Knowledge that Transforms

Research Summary This paper investigates the corporate parenting advantage, the extent to which corporate parents improve the performance of their subsidiaries. Despite the importance of this concept for corporate strategy, researchers have yet to quantify it empirically. I measure the corporate parenting advantage by comparing the performance of utilities that were legally classified into one of two types of holding companies: regulated holding companies, which faced limits on their ability to parent, and exempt holding companies, which did not. I find that observationally similar utilities that were owned by exempt holding companies outperform utilities that were owned by regulated holding companies, and that this performance differential attenuates once the legal restrictions on parenting were lifted. These results provide the first large‐scale empirical evidence of the corporate parenting advantage. Managerial Summary By how much do corporate parents improve the performance of their subsidiaries? Despite the importance of this question of the “corporate parenting advantage,” it does not yet have a clear answer. In this paper, I measure the corporate parenting advantage by comparing the performance of utilities that were legally grouped into one of two types of holding companies: regulated holding companies, which faced limits on their ability to parent, and exempt holding companies, which did not. I find that comparable utilities that were owned by regulated holding companies have lower return on assets than utilities that were owned by exempt holding companies, and that this performance difference disappears once the legal restrictions on parenting were lifted. These results provide evidence of the corporate parenting advantage.

Research Summary Why do individuals become entrepreneurs? Why do some succeed? We propose two theories in which information frictions play a central role in answering these questions. Empirical analysis of longitudinal samples from the United States and the United Kingdom reveals the following patterns: (a) entrepreneurs have higher cognitive ability than employees with comparable education, (b) employees have better education than equally able entrepreneurs, and (c) entrepreneurs' earnings are higher and exhibit greater variance than employees with similar education. These and other empirical tests support our asymmetric information theory of entrepreneurship that when information frictions cause firms to undervalue workers lacking traditional credentials, workers' quest to maximize their private returns drives the most able into successful entrepreneurship. Managerial Summary Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, Rachael Ray, and Oprah Winfrey are all entrepreneurs whose educational qualifications belie their extraordinary success. Are they outliers or do their examples reveal a link between education and success in entrepreneurship? We argue that employers assess potential workers based on their educational qualifications, especially early in their careers when there is little direct information on work accomplishments and productivity. This leads those who correctly believe that they are better than their résumés show to become successful entrepreneurs. Evidence from two nationally representative samples of workers (from the United States and the United Kingdom) supports our theory, which applies to equally to the immigrant food vendor lacking a high school diploma as well as the PhD founder of a science‐based startup.

Research Summary The market for acquiring technology companies is rife with information frictions. Although such frictions can stifle trading activity, they also provide room for strategic gain. We investigate this dual role of information frictions by exploiting an institutional reform that releases technological information to the public domain. Leveraging cross‐sectoral variation in the magnitude of disclosure, we find an increase in acquisition activity and in the technological distance between matched pairings. In line with predictions from strategic factor market theory, however, we also find a disproportionate decline in acquirer returns on average. Our findings suggest that information disclosed through the reform‐facilitated exchange in the takeover market yet had a leveling effect on the returns to acquirers. Managerial Summary Firms acquire technology‐oriented companies to complement internal R&D projects and accelerate the innovation process. But identifying promising targets is challenging, not least due to the lack of information about the value of acquired technologies. This study investigates an information shock and tests its effects on the market for acquiring technology‐intensive companies. We find that greater disclosure of technological information to the public domain intensifies trading activity and allows acquirers to better identify and assess targets outside their core technological domains. But it also reduces the returns to acquirers. In combination, our findings illuminate a dual role of information disclosure: placing more information into the public domain may facilitate trade in corporate takeover markets while simultaneously restricting acquirer opportunities for strategic gain.

