This paper examines the impact of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure on firm investment. The analysis characterizes the optimal precision of ESG disclosure that channels investors’ tastes for ESG into firm investment. Although it is tempting to think that the optimal ESG disclosure becomes more precise when investors care more about ESG, I show this intuition is incomplete because it overlooks the fact that stronger tastes for ESG change how investors use information. Applying the analysis to a large economy, I show that mandating more precise climate disclosure than would be voluntarily provided motivates self-interested firms to act on common interests in reducing emissions. That is, a regulator can leverage market forces and a disclosure mandate to achieve a similar result as a Pigovian tax in motivating firms to internalize the externalities created by their climate-related investments

Despite the rising use of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings, there is substantial disagreement across rating agencies regarding what rating to give to individual firms. As what drives this disagreement is unclear, we examine whether a firm's ESG disclosure helps explain some of this disagreement. We predict and find that greater ESG disclosure actually leads to greater ESG rating disagreement. These findings hold using firm fixed effects and using a difference-in-differences design with mandatory ESG disclosure shocks. We also find that raters disagree more about ESG outcome metrics than input metrics (policies), and that disclosure appears to amplify disagreement more for outcomes. Last, we examine consequences of ESG disagreement and find that greater ESG disagreement is associated with higher return volatility, larger absolute price movements, and a lower likelihood of issuing external financing. Overall, our findings highlight that ESG disclosure generally exacerbates ESG rating disagreement rather than resolves it. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources cited in the text

We compare the ESG ratings of MSCI, a global rater, with those of SINO, a local Chinese rater, to evaluate their effectiveness in capturing ESG risks within the Chinese context. Using ESG issues revealed in negative incidents as a proxy for ESG risk, we find that the ratings from the two raters often diverge, with SINO generally outperforming MSCI in predicting ESG risks in China. This divergence is more pronounced for firms with extensive ESG disclosures and when there are significant differences in how the raters define and measure ESG issues. Distance-based information asymmetry does not appear to play a significant role in explaining the performance gap. The advantage of local raters likely stems from their flexibility in tailoring methodologies to reflect country-specific nuances. In contrast, global raters adopt consistent methodologies to meet investor demand for comparability, but this approach may inadvertently reduce their relevance for capturing localized ESG risks. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text

Using SASB’s materiality framework, prior research finds alpha for the portfolio of firms with improving ratings on material ESG issues. We replicate this finding and provide a fundamentals-based perspective on why the materiality portfolio outperforms. Our basic premise is that changes in material ESG issues reflect fundamental firm characteristics. More financially established firms—firms with larger size, lower growth, and higher profitability relative to their sector—are more likely to not only create material strengths but also resolve material weaknesses in their ESG scoring. This fundamental link dictates that one should comprehensively control for fundamental determinants of stock returns before attributing portfolio outperformance to improving material ESG scores. Indeed, we find that the materiality portfolio does not generate alpha after we account for its exposure to profitability and growth factors. Our evidence underscores the issue of correlated omitted fundamental factors in the debate of ESG alpha. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text

We describe the development of public company auditing in the U.S. in the early 20th century to gain perspective on current developments in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) assurance. Using a broad sample of historical annual reports spanning four decades, we document three facts: first, the spread of public company auditing occurred steadily over the span of several decades. Second, audit services were initially heterogeneous but became standardized through the audit profession’s efforts and interactions with private and public actors. Third, the role of regulation in those early developments was seemingly limited to codifying existing practices, as the first federal audit regulation was introduced only late in the development of the profession and did not significantly impact capital markets. Our historical evidence helps us understand how we arrived at today’s widely accepted and highly regulated financial audits. It uncovers parallels to and offers lessons for current developments in ESG assurance. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text