Knowledge that Transforms

Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Search Site Cite View This Citation Add to Citation Manager Citation W. Robert Knechel; Annual Editor Report. The Accounting Review 1 November 2022; 97 (7): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10849 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentThe Accounting Review Search Advanced Search

We examine whether investor inattention influences managers’ non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Hirshleifer and Teoh’s (2003) theoretical model predicts that managers are more likely to disclose upwardly-biased non-GAAP metrics when investors are inattentive. Employing a measure that captures exogenous variation in institutional investor inattention, we find that managers are more likely to provide non-GAAP disclosures, particularly those where non-GAAP earnings are greater than GAAP earnings, when inattention is high. Moreover, inattention is positively associated with the magnitude of non-GAAP exclusions, which suggests managers present better non-GAAP performance to inattentive investors. Consistent with managers exploiting investors’ limited attention, we find that stock prices respond more strongly to non-GAAP exclusions when investors are inattentive and that managers are more likely to respond to inattention with income increasing non-GAAP disclosures if they sell shares following the disclosure. Taken together, these findings suggest that managers respond opportunistically to inattentive institutions by disclosing aggressive non-GAAP earnings metrics.

We develop and validate an empirical measure of the informativeness of accounting assets in measuring firm-specific economic capital, an important determinant of both cash flows and intrinsic values. Our validation tests show that the asset informativeness measure is sensitive to differences in both accounting methods and implementation decisions at the firm level and corresponds to the way equity investors use the information in accounting assets. We find that accounting assets contain substantial information about firms' productive capacity (economic capital) and the information is not summarized in several earnings attributes often associated with earnings quality.

We examine the voluntary disclosure behavior of peer firms of hostile takeover targets. We find that peer firms under control threat use a disclosure strategy that emphasizes bad news: they provide more bad news forecasts, tend to bundle bad news forecasts with earnings announcements, use more negative tone in conference call presentations, and more evenly distribute negative tonal words throughout the presentation to heighten the visibility of bad news. This asymmetric disclosure of bad news is concentrated in firms whose managers have greater incentives to mitigate the control threat—firms with younger CEOs, CEOs with higher total compensation, and firms with weaker anti-takeover provisions. Further tests show that peer firms also manage accruals downward. We contribute to the sparse literature on the impact of corporate control contests on voluntary disclosure by demonstrating that peer firms under control threat emphasize bad news to preempt control threat.

We examine how managers' accounting estimates are affected by whether they are informed about an impending critical audit matter (CAM) disclosure from a close or distant auditor. A close (distant) auditor is one who has a smaller (greater) social distance from the client in terms of their working relationship. We predict and find that being informed about an impending CAM by a close (distant) auditor leads to more (less) aggressive estimates than if managers are not informed. With a close auditor-client relationship, managers perceive a CAM disclosure as forewarning investors about estimate subjectivity, thus providing a moral license to report more aggressively. With a distant relationship, a CAM disclosure does not provide a moral license, but signals greater auditor scrutiny, which leads to less aggressive reporting. Our results inform regulators and standard setters about the effects of CAM on managers' reporting decisions in the presence of a close auditor-client relationship.

In three experiments, we find that rewarding professional skepticism can backfire and decrease skepticism on future audit tasks where red flags are present. We focus on rewards for costly skepticism: skepticism that is ex ante appropriate, but generates incremental ex post costs and does not identify a misstatement. Auditors interpret a reward for costly skepticism as a better-than-expected outcome and view subsequent tasks from a risk-averse gain frame. As a result, auditors seek to avoid the downside risk of skeptical action, which decreases auditors' sensitivity to red flags and their willingness to communicate severe red flags to their managers, compromising audit quality. However, we also find that a supervisor consistently rewarding costly skepticism decreases auditors' risk aversion and increases their skepticism. In sum, auditors believe skeptical action has downside risk. A cultural shift toward credible, consistent rewards for appropriate skepticism likely helps ensure that rewards have their intended effect. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

We examine how executives' ability to control their firms' exposure to risk affects the design of their incentive-compensation contracts. Our natural experimental evidence shows that exchange-traded weather derivatives allow executives to control their firms' exposure to weather risk. Once these derivatives became available, those executives who use them to hedge experience relative reductions in their total compensation and equity incentives. The decline in compensation is consistent with a reduction in the risk premium that executives receive for exposure to weather risk. The decline in equity incentives is consistent with the relation between risk and incentives shifting in a complementary direction when executives can better control their firms' exposure to risk. Collectively, our findings provide evidence that executives' ability to control their firms' exposure and, by extension, their own to an important source of risk influences the design of their incentive-compensation contracts.

Banks play a central role in creating liquidity for the economy by financing illiquid assets with liquid liabilities. This paper examines the effect of accounting restatements on bank liquidity creation. Using a difference-in-differences research design, I show that restatements trigger a significant reduction in liquidity creation. This effect derives mainly from banks shifting away from illiquid assets and toward liquid assets. Further analysis reveals that restatements affect liquidity creation through supervisory enforcement actions and unravelling of risk exposures accumulated in the misreporting period. Government deposit insurance blunts the effect of an information asymmetry channel.

I investigate capital market consequences of an increase in prescribed timeliness of firms' mandatory disclosure of material events. Specifically, I examine an SEC regulatory change that accelerates the Form 8-K filing deadline and classifies 8-Ks as likely to be constrained or unconstrained by the increase in prescribed timeliness. After the regulatory change, firms filing constrained 8-Ks exhibit increases in information asymmetry between investors and investor disagreement at the 8-K filing date relative to firms filing unconstrained 8-Ks. Moreover, the relative increases in information asymmetry and investor disagreement for firms filing constrained 8-Ks appear to be attributable to a decline in the length of and quantitative information included in 8-K disclosures. My findings shed light on the costs of a prescriptive approach to enhanced disclosure timeliness of ongoing disclosure. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text.