Research Summary Ownership is fundamental to firm strategy, organization, and governance. Standard ownership concepts—mainly derived from agency and incomplete contracting theories—focus on its incentive effects. However, these concepts and theories neglect ownership's role as an instrument to match judgment about resource use and governance with the firm's evolving environment under uncertainty. We develop the concept of ownership competence—the skill with which ownership is used as an instrument to create value—and decompose it into matching competence ( what to own), governance competence ( how to own), and timing competence ( when to own). We describe how property rights of use, appropriation, and transfer relate to the three ownership competences and show how our theory offers a fresh perspective into the role of ownership for value generation. Managerial Summary Business owners own with different levels of competence, and differences in ownership competence matter for value creation. We argue that ownership competence consists of competence about what to own (matching competence), competence about how to own (governance competence), and competence about when to own (timing competence). We clarify the role played by each of the three competences for value creation. We also show how the importance of ownership competence for value creation alters depending on ownership concentration, life cycle effects, uncertainty of the environment, and the efficiency of resource markets. With our paper, we prepare the ground for a fuller understanding of the strategic role of owners for value creation.

Research summary: The pandemic spread of the coronavirus COVID-19 is rightly focusing policytime, the pandemic crisis is threatening the survival of firms at a global scale, with potentially devastating societal and economic outcomes. In this Virtual Special Issue, we gather and discuss key papers published in the journals of the Strategic Management Society that to crisis. Based on our overview, we identify four types of responses: retrenchment, persevering, innovating, and exit. Awareness of these responses has implications for managers and strategy scholars alike. Managerial summary: How can firms respond to crises such as the current pandemic spread of the coronavirus COVID-19? This Virtual Special Issue begins to provide answers to this question. Based on a select overview of papers published in the journals of the Strategic Management Society, we advance four types of strategic responses to crisis: retrenchment, persevering, innovating, and exit. Awareness of these responses has implications for managers and strategy scholars alike.

Research Summary Whereas prior innovation and strategy literature studied how attentional and search dynamics influence the creation of inventions, we examine how these same processes affect the impact of inventions after their creation. We theorize that inventions classified in “high‐contrast” technological categories garner more attention by potential users and, hence, accrue more citations than otherwise‐equivalent inventions classified in “low‐contrast” categories. We test this hypothesis via three studies. First, we estimate citation‐count models among all USPTO patents granted between 1975 and 2010. Second, we conduct a twin patents test comparing inventions patented both at the USPTO and at the EPO. Third, we examine minute‐by‐minute search logs from a sample of USPTO examiners. These studies support our hypothesis and extend current understandings of attentional and search dynamics in the innovation process. Managerial Summary Patents that receive more citations tend to have greater economic value and greater impact on future technological developments. We show that the number of citations a patent receives does not only depend on its inherent technological value, but also on seemingly neutral classification decisions affecting the likelihood that it will be noticed by potential future users. We test our arguments via three related studies. Our results demonstrate that inventions classified in “high‐contrast” technology classes garner considerably more attention—and hence citations—than twin‐inventions classified in “low‐contrast” classes. The key managerial implication is that, whenever feasible, nudging an invention towards higher‐contrast classes will increase its future worth. The key policy implication is that maximizing categorical contrast across technology classes will help users identify relevant prior patents.

Research Summary Software platforms create value by cultivating an ecosystem of complementary products and services. Existing explanations for how a prospective complementor chooses platforms to join assume the complementor has rich information about the range of available platforms. However, complementors lack this information in many ecosystems, raising the question of how complementors learn about platforms in the first place. We investigate whether attending a temporary gathering—a hackathon—impacts the platform choices of software developers. Through a large‐scale quantitative study of 1,302 developers and 167 hackathons, supported by qualitative research, we analyze the multiple channels—sponsorship, social learning, knowledge exchange, and social coordination—through which hackathons serve as a social forum for the diffusion of platform adoption among attendees. Managerial Summary A software platform such as Windows, iOS, or Amazon Web Services relies on third‐party developers to create applications that complement the platform and make it valuable for end users. However, developers face a wide range of possible platforms, and they may have limited information about which platforms would be worthwhile to develop for. A software platform business can educate and encourage developers to adopt their platform by supporting in‐person software development competitions, known as hackathons. Developers learn about prospective platforms that advertise at the hackathon. Developers also learn whether and how to use a platform by observing and teaching one other. Hackathons are particularly useful for spreading platform technologies: developers prefer to adopt widely used platforms, and hackathons permit developers to identify and join fashionable platforms.

