Knowledge that Transforms

The knowledge and skills inherent in human capital are increasingly recognized as the essence of competitive advantage. Extending the emerging literature on capability building, this paper explores the strategic decision of participating in school‐to‐work programs from the transaction cost and resource‐based view of the firm. Using data from a national sample, we find that both strategic perspectives help to explain decisions to participate in school‐to‐work activities. Our findings indicate that school‐to‐work programs and activities may be understood as interorganizational strategies from a transaction cost view and evidence of a firm's motivation to develop human capital to build competitive advantage from a resource‐based view. Implications for school‐to‐work public policy development in the United States and future research are identified.

In the comment on Ruefli and Wiggins (2003), a number of points are made supporting the variance component analysis approach to determining the importance of industry, corporate, and business segment factors on business segment performance. This response addresses in more detail the nature of the methodological and statistical assumptions made by variance components analysis or ANOVA and their implications for the ‘puzzling’ results obtained when these techniques are employed. The response then contrasts the variance‐based methodologies with a non‐parametric approach used in Ruefli and Wiggins (2003) that makes fewer and weaker assumptions and yields more robust and more internally consistent results. The response also examines the limitations of employing an autoregressive approach to measuring persistence of abnormal profits and contrasts it with a non‐parametric methodology presented in the article.

Prior research over several decades has catalogued many positive motives underlying firms' decisions to engage in joint ventures and other forms of alliances. In this empirical analysis, we investigate whether agency problems brought about by the separation of ownership and control also stimulate the development of firms' joint venture portfolios. By focusing on joint ventures, as opposed to diversification in general or acquisitions, we address the recent debate on agency theory's domain. Results from a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms' alliance portfolios offer supporting evidence, and comparable findings are obtained for international and domestic joint ventures. Agency hazards are also found to bring about extensions of firms' nonequity alliance portfolios in both the international and domestic settings.

In order to establish a competitive advantage, firms must acquire or create resources at a price below their value in use. Absent pure luck, this requires managers to exercise foresight about a resource's future value and/or complementarities with pre‐existing capabilities. This foresight grants managers the opportunity to exploit information asymmetries for personal gain as well as building organizational capabilities. Nevertheless, there is limited research on the extent of foresight or how managers use it. In our study of insider trading, we found that managers purchase stock well before breakthrough patents are filed. We argue for further research on the extent of managerial foresight and how it affects rent generation and appropriation.

A significant portion of knowledge generated by university inventors remains latent (uncodified but codifiable), even though this information is valuable to firms that have licensed their inventions and famously strong incentives exist to disseminate academic findings widely. However, the licensee may access and exploit this latent knowledge by engaging the inventor during the development phase. This paper examines the hypothesis that licensing strategies that directly engage the inventor increase the likelihood and degree of commercialization success. While this may seem somewhat apparent, firms in the sample under investigation vary substantially in the degree to which they engage the inventor: one third of the sample does not engage the inventor at all. On the other hand, the hypothesis might seem surprising given the norms of open science under which university labs are expected to operate. Regression analyses based on a unique dataset of 124 license agreements associated with inventions from MIT support the hypothesis and generate results that are robust to a variety of controls.

We present and solve a new, more accurate model of behavior within alliance activity. The model is essentially an iterated prisoners' dilemma with an exit option in each stage of the alliance. The proposed solution results in each partner receiving its opportunity cost as its expected average pay‐off in the alliance. Managerial implications include: identification of where to focus efforts to improve alliance cooperation and performance; and an explanation for why more sophisticated partnership strategies than tit‐for‐tat are likely to be superior in this game.

We analyze the determinants of the decision to invest abroad and the choice of spatial configurations of overseas plants for 120 Japanese firms active in 36 well‐defined electronic product markets. We find that key competitive drivers at the firm and industry levels have a critical impact on the choice between alternative international plant configurations. Regional configurations focused on Asia are chosen by firms with weaker competitiveness for products with established manufacturing technologies. Plant configurations focused on the United States and the European Union are chosen by technology‐intensive firms facing competitive threats in foreign markets. Global configurations are chosen by firms with a strong competitive position in the Japanese and world market for their core product businesses and are more common in the case of strong oligopolistic rivalry between Japanese firms.

We revisit the questions of identification of outlying firms within industries and their impact on the relative importance of firm‐ and industry‐specific factors for firm performance. In response to McNamara, Aime and Valler (2005), we argue that the key results in Hawawini, Subramnian and Verdin (2003) are insensitive to the varying methods used to identify firm outliers. Further, we argue that conducting tests on industry outliers are inconsistent to what is indicated by theory and past empirical results on the relative importance of firm and industry effects to firm performance. Firm effects may matter most for outperforming and underpeforming firms, while industry effects may be at least as important to firms ‘stuck in the middle’.

Managers are increasingly uncertain over the source (home nation or foreign nation) of antitrust holdup for domestic mergers with significant international implications. I propose a conceptual framework that predicts the source of antitrust holdup for domestic mergers. I find an industry's global competitiveness to be the primary driver behind holdup source. Further, I factor institutional conditions to yield more precise predictions tailored to the cross‐national environment for antitrust policy. Exploratory empirical tests based on the merger policies of 27 antitrust jurisdictions over the 1992–2000 period provide support for baseline predictions. Finally, I generate prescriptive propositions that yield implications for effective political strategies.

The objective of this study is to examine asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups in a given industry. Two research hypotheses argue for the existence of asymmetric rivalry in the sense that strategic groups of small companies have a greater degree of response but a slower speed of response to the actions of strategic groups of large companies, than vice versa. To test this, we use an ex post approach that examines the news releases published on the strategic actions and reactions of firms. A third hypothesis compares ex ante competitive expectations with ex post asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups. To test this, we compare ex post news on actions/reactions with an ex ante approach that estimates conjectural variations. The empirical application carried out on bank deposits in the Spanish market defines strategic groups in terms of size due to the historical and institutional conditions of the industry (deregulatory change). The results obtained show that rivalry patterns between strategic groups in terms of company size can be predicted as asymmetric in the sense that smaller bank strategic groups have a greater degree of response (Stackelberg ‘leader–follower’ competitive interaction), and a slower speed of response to the actions of larger bank strategic groups than is found the other way around. Moreover, ex ante expectations of aggressiveness on the part of larger strategic groups characterize greater ex post reactions from the smaller‐size strategic groups. Therefore, the size distribution of strategic groups is valuable to research on complex industries with deregulation changes.