This study examines whether straight-line depreciation, relative to accelerated depreciation, causes non-executive managers to make non-value-maximizing capital investment decisions. To do this, I conduct experiments in which managers must decide whether to continue using an existing asset or invest in a replacement asset. By design, replacing the existing asset yields higher cash flows and managers are aware of this fact. However, if the asset is replaced, then the greater remaining book value under straight-line depreciation relative to accelerated depreciation causes earnings to be lower. Lower earnings and psychological forces may push managers of firms that use straight-line depreciation away from making the economically efficient capital investment decision. The results suggest that managers of firms that use straight-line depreciation are less likely to invest in a replacement asset than are managers of firms that use accelerated depreciation. Further, the results suggest that managers perceive that an asset depreciated using straight-line depreciation has provided less retrospective utility than an asset depreciated using accelerated depreciation. In turn, I find that depreciation method-induced differences in managers' retrospective utility perceptions influence their prospective utility perceptions, which, in turn, influence managers' asset replacement decisions. By theoretically and empirically linking firms' depreciation method choice to managers' capital investment decisions, I provide evidence that a seemingly innocuous choice made for external financial reporting purposes can cause managers to make non-value-maximizing capital investment decisions.

Evidence reveals that managers exercise discretion over budget estimates, but little is known about whether revenues or expenses are more susceptible to budget discretion. Drawing upon regulatory focus theory, we predict a pattern of budget discretion that has not previously been identified. To test our theory, we conduct a series of experiments where managers face a goal to either minimize the performance metric to avoid missing the target (minimal budget goal) or maximize the performance metric to achieve a desired outcome (maximal budget goal). When managers face a minimal budget goal, they are more likely to make self-interested budget estimates for uncertain expenses than monetarily equivalent uncertain revenues. Conversely, when managers face a maximal budget goal, they are more likely to make self-interested budget estimates for uncertain revenues than monetarily equivalent uncertain expenses. Thus, managers prefer acts of inclusion over acts of exclusion when pursuing their budget goals.

Despite the importance placed on professional skepticism by the accounting profession and regulators, the failure of auditors to exercise an appropriate level of skepticism continues to be a global issue. We experimentally test a potential barrier to skepticism. We find that outcome knowledge biases supervisors' evaluations of skeptical behavior. Holding a staff member's skeptical judgments and acts constant, superiors on the engagement team evaluate the staff's skeptical behavior based on whether the staff's investigation of an issue ultimately identifies a misstatement. Our evidence suggests that evaluators penalize auditors who employ an appropriate level of skepticism, but do not identify a misstatement. Although consultation with their superiors while exercising skepticism improved staff auditors' performance evaluations, consultation did not effectively mitigate the outcome effect on their evaluations. Last, we observe that auditors in the field anticipate that their superiors will be influenced by outcome knowledge when they evaluate their skeptical behavior. Collectively, our results depict an evaluation system that may inadvertently discourage skepticism among auditors in the field. Data Availability: Contact the authors.