Research Summary We introduce an innovative method of identifying the risk‐management benefit of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Option‐implied volatility captures the financial markets' expectations of a firm's future risk, so if CSR is related to risk‐management benefits, it should be related to lower implied volatility. We find that CSR is associated with low implied volatility and that CSR's insurance benefit is larger for firms that have high leverage, growth opportunities, or uncertainty. However, CSR as an insurance mechanism is less beneficial to firms that are already sound (i.e., those that have high market value and good accounting and financial performance). The results reveal the “terms” of a CSR‐as‐insurance contract, confirm that CSR creates risk‐management benefits, and suggest that financial markets price this benefit in economically significant ways. Managerial Summary We suggest a practical technique of evaluating a firm's CSR policy. For example, a manager would simply check how a firm's implied volatility changes as its CSR policy changes. Or, the manager can compare a firm's and its comparable firms' implied volatilities to knowhow financial markets perceive the firm's CSR differently. Option implied volatilities could guide a firm to identify proper CSR‐based risk‐management policies because they have the advantage of being ex ante, real‐time, and objectively observable market‐pricing information in identifying the risk‐management benefit of CSR. Our results also illustrate how a financial expert can use the valuable insight of strategic management literature about CSR‐as‐insurance to price derivative contracts.

Research Summary Scholars have long recognized the theoretical and practical implications of firm‐specific human capital . However, we highlight that firm‐specific incentives (i.e., worker incentives that provide more utility to workers in the focal firm than similar incentives available at other employers) provide an important pathway to competitive advantages that has not been comprehensively examined in the extant organizational research. We address this gap by (a) defining firm‐specific incentives and showing why they are different from incentive conceptualizations and typologies in the extant literature, (b) articulating potential origins of firm‐specific incentives, and (c) formally proposing the conditions under which firm‐specific incentives facilitate human capital‐based competitive advantages. In so doing, we develop a cohesive theoretical framework of incentive‐based competitive advantage that integrates across multiple literatures. Managerial Summary Just as companies differentiate their products by creating unique value for customers, they also create unique value for their employees. Some companies do this by offering employee incentives, perks, and benefits that are highly unique to the company and difficult for other companies to imitate. These unique incentives, perks, and benefits can help these companies to attract, motivate, and retain top talent at a financial discount and, accordingly, can help these companies realize competitive advantages over their rivals.

Research summary Enterprises in low‐resource contexts often rely on bricolage (i.e., making do by applying resources at hand to new problems). However, bricolage has traditionally been regarded as a way to temporarily get by, potentially constraining growth if continued over time. This has been explained by factors such as limited development of learning competencies. Surprisingly, we encountered a social organization appearing to use bricolage to scale extensively into a variety of locations. This puzzling observation prompted our research question: Can bricolage be scaled, and if so, how and why? We embarked on a process study of this organization, leading to a novel conceptual model of scaling bricolage: as a low‐cost replication process of heuristics, enabling fit with a diversity of local environments, as well as cross‐unit learning. Managerial summary How do organizations emerge, survive, and scale in resource‐scarce environments? Traditional scaling models tend to rely on considerable financial resources and companies often struggle to adjust to diverse contexts. In contrast, we identified and studied an organization in Sub‐Saharan Africa that we argue used simple rules to scale bricolage—making the best out of what is at hand—successfully in diverse low‐resource contexts. Our paper provides a novel conceptual model of scaling bricolage: a low‐cost replication process of heuristics, enabling fit with a diversity of local environments, as well as cross‐unit innovation and learning.