We present an ordinal method for studying persistence in firm profitability. The method is based on the degree of stability in a ranked performance distribution over time. The method gives a numerical index of rank friction (Rf) that can be applied to any ranked data over any period of time. Rf is nonparametric and can be used to test theoretical assumptions in strategic management. We illustrate the method in an empirical study of 40 years of profit data in 12 industries.
This article examines how leader firms should respond to the erosion of competitive advantages caused by rapid imitation and innovation in hypercompetitive environments. On the one hand, shorter‐lived advantages induce leaders to develop new advantages faster. On the other hand, hypercompetition also erodes the expected returns from new advantages—reducing leaders' incentives to accelerate investments. Since investing faster also raises costs, this article shows that leaders often prefer to renew competitive advantages more slowly in more hypercompetitive industries—thereby increasing the probability of being displaced by competitors. This phenomenon is dubbed self‐displacement. Firms' decision to self‐displace themselves from industry leadership with greater probability is deliberate and rational—not a result of leaders' inability to respond to competitive threats, as previously assumed in the literature. This article also shows that leaders' rule of thumb in more hypercompetitive environments should be to accelerate the development of advantages with high competitive value but low market value. This study is based on a theoretical model and numerical analysis grounded on stylized empirical facts that govern industry competitive macrodynamics and firm investment microdynamics in most industries. Because the model builds on empirically observable constructs, its theoretical propositions are amenable to large sample testing.
Prior work examines competitive moves in relatively stable markets. In contrast, we focus on less stable markets where competitive advantages are temporary and R&D moves are essential. Using evolutionary search theory and an experiential simulation with in‐depth fieldwork, we find that the relationship between performance and subsequent competitive moves depends on the type of market, not just on whether performance is high or low. High performers seek to maintain status quo, but this requires different strategies in different markets. They are conservative in established markets and bold in new ones. In contrast, low performers seek to disrupt the status quo. Again, this requires different strategies in different markets. Unlike high performers, low performers are bold in established markets and conservative in new ones where they lack understanding of how to disrupt rivals. Overall, our results incorporate unstable markets in theories of competitive dynamics and competitive interaction in theories of evolutionary search. By examining R&D moves, we also extend competitive dynamics research to include technology‐based firms for whom temporary advantages are often essential.
Extant approaches to rent appropriation are static in that they explore bargaining power at a fixed point in time. This article contributes by examining how capabilities and bargaining power coevolve. As capabilities are developed, those who are favored by knowledge asymmetries make decisions that balance value creation potential against the rent appropriation regime, such as the organizational form in which the capability will be embedded. Using the example of Apple's development of the iPod, this article illustrates how stakeholders plan for rent appropriation as they assemble new capabilities—well before any value is actually created. Given that firm performance is an outcome of both capability development and rent appropriation, a robust theory must incorporate an understanding of how they coevolve. As such, the article highlights the need to integrate property rights theory with theories of value creation and governance costs as actors constantly make trade‐offs along these dimensions.
This paper investigates the effect of compensation of corporate personnel on their investment in new technologies. We focus on a specific corporate activity, namely corporate venture capital (CVC), describing minority equity investment by established‐firms in entrepreneurial ventures. The setting offers an opportunity to compare corporate investors to investment experts, the independent venture capitalists (IVCs). On average, we observe a performance gap between corporate investors and their independent counterparts. Interestingly, the performance gap is sensitive to CVCs' compensation scheme: it is the largest when CVC personnel are awarded performance pay. Not only do we study the association between incentives and performance but we also document a direct relationship between incentives and the actions managers undertake. For example, we observe disparity between the number of participants in venture capital syndicates that involve a corporate investor, and those that consist solely of IVCs. The disparity shrinks substantially, however, for a subset of CVCs that compensate their personnel using performance pay. We find a parallel pattern when analyzing the relationship between compensation and another investment practice, staging of investment. To conclude, the paper investigates the three elements of the principal‐agent framework, thus providing direct evidence that compensation schemes (incentives) shape investment practices (managerial action), and ultimately investors' outcome (performance).
