We examine the effect of lender monitoring through board representation, which we label “affiliated banker on board” (AFB) on conservative accounting. We hypothesize that monitoring reduces lenders' demand for conservatism-facilitated control transfers through debt covenants by reducing the information asymmetry that underlies the agency problem of debt. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that AFB firms have markedly lower conservative accounting than non-AFB firms. This result is robust to a battery of tests that account for bias from both observable and unobservable factors. We also find additional evidence to support key elements of our hypothesis. First, an examination of the relation between borrower-unfavorable renegotiations and covenant violations suggests that board representation allows lenders to renegotiate in a timelier manner based on private information. Second, an examination of the relation between covenant intensity and conservative accounting suggests that board representation decreases lenders' reliance on conservatism-facilitated control transfers. Finally, an analysis that uses relationship lending as an alternative proxy of lender monitoring suggests that it is lender monitoring, and not AFB per se, that reduces demand for conservative accounting.

We investigate whether issuers on negative credit watch manage earnings upward and whether such earnings management favorably influences the watch resolution. We find that rating, industry, and performance matched discretionary accruals reported during negative watch are significantly higher than their respective pre- and post-watch levels, after controlling for accrual reversal. Consistent with its opportunistic nature, we find that accrual management increases with issuers' incentives to avoid downgrade, and decreases with their earnings management constraints and the strength of the external monitoring. Surprisingly, such accrual management significantly increases the likelihood of a favorable resolution—issuers in the top half of the discretionary accruals distribution are 24 percent less likely to be downgraded than those in the propensity score matched bottom half. We find that issuers that avoid downgrades through income-increasing accrual management significantly underperform those that do not over the ensuing year, mitigating the signaling or measurement error explanations for our results. Finally, we find that accrual management does not reflect attempts to improve short-term credit quality.

Using a Supreme Court ruling that rejected the use of “bright-line” rules previously relied upon in evaluating materiality claims, this study examines how heightened materiality uncertainty impacts audit pricing. We expect the heightened uncertainty to make it more difficult for auditors and clients to assess materiality and to reach a consensus on materiality assessment, which increases audit effort and engagement risk, leading to higher audit fees. Consistent with this prediction, we find that after the ruling, audit fees increase significantly for treatment firms in the circuits using bright-line rules in the pre-ruling period, relative to control firms not affected by the ruling. This effect is stronger when auditors have lower quality or lower industry expertise, and when investors have more diverse opinions. We also find that for firms audited by low-expertise auditors, auditor turnover due to auditor-client disagreement on materiality-related issues increases significantly for treatment firms relative to control firms. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.