Knowledge that Transforms

We predict that access to cross-border financing by the industrial sector reduces firms' reliance on domestic banks, thereby leading to lower rents for banks and greater competition in the domestic banking sector. We also predict that banks take on more risk to offset these lost rents and remain competitive. Using mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to identify variation in cross-border financing, we find evidence consistent with our hypotheses. Additional tests verify that the effects emanate from the demand side (i.e., firms not relying on banks) rather than the supply side (i.e., banks not willing to lend to firms). Overall, we document how competition from overseas financial markets influences the domestic banking sector.

The emergence of double entry bookkeeping marked the shift in bookkeeping from a mechanical task to a skilled craft, and represented the beginnings of the accounting profession. This study seeks to identify what caused this significant change in bookkeeping practice. I do so by adopting a new accounting history perspective to investigate the circumstances surrounding the emergence of double entry in early 13th century Italy. Contrary to previous findings, this paper concludes that the most likely form of enterprise where bookkeeping of this form emerged is a bank, most likely in Florence. Accountability of the local bankers in Florence to the Bankers Guild provided a unique external impetus to generate a new form of bookkeeping. This new bookkeeping format provided a clear and unambiguous picture of the accounts of all debtors and creditors, along with the means to check that the entries between them were complete and accurate.

This study examines how the incentives related to ownership structure influence labor cost management decisions in publicly traded and privately held organizations. I document that public banks have more elastic labor cost structures than private banks, which suggests that public bank managers prefer greater flexibility to remove labor resources when desired. Consistent with public banks facing greater financial reporting pressures, I find that they reduce labor costs to avoid earnings declines. However, I also find that the use of labor cost reductions to manage required regulatory capital is more pronounced in private banks. Consistent with the explanation that access to the equity markets allows public firms to sell equity in lieu of cutting costs, I find that the use of labor cost reductions to manage capital requirements is concentrated in the subsample of banks with lower equity issuances. These findings suggest that while public ownership induces financial reporting pressure, it may also alleviate regulatory pressure through greater ability to sell equity.

Although macroeconomic news has a major impact on corporate earnings, anecdotal evidence suggests that financial analyst research is inefficient with respect to such news. Examining analysts' earnings research, we find that they underreact to negative macroeconomic news. Analysts are not all equal, though, as analysts employed at the same firm as an active macroeconomist underreact much less. We find that the benefit of analyst access to an economist is concentrated in firms that are high in cyclicality relative to their industry, high in cyclicality in general, and that are smaller in size. In addition, analysts who are exposed to more accurate or award-winning in-house macroeconomists benefit more. Investors appear to recognize the advantage of access to macroeconomists, reacting more strongly to these analysts' forecast revisions. Overall, our results suggest that the presence of an active in-house macroeconomist improves the efficiency and credibility of analyst research.

Based on Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia's (2007) derivation of the cost of equity capital in terms of expected cash flows, we generate a testable hypothesis that relates tax avoidance to a firm's cost of equity capital. Using three broad measures of tax avoidance—book-tax differences, permanent book-tax differences, and long-run cash effective tax rates—to test our hypothesis, we find that the cost of equity is lower for tax-avoiding firms. This effect is stronger for firms with better outside monitoring, firms that likely realize higher marginal benefits from tax savings, and firms with higher information quality. Overall, our results suggest that equity investors generally require a lower expected rate of return due to the positive cash flow effects of corporate tax avoidance.

We find that auditors of more conservative clients charge lower fees, issue fewer going concern opinions, and resign less frequently, consistent with more conservative clients imposing less engagement risk on their auditors. Using path analysis, we find evidence that both inherent risk and auditor business risk explain these associations. Also consistent with conservatism reducing auditor business risk, we find that client conservatism is associated with fewer lawsuits against auditors and with fewer client restatements. Taken together, our results are consistent with auditors viewing client conservatism as an important determinant of engagement risk that, in turn, affects auditor-client contracting decisions. Our findings should be of interest to auditors who actively manage client risk and to standard-setters who recently dropped conservatism as a desired attribute of financial reporting quality. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources indicated in the text.