In this paper, we offer a comprehensive alliance portfolio diversity construct that includes partner, functional, and governance diversity. Grounding our work primarily with the resource‐ and dynamic capabilities‐based views, we argue that increased diversity in partners' industry, organizational, and national background will incur added complexity and coordination costs but will provide broadened resource and learning benefits. Increased functional diversity results in a more balanced portfolio of exploration and exploitation activities that expands the firm's knowledge base while increased governance diversity inhibits learning and routine building. Hypotheses were tested with alliance portfolio and performance data for 138 multinational firms in the global automobile industry during the twenty‐year period from 1985 to 2005. We found alliance portfolios with greater organizational and functional diversity and lower governance diversity were related to higher firm performance while industry diversity had a U‐shaped relationship with firm performance. We suggest firms manage their alliances with a portfolio perspective, seeking to maximize resource and learning benefits by collaborating with a variety of organizations in various value chain activities while minimizing managerial costs through a focused set of governance structures.
We examine whether pre‐IPO affiliations affect post‐IPO corporate events, namely acquisitions. On the one hand, newly public acquirers may benefit from their pre‐IPO affiliations through residual signaling value or/and resource‐related benefits. On the other hand, newly public acquirers may suffer from those affiliations when conflicts of interests arise during the post‐IPO period. Equity underwriters may have incentive to promote non–value‐creating acquisitions (Type II error), and venture capitalists (VCs) may have incentive to forgo strategically important acquisitions (Type I error). Drawing on a sample of 4,029 acquisitions made by 717 newly public firms, we find that on average the announcement of an acquisition by a newly public acquirer elicits a positive response from investors. The market views more favorably the acquisitions announced by newly public acquirers associated with prestigious equity underwriters, but this reaction becomes negative when the lead underwriter is retained as the acquisition advisor. The market reacts more favorably to acquisitions announced by VC‐backed newly public acquirers, but only when those VCs are committed to a longer lockup period. The effects of pre‐IPO affiliations on expected returns are stronger for newly public acquirers with a high intangible resource base and persist throughout the three‐year post‐IPO period (across each subsequent acquisition announcement).
To explain resource heterogeneity, past research focuses on how rivals' resources are hidden from firms and firms accordingly have difficulties accessing them. We argue that resource heterogeneity may also arise when firms are deterred from a technological space upon being shown what resources rivals already possess within that space. To illustrate this deterrence effect, we use patent reexamination certificates, which indicate strategic stakes within a technological space without materially disclosing additional details of the underlying technologies and hence avoid the confounding effect of attracting competition through disclosure. We demonstrate how rivals' reexamination certificates within a technological space induce a firm to subsequently allocate less inventive effort in that space, based on two mechanisms—indications of rivals' developmental speed and exclusionary ability. We further develop these two mechanisms by arguing that the deterrence effect is stronger when rivals' speed is enhanced by their downstream capabilities, or when rivals' exclusion is enhanced by their litigation experiences. Findings suggest that a firm's path of resource accumulation evolves through avoidance of rivals' paths, and deterrence may constitute a viable alternative theory of resource heterogeneity.
Empirical studies of mergers and acquisitions typically focus on firm‐level financial performance. In contrast, we use human capital theory to model these events as transactions that simultaneously have cross‐level, real effects on workers, plants, and firms. Our empirical analysis is based on longitudinal, linked employer‐employee data for virtually all Swedish manufacturing firms and employees. We find that mergers and acquisitions enhance plant productivity, although they also result in the downsizing of establishments and firms. Firm performance does not decline in the aftermath of these ownership changes. We conclude that such transactions constitute a mechanism for improving the sorting and matching of plants and workers to more efficient uses.
Drawing on patent data for approximately 500 firms over 20 years, we advance recent theory on firm boundaries and test these propositions for the first time. We first provide evidence for the existence of knowledge complementarities between vertically related activities in a firm's value chain by showing that firms face increasing (decreasing) performance in conducting downstream activities (i.e., patent litigation) the less (more) they outsource related upstream activities (i.e., patent filing). We then propose and empirically demonstrate that vertical integration benefits through learning differ from vertical outsourcing costs through forgetting. We show that firms can partly offset these hidden outsourcing costs by sourcing similar upstream products from internal and external suppliers.