Knowledge that Transforms

The emergence of technical subfields is a common phenomenon in dynamic as well as relatively stable industries. The proper strategic response to the emergence of a subfield, that is, the decision on whether to enter or not to enter, is a key determinant of future firm performance. We propose that this entry decision is not a simple one. The effects of subfield entry may be influenced by strategic factors related to the subfield as well as to the greater industry environment. In this study, we apply a population ecology framework to the study of subfield birth and evolution and use this perspective to develop and test several propositions related to the effects of subfield entry on performance. The data pertain to the evolution of the automatic teller machine subfield over the first 9 years of its existence for a population of over 3500 banks. Our results support the population ecology framework, generally emphasizing the positive performance consequences of early subfield entry.

This paper develops a theory of strategic group identity that explains how strategic groups emerge in an industry and how they can affect firm behaviors and outcomes. In so doing, it provides a theoretical basis for the existence of strategic groups. We argue that managers cognitively partition their industry environment to reduce uncertainty and to cope with bounded rationality. Social learning theory and social identification theory are used to describe how cognitive groups coalesce into meaningful substructures and how a group-level identity emerges. We describe the ways in which macro level factors condition the development of groups and their identities. We introduce the notion of a strong identity, which characterizes any group sufficiently recognized and attended to by members to affect individual action. Groups with ‘weak identities’ are no more than transient agglomerations of firms and do not exist in any meaningful sense. These ideas are developed into propositions that describe the conditions under which groups with strong identities are likely to emerge. A second set of propositions describes their transformation over time. Identity strength is linked to both positive and negative outcomes in a final set of propositions. We show how strategic groups with strong identities can affect firm performance, resolving a longstanding problem which has plagued strategic groups research and conclude by suggesting some approaches for measurement and future research.

This study examines the characteristics of Japanese and U.S. equity joint ventures (EJVs) in China over a 15-year period. These EJVs were announced between 1979 and the end of 1993. Substantial differences are found with respect to six key characteristics. They are: selection of the Chinese partner, selection of the second foreign partner (when more than one foreign partner is involved), foreign equity ownership, foreign capital contribution, EJV business scope, and the EJV location. Tentative explanations for these differences are offered from the perspectives of risk orientation, cultural similarities, and the impact of political events in China.

We examine the characteristics of U.S. multinationals that control operations in the Middle East, a geographic region in which the foreign investment climate has been unfavorable. By comparing U.S. multinationals in the Middle East to a random sample of U.S. multinationals absent from the region, we find that the former have significantly greater R&D intensity and sales than the latter. Dividing multinationals with a presence in the Middle East between those in Israel and those in other countries, we find that the former are more R&D intensive, have a greater proportion of overseas sales, but are smaller in terms of total sales. We discuss the strategic implications of these findings and highlight avenues for future research.

Similarity judgments are an important and distinct aspect of strategy formulation. They are manifest in strategic decisions and errors, and in the construction of analytic concepts such as strategic groups and relatedness in diversification. However, existing models of strategy formulation either assume away the process of making similarity judgments or regard it as unproblematic. This paper highlights the role of similarity judgments in strategy formulation, and discusses cognitive findings showing that decision makers’ assessment of similarity is not free from bias. The cognitive findings help construct a new process explanation for a wide range of apparently isolated strategic errors. The process explanation is contrasted and integrated with traditional explanations based on imperfections in decision inputs. Finally, in light of the cognitive findings, the methods and assumptions of existing approaches in strategy formulation research to the construction of analytic concepts are reexamined.