Examines the effects of providing cost reports in a complex professional environment like Medicare which is characterized by implicit contracts. Details of the institutional environment; Linkage between incentives to contain costs and the type of accounting information provided; Linkage between behavior of medical professionals and cost accounting information reporting.

Under hospital accounting guidelines, contractual adjustments are an allowable deduction from revenue that reflect the difference between gross charges and reimbursement amounts. This study explores the use of contractual adjustments to shift costs among payors and increase revenues within a regulatory environment that attempted to limit cost shifting and set revenue constraints. Throughout the regulatory period, we find that hospitals overestimated budgeted contractual adjustments in a systematic manner which allowed cost shifting among payors and increased revenues. In addition, budgeted patient volumes and variable costs were manipulated in an attempt to relax the revenue constraint. After deregulation, we find that volume and cost biasing behavior decreased while overestimation of contractual adjustments increased. Further, we examine the interaction of this regulation with cost-containment regulation at the federal level.

We extend the literature on earnings management through real operating decisions by providing insight into the types of expenditures (core versus noncore and operating versus non-operating activities) affected by earnings management. We partition a sample of California nonprofit hospitals based on their earnings management incentives. We find that expenditures on non-operating and non-revenue-generating activities appear to decrease in hospitals with incentives to engage in such behavior, while core patient care activities remain unchanged. We also find evidence of earnings management in non-core operational expenses. Second, we analyze real earnings management related to pay-for-performance incentives and find that hospitals with stronger performance incentives exhibit a significant incremental decrease in expenditures. Finally, we examine two different kinds of behavior to discriminate between earnings management and good operational decisions and provide weak evidence to support opportunism rather than good management. Together, these results provide evidence of the use of real operating decisions to manage earnings.