Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT We consider the dynamics of analyst inattention by investigating how analysts allocate their attention when a firm in their portfolio experiences CEO turnover. Our analysis shows that analysts tend to divert their attention toward firms that experience such events, resulting in less attention and a corresponding reduction in forecasting accuracy for nonevent firms. Furthermore, this reduction in accuracy varies with factors related to the costs and benefits of rationally allocating attention to firms that have experienced CEO turnover. Collectively, our analysis responds to the call for research on rational inattention among analysts and illustrates the specific intraportfolio events that alter attention allocation and information. JEL Classifications: G10; G11; G17; G14; M12; M40; M41.

ABSTRACT Using a dataset constructed through textual analysis and manual data collection, we show that, prior to ASC 606, firms with principal-versus-agent (PA) exposure face heightened GAAP compliance risk, reflected in a greater likelihood of receiving revenue-related SEC comment letters and higher audit fees. Following the adoption of ASC 606, these differences decline, consistent with the standard’s stated goal of simplifying PA assessments and reducing implementation challenges. Overall, our findings provide the first large-sample evidence on PA considerations and show that ASC 606 mitigates compliance risk, although further analyses suggest additional disclosure may be needed to mitigate information challenges associated with PA assessments. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: L86; M41; M42; M48.

ABSTRACT Audit senior associates are essential to audit production, yet we know little about how they experience their organizational role. We interview 45 U.S.-based audit seniors and find they experience persistent paradoxical tensions between contradictory yet interrelated objectives, stemming from their middle hierarchical position as both experienced associates and novice executives. Applying Paradox Theory, we find seniors sometimes work around paradox by attending to one paradoxical objective to temporarily alleviate tension but leave the other paradoxical objective neglected. Other times, seniors work through paradox by dynamically engaging with both paradoxical objectives, particularly when empowered by perceiving adequate resources—time, information, and social capital. Our study reconceptualizes seniors as self-directed fledgling leaders whose capabilities are forged through navigating paradoxical tensions, expanding the conventional academic view of seniors as experienced associates. We discuss how audit firm-level tensions revealed through seniors’ experiences offer insights for human capital development and audit quality.

ABSTRACT We examine how audit firms changed their policies regarding audit partner performance measurement, career development, and compensation during a period of heightened public scrutiny of audit quality (2007 to 2017). We theorize how implementing policy changes requires a delicate transition in the organizational design and internal processes of the firms and may not effectively translate into their day-to-day practices. Our access to proprietary performance management policies and individual partner performance and compensation data from the eight largest Dutch audit firms allows us to gain an in-depth understanding of the evolution of performance management for audit partners. We find that most of the policy changes have real consequences. For example, audit quality becomes more consequential to career development, whereas profit sharing becomes better linked to quality and long-term performance. We conclude that audit firms appear effectively responsive to public scrutiny, increasingly aligning partner incentives with societal expectations of audit quality.

ABSTRACT Concerns that goodwill impairments unresponsiveness to declining performance produces inflated goodwill led standard-setters to reconsider post-acquisition impairment-only accounting. We use granular large-scale data to provide institutionally relevant novel descriptive evidence motivated by this hotly debated accounting standard. Comparing goodwill versus other acquired intangibles growth rates for firms reporting goodwill throughout the 2010–2020 post-FAS 141(R) period provides no evidence of runaway goodwill inflation concerns. For firms with goodwill anytime during 2010–2020 we use Shapley values to explore the explanatory power of performance factors affecting goodwill impairments. Consistent with standard-setters’ intent, single-segment market performance explains 81 percent of goodwill impairment incidence variation (controlling for Fama-French-38 industry and time fixed-effects). Limited evidence of reduced impairment incidence after incorporating FASB sanctioned control premia or alternative market values provides little support for discretionary impairment avoidance. Conversely, higher impairment incidence when book values incorporate IFRS (2020) proposed off-balance-sheet headroom or market-to-book decreases supports discretionary impairment recognition. Data Availability: The data used in this study are obtained from commercial sources, including Compustat, Calcbench, I/B/E/S, FactSet Mergerstat/BVR, and Peters and Taylor's intangible capital dataset. JEL Classifications: M41; M48; G34.

ABSTRACT This paper investigates how consulting services affect audit quality, from the perspective of knowledge- and expertise-sharing between employees. Semistructured interviews with 16 audit partners reveal that consulting expertise is used in 60–80 percent of audit engagements, with the main rationale for such collaboration being knowledge-sharing and improved audit quality. We leverage a comprehensive office-level dataset of employment profiles covering 86 percent of all employees at large U.S. public accounting firms to systematically investigate the effect of consulting employees on audit quality. We document that a one standard deviation increase in the share of consulting employees in an office results in a 2.6 percentage point reduction in restatements (a decrease of 19 percent relative to the baseline). This effect is strongest when consulting employees have skills complimentary to auditors, e.g., technical and human resources skills, and when consultants have specific industry expertise in the same industry as the audit client. Data Availability: Data from common sources, such as Audit Analytics, can be purchased from the providers. Data on firm-level measures of workforce characteristics and skills are available from the authors upon request, conditional on approval from the data provider (Cognism). JEL Classifications: D22; E24; J24; M42.

ABSTRACT Despite the potential of algorithms to improve judgment quality, recent research suggests that individuals may be averse to algorithmic use. We experimentally examine whether and how managers’ use of an algorithm-advised performance rating is influenced by rating valence and the decision rights managers have to adjust the algorithm. We find that managers are less willing to use an algorithm to evaluate subordinate performance when it advises a low, rather than high, rating. We further show that when the algorithm-advised rating is low, allowing managers to adjust how the algorithm computes the rating, compared with adjusting the rating itself or not allowing any adjustment, increases algorithmic use. Further analyses show this effect to be consistent with managers’ increased understanding of an algorithm when involved in its computation. Our findings inform organizations’ implementation of performance evaluation algorithms by showing how rating valence and decision rights jointly influence managers’ use of the algorithms.

ABSTRACT We exploit a one-month period when SEC activity largely stopped during a U.S. government shutdown to examine whether variation in SEC scrutiny affects its ability to enforce insider trading. Difference-in-differences analyses suggest insiders earn abnormal profits during the shutdown, and the findings are robust to using different control periods and groups. We estimate that it takes roughly one week before the abnormally profitable trading begins, consistent with insiders updating their beliefs regarding the duration and disruption of the shutdown. Supporting the claim that SEC regulatory activity drops with the shutdown and does not fully recover afterward, we find a decline in the frequency of insider trading enforcement releases, investigations, and comment letter issuances after the SEC resumes operations. Our study speaks to the SEC insider trading enforcement literature and economic consequences of a regulatory discontinuity in a divisive political climate. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources. JEL Classifications: G14; G30; M41; M48.

ABSTRACT I examine how mandatory position disclosure of claimholders’ economic interests affects Chapter 11 bankruptcy outcomes. Exploiting a regulation that increased disclosure by creditors and equityholders on certain committees, I find that position disclosure is associated with a decrease in the length of bankruptcy cases, especially the duration of negotiations between claimholders across classes. Further, I show that position disclosure is associated with lower post-bankruptcy recidivism. Contrary to the concerns expressed by critics, I find little evidence that position disclosure reduced claimholders’ participation in committees or decreased trading in the market for bankruptcy claims. My findings highlight the overall benefits of position disclosure in facilitating negotiations during bankruptcy. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D82; G33: G34; K22; M40.

ABSTRACT I use a unique setting in the municipal bond market to examine the impact of compliance auditing on bond yields. SEC Rule 15c2-12 requires bond issuers to provide annual financial and operating disclosures to investors over the life of the bonds. Due to concerns of noncompliance, Louisiana passed a state law requiring auditors to test for compliance with Rule 15c2-12. I find that bond yields in the municipal bond market decrease by 21 basis points after the audit law for previously noncompliant issuers in Louisiana. I find similar results when I separately examine the primary and secondary markets. I also find that previously noncompliant issuers file 75.2 percent more annual disclosures after the audit law, suggesting that the audit law improved compliance with Rule 15c2-12. Overall, my findings inform policymakers and regulators on the role of auditing over compliance with disclosure regulation as a mechanism to protect investors. JEL Classifications: G28; H74; K22; M42.