Focuses on the manner in which the experience affects the auditor's organization and amount of knowledge structure. Ability to perform audit tasks successfully; Consistency; Differences in knowledge between inexperienced and experienced auditors; Importance of errors in auditing.

Prior research on auditors' memory for evidence encountered during working paper review suggests that auditors commit memory errors that could inhibit audit efficiency and effectiveness. The current study extends this line of research by examining whether two prominent features of the auditing environment. The current study extends this line of research by examination whether two prominent features of the auditing environment, audit risk and information importance, affect the accuracy of auditors' memory and auditors' memory and author's willingness to rely on memory. These issues were examined in an experiment in which auditors were required to review two working-paper areas (accounts) and, 24 hours later, recognize if information items had been present in the working papers and express how willing they would be to rely on their memory for each item. The results indicate that (1) the accuracy of auditors' memories is positively related to the level of audit risk of the area and the degree of importance of an information item within the area; (2) the auditors' willingness to rely on memory is negatively related to the degree of information importance but not related to the level of audit risk of the area; and (3) the auditors' likelihood of referring back to the working papers is negatively related to the accuracy of auditors' memories, and this negative relationship increase with the degree of information importance. Collectively, these results suggest that audit risk and information importance altered auditor's cognitive activities during the review process in a manner that contributes to the effectiveness (e.g., better memory for more consequential evidence) and efficiency (e.g., less verification more strongly remembered and less consequential evidence) of the audit.

The trend towards more structure In some of the largest accounting firms' audit methodologies has generated considerable Interest, but little empirical evidence. This study provides evidence on the role conflict and role ambiguity perceived by audit seniors in structured versus unstructured accounting firms. Role theory provides a basis for analyzing the effects of audit structure on the organizational characteristics which are potential sources of role conflict and ambiguity, The results are based on a sample of 67 seniors from structured and 54 seniors from unstructured firms. The seniors' perceptions of their firms' organizational characteristics and their perceived role stress differed systematically across structured versus unstructured firms. No evidence is found of the concerns (such as inflexibility in atypical audit environments) that have been raised regarding the trend towards Increasing audit structure.

Tests the predictions of a descriptive model of sequential belief revision using content-rich audit scenarios. Characteristics of auditing as a sequential process; Prediction of the model in which an auditor obtains and evaluates evidence; Testing of lack of order effect.

Prior research shows that an audit supervisor’s active intervention in a subordinate’s judgment distorts that judgment. However, subordinates’ judgments are only one input into audit team judgments. How do supervisors finalize audit team judgments after actively intervening in their subordinates’ judgments? In an experiment using audit teams, supervisors with weaker or stronger goals to reach a client-preferred conclusion either were or were not asked to first actively coach a subordinate’s judgment (i.e., active intervention) before reviewing it and finalizing the audit team’s judgment. Supervisors’ intervention influenced subordinates’ inputs, which, in turn, supervisors incorporated into their final judgments. More interestingly, intervention biased supervisors’ final judgments, controlling for supervisor directional goal strength and for concurrent effects on subordinates’ inputs. However, supervisors distorted their judgments less as they perceived a larger technical knowledge advantage over subordinates. In a second experiment, auditors appear aware of the bias-reducing knowledge advantage effects but unaware of the bias-increasing active intervention effects. We discuss implications for audit team judgments and audit quality control.