Knowledge that Transforms

This paper presents an analytical model that explores the impact of auditors' legal liability on audit quality and investment. The model is particularly concerned with the impact of damage measures on investments. The threat of liability payments creates an incentive for the auditor to work hard: however, the potential liability payments can also provide an "insurance" for investors in the event the state of nature is bad. Indeed, if damages are measured based on actual investments, investors can increase the liability payments by over-investing. Thus, the potential transfer of wealth from auditors to investors can lead to an over- investment in risky assets, relative to a socially optimal level, even with a high-quality audit. A socially optimal level of investment can be induced by removing the association between actual investments and liability payments. In my model, a legal regime that can induce the socially optimal level of investment, while still motivating the auditors to exert the socially optimal effort level, consists of a strict liability rule with a damage measure that is independent of the actual investment.

This study investigates the separate and joint effects of prior knowledge and accountability on performance in the information search phase of a tax research task. An experiment is reported in which 63 tax professionals performed a computer-based tax research task. The results indicate that increases in effort duration, which are partly attributable to the accountability manipulation, improved search effectiveness regardless of the level of prior knowledge. In addition, after controlling for the effect of effort duration, accountability had an incremental positive effect on performance among the more knowledgeable professionals. These results suggest that effort can substitute for knowledge in performing information search tasks, but this substitution does not appear to be complete. The results also support the hypothesis that the effect of accountability on performance depends upon the level of knowledge, which suggests that certain aspects of effort and knowledge act as complements in improving performance.

This paper examines the relationship between the incidence of litigation events with potentially large damage awards and managers' accounting choices. We argue that the size of damage awards is a function of reported net income and net worth, and that this relationship provides management an incentive to manipulate accounting numbers. Our results indicate that managers of oil firms facing potentially large damage awards choose income decreasing non-working capital accruals relative to managers of other oil firms. Further, the results indicate that the management of these firms makes accounting choices that result in lower non-working capital accruals during the litigation period than in other years. These negative non-working capital accruals appear to result from the under-estimation of new reserves.

This study examines the trade-offs that an entrepreneur makes in an initial public stock offering (IPO) between the incremental costs and benefits of selecting a Big 6 audit firm. The benefit of hiring a Big 6 auditor is assumed to be reduced underpricing, consistent with Beatty (1989) and Balvers et al. (1988). The cost of hiring a Big 6 auditor is higher auditor compensation. Evidence drawn from a sample of lPOs during the early 1990's is consistent with a differentiated market for audit services where owners select the type of auditor that minimizes the sum of underpricing and auditor compensation costs.

Litigation against auditors has increased dramatically in recent years. Auditors can offset litigation risk in a number of ways, including improved audit quality and planning, increases in audit fees and increases in the issuance of modified opinions. Auditors can also adjust their client portfolios by becoming more selective in their choice of new clients and by withdrawing from high-risk engagements. We test the hypothesis that litigation risk motivates auditor resignations by comparing resignation companies with two groups of client companies that dismissed their auditors: one matched with the resignation companies on industry and year, and the other matched on year alone. We find resignation companies differ from dismissal companies along dimensions that capture the probability of litigation: financial distress, variance of abnormal returns, auditor independence, tenure and a modified (particularly going-concern) opinion. We also construct a litigation proxy based on a prior litigation-prediction model and find that the proxy is positively associated with the probability that the auditor will resign rather than be dismissed from the engagement. Our analysis is consistent with concerns expressed by the accounting profession that litigation pressures lead to the withdrawal of audit services for a segment of the market.

This paper develops and tests an option-style valuation model, whose main prediction is that equity value is a convex function of both earnings and book value, where the function depends on the relative values of earnings and book value. Earnings provides a measure of how the firm's resources are currently used. Book value provides a measure of the value of the firm's resources, independent of how the resources are currently used. When the ratio earnings/book value is high, the firm is likely to continue its current way of using resources, and earnings is the more important determinant of equity value. When earnings/book value is low, the firm is more likely to exercise the option to adapt its resources to a superior alternative use, and book value becomes the more important determinant of equity value. Evidence from a variety of empirical specifications is consistent with the convexity prediction.