To commemorate the 100th anniversary of The Accounting Review, I was asked to provide my forecast of the future of tax research in accounting. In sum, my opinion is that the future is bright and full of opportunities for tax scholars. Governments are altering corporate income tax laws in fundamental ways and questions about how these changes affect investment, investment location, income shifting, corporate capital structure, and financial reporting will be very important aspects to study. New and newly used taxes, such as tariffs and endowment taxes, will allow for novel paths of inquiry and accountants should contribute. The use of AI by tax authorities and taxpayers could alter both tax enforcement and tax planning. The increasing access to administrative data, the use of field experiments and field studies, and employing survey methods to obtain data should expand the settings available to study and improve identification.

There are past and proposed tax law changes that contain provisions that affect financial reporting. These include calls for book-tax conformity, proposals to increase the links between financial accounting and taxable incomes, and actions by Congress that make direct alterations to U.S. GAAP. I submit that these tax law changes potentially threaten financial reporting quality. I discuss my concerns about why such provisions have not attracted attention from accountants to the extent they should and make a case for more awareness and more research going forward.

We hypothesize that prior evidence of target shareholder capital gains tax liabilities affecting acquisition features is driven by the tax liabilities of the target firm CEO. To test this, we estimate CEOs' capital gains tax liabilities for a large sample of acquisitions and examine the effects of such liabilities on acquisition outcomes. Results indicate that the previously documented positive relations between shareholder-level capital gains tax rates and (1) the likelihood of a nontaxable acquisition (Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2004), and (2) acquisition premiums (Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2003) are largely driven by CEO tax effects. We also find evidence consistent with (1) CEOs' tax incentives leading to potential agency conflicts under certain conditions, and (2) acquisition structure or premium being adjusted in response to CEOs' taxes depending on the alternatives available to the acquirer. Our study contributes to our understanding of what and whose taxes affect acquisition structure and value.

We investigate the relation between tax avoidance and tax uncertainty, where tax uncertainty is the amount of unrecognized tax benefits recorded over the same time period as the tax avoidance. On average, we find that tax avoiders, i.e., firms with relatively low cash effective tax rates, bear significantly greater tax uncertainty than firms that have higher cash effective tax rates. We find that the relation between tax avoidance and tax uncertainty is stronger for firms with frequent patent filings and tax haven subsidiaries, proxies for intangible-related transfer pricing strategies. The findings have implications for several puzzling results in the literature.