Knowledge that Transforms

There are past and proposed tax law changes that contain provisions that affect financial reporting. These include calls for book-tax conformity, proposals to increase the links between financial accounting and taxable incomes, and actions by Congress that make direct alterations to U.S. GAAP. I submit that these tax law changes potentially threaten financial reporting quality. I discuss my concerns about why such provisions have not attracted attention from accountants to the extent they should and make a case for more awareness and more research going forward.

We extend prior research examining the relation between aggregate recommendation changes and future returns by documenting that this relation varies over time as a function of the predictability of future earnings growth. When industry-level earnings growth is more predictable, we find that recommendation changes relate negatively to future returns. Our evidence suggests that this negative relation results from analysts revising recommendations upward for higher expected earnings growth but failing to also adjust downward for a related decrease in expected returns arising from a decrease in investor risk aversion. In contrast, when industry-level earnings growth is less predictable, we find that recommendation changes relate positively to future returns. However, this positive relation results from analysts and investors similarly underestimating earnings growth persistence. Overall, the evidence fails to support the claim that analysts' recommendation changes incorporate aggregate information in a manner that adds value to investors by predicting future returns.

In an online experiment, the immediate (Roth) versus deferred taxation of retirement income affects taxpayers' investment decisions such that tax-deferred plan investors under-adjust for future tax burdens and overestimate their future wealth compared to Roth investors. When presented with a specific after-tax monetary goal, Roth account holders invest more in higher-risk, higher-return assets than tax-deferred account holders. We investigate four aspects of this investment context that could alleviate these differences: (1) implementing a “do-your-best” goal, (2) reframing specific goals in pre-tax dollars, (3) explicitly prompting investors to estimate future tax burdens, and (4) providing performance feedback. These interventions reduce differences