longitudinal field research and executive experience, we propose that corporate longevity depends on matching cycles of autonomous and induced strategy processes to different forms of strategic dynamics, and that the role of alert strategic leadership is to appropriately balance the induced and autonomous processes throughout these cycles. We also propose that such strategic leadership is the means through which leadership style exerts its influence on corporate longevity. Our findings can be related to organizational research on structural inertia, learning and adaptation, as well as to formal theories of complex adaptive systems. They also contribute to resolving the seeming contradiction between a study of corporations that attributes exceptional long‐term success to leadership style, and the more common proposition that strategy is the determinant of long‐term performance.

In contrast to prior studies examining strategic alliances as discrete governance structures (e.g., alliances vs. M&A, equity vs. non‐equity agreements), we investigate their particular contractual features. The analysis examines the dimensionality of the contractual complexity construct and investigates the determinants of firms' adoption of various contractual provisions. We find two underlying dimensions of contractual complexity, based upon the enforcement and coordination functions of different contractual provisions. The evidence reveals that firms' usage of particular contractual provisions is a function of asset specificity as well as whether the alliance's duration is pre‐specified or open‐ended. The findings also speak to the debate surrounding the roles of prior ties and trust for alliance governance. Firms that have collaborated with each other in the past are not less likely to negotiate enforcement provisions; rather, repeat collaborators are less likely to adopt contractual provisions that are informational in nature and are geared to the coordination of the alliance.

Drawing upon the resource‐based view and transaction cost economics, this study aims to examine how various types of managerial resources (i.e., political networking and functional experience) can be beneficial to new ventures in a transition economy. Using survey data from a sample of new ventures in China's high‐technology industries, we demonstrate that managers' political networking and functional experience are positively related to new venture performance. We also find that the positive relationship between functional experience and new venture performance is moderated by the type of ownership of the ventures and the level of dysfunctional competition in their environments. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.

It is commonly asserted that the field of strategic management is fragmented and lacks a coherent identity. This skepticism, however, is paradoxically at odds with the great success that strategic management has enjoyed. How might one explain this paradox? We seek answers to this question by relying first on a large‐scale survey of strategic management scholars from which we derive an implicit consensual definition of the field—as tacitly held by its members. We then supplement this implicit definition with an examination of the espoused definitions of the field obtained from a group of boundary‐spanning scholars. Our findings suggest that strategic management's success as a field emerges from an underlying consensus that enables it to attract multiple perspectives, while still maintaining its coherent distinctiveness.

This study replicates and extends previous research focusing on China, to a sub‐Saharan African emerging economy environment. Specifically, the study directly replicates the impact of social capital derived from the micro‐managerial networking relationships and ties with top managers at other firms and government officials on macro‐organizational performance using data from Ghana. This study further extends previous work by examining the impact of social capital derived from managerial social networking relationships and ties with community leaders on organizational performance. It examines how the relationship between social capital and organizational performance is contingent on an organization's competitive strategic orientation. The findings suggest that social capital developed from managerial networking and social relationships with top managers at other firms, government officials (political leaders and bureaucratic officials), and community leadership enhance organizational performance. The findings from the contingency analyses reveal some interesting trends. The impact of social capital on organizational performance differs between firms that pursue the different competitive strategies (low‐cost, differentiation, and combination of low‐cost and differentiation) and those who do not pursue those strategies.

The recent discussion in the field of strategic management broadly favors the idea of dynamic capabilities in order to overcome potential rigidities of organizational capability building. The major question addressed in this paper is whether capabilities can actually be conceived as being in flux—and if so, to what extent and in which way? After briefly recapitulating the distinguishing features of organizational capabilities, path dependency, structural inertia, and commitment are identified as the main capability‐rigidity drivers causing a managerial dilemma. In the search for a resolution of this dilemma different approaches of dynamic capabilities are identified and discussed. The analysis shows that the approaches suffer from inherent conceptual contradictions: the dynamization runs the risk of dissolving the original idea and strength of organizational capability building. Ultimately, capabilities would lose the strategic power attributed to them in the resource‐based view. The last section of this paper therefore aims to develop an alternative approach, which aims at preserving the original merits of organizational capability and solving the rigidity issue not by integrating a dynamic dimension into the capability construct but rather by establishing a separate function (‘capability monitoring’). The suggestions mount up to a tier solution. Its logic builds on the dynamics of countervailing processes and second‐level observation.

The logit and probit models have become critical parts of the management researcher's analytical arsenal, growing rapidly from almost no use in the 1980s to appearing in 15% of all articles published in Strategic Management Journal in 2005. However, a review of three top strategy journals revealed numerous areas in their use and interpretation where current practice fell short of ideal. Failure to understand how these models differ from ordinary least squares can lead researchers to misunderstand their statistical results and draw incorrect conclusions regarding the theory they are testing. Based on a review of the methodological literature and recent empirical papers in three leading strategy journals, this paper identifies four critical issues in their use: interpreting coefficients, modeling interactions between variables, comparing coefficients between groups (e.g., foreign and domestic firms), and measures of model fit. For each issue, the paper provides a background, a review of current practice, and recommendations for best practice. A concluding section presents overall implications for the conduct of research with logit and probit models, which should assist both authors and readers of strategic management research.

We propose that competitive success and failure evolve through an ecology of organizational learning. An organization facing competition is likely to engage in a search for ways to improve performance. When successful, this search results in learning that is likely to increase the organization's competitive strength, which in turn triggers learning in its rivals—consequently making them stronger competitors and so again triggering learning in the first organization. We elaborate the conditions under which this self-reinforcing process, known in evolutionary theory as the ‘Red Queen,’ is likely to be adaptive or maladaptive. Adaptive consequences are predicted only for recently experienced learning. Experience in the more distant past of an organization's life, by contrast, is predicted to backfire into a ‘competency trap.’ We predict maladaptive consequences when organizations face many, varied cohorts of rivals. We empirically distinguish these effects using ecological models of competition. Estimates of organizational failure rales reveal a Red Queen among Illinois banks, and support our predictions.