Knowledge that Transforms

The performance goal for a unit is commonly created by consolidating the goals of its subunits. This paper shows that if it is difficult (easy) for the subunits to achieve their goals, it is almost always even more difficult (easier) for the unit to whole will almost certainly not meet a goal to cut its costs by a certain percentage if the degree of cost cutting is difficult to achieve at the individual subunit levels.

This study evaluates the relation between security returns and funds-based earnings components. We document that proxies for market expectations of the components that are based on measures of historical serial- and cross-dependencies are substantially more accurate than random-walk proxies. Moreover, we detect significantly higher valuations of the operating cash flow component of earnings, relative to current accruals, when market expectations are represented using the dependency-based predictions. Such differential valuation is not detectable for random-walk representations. Contrary to results in Ali (1994), we find incremental information in unexpected cash flows over the whole spectrum (moderate and extreme) of unexpected cash flow realizations.

Economic theory stresses that opportunity costs are relevant to resource allocation decisions, while prior empirical accounting research finds that decision makers tend to ignore or underweight opportunity cost information. This study examines whether accounting knowledge is associated with a decision maker's tendency to ignore opportunity costs in business decisions. The experiment's results indicate that the number of opportunity costs ignored by subjects in a business resource allocation decision is greater for subjects with high-accounting knowledge than for subjects with low-accounting knowledge. The experiment also indicates that subjects with high- accounting knowledge ignore a greater number of opportunity costs when the decision is posed in a business context than when it is posed in a personal context.

We construct a dynamic multi-agent moral hazard model to analyze the interactions among the firm owner, the manager and the auditor. Moral hazard may arise in hierarchical agency because a rational monitoring agent may accept a side payment from the monitored agent for misrepresenting information to the principal. This multi-agent moral hazard problem is the essence of the concern for auditor independence. We show that a "low-balling" compensation scheme and the auditor's legal liability constitute an efficient dynamic contracting mechanism for hierarchical agency. In particular, low balling serves as a substitute for legal liabilities for maintaining auditor independence. Low balling reduces the transaction costs associated with the audit engagement relative to the flat-fee structure and can actually improve auditor independence.

This study investigates whether the net deferred tax liabilities disclosed under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109, Accounting for Income Taxes (SFAS No. 109) provides additional value-relevant information over the disclosure required by Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 11, Accounting for Income Taxes (APS No. 11). Evidence suggests that SEAS No. 109 data represent value-relevant information above and beyond APB No. 11. Additionally, evidence indicates that the changes made by SFAS No. 109-the separate recognition of deferred tax assets, the creation of valuation allowances for deferred tax assets and the adjustment of deferred tax accounts for enacted tax rate changes-each provide value-relevant firm data. These results suggest that SFAS No. 109 increased the value-relevance of deferred tax amounts in financial statements.

This paper explores the determinants of the valuation allowance for deferred tax assets under SFAS No.109. We find that, consistent with SFAS No. 109, the allowance is larger for firms with relatively more deferred tax assets and smaller for firms with higher levels of expected future taxable income. The most important explanatory variable for the valuation allowance is the level of firms' tax credit and tax loss carryforwards, consistent with these items being more difficult to realize. We find little evidence that managers use the valuation allowance for earnings management purposes, although these tests may not be very powerful.

This study tests the competitive equilibrium predictions of a multi-period model of audit pricing and independence in two sets of laboratory markets: a control set consisting of human subjects in the role of auditors contracting with robot clients, and a treatment set in which both auditors and clients are human subjects. The results in all the control-set markets and some of the treatment markets support the predictions of "lowball" pricing and that heterogeneous beliefs among auditors regarding the treatment of a client-reporting issue is a necessary condition for independence impairment. By contrast, several treatment-set markets exhibit cooperative behavior between auditors and clients to achieve jointly beneficial outcomes. This behavior deviates from the price-independence relationship predicted in the competitive equilibrium, exhibiting instead a price-independence relationship that is characterized by an absence of lowballing and frequent independence impairment, even when auditors have homogeneous beliefs.

This study examines whether certain types of financial reporting fraud result in a higher likelihood of litigation against independent auditors. We expect that auditors are more likely to be judged responsible for failing to detect commonly occurring frauds of those that stem from fictitious transactions. We examine companies with SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases and designate whether each fraud present in their financial statements in common and/ or arises from fictitious transactions. We then examine whether these types of fraud are related to auditor litigation in analyses that control for various client, auditor and case characteristics. Our results provide some support for our two primary hypotheses - auditors are more likely to be sued when the financial statement frauds are of a common variety or when the frauds arise from fictitious transactions.

This study investigates the relationship between insider trading and fraud. We find that in the presence of fraud, insiders reduce their holdings of company stock through high levels of selling activity as measured by either the number of transactions, the number of shares sold, or the dollar amount of shares sold. Moreover, we present evidence that a cascaded logit model, incorporating insider trading variables and firm-specific financial characteristics, differentiates companies with fraud from companies without fraud.

This paper presents a model that relates properties of the analysts' information environment of the properties of their forecasts. First, we express forecast dispersion and error in the mean forecast in terms of analyst uncertainty and consensus (that is, the degree to which analysts share a common belief). Second, were reserve the relations to show how uncertainability and consensus cab be measured by combining forecast dispersion, error in the mean forecast, and the number of forecasts. Third, we show that the quality of common and private information available to analysts can be measured using these same observable variables. The relations we present are intuitive and easily applied in empirical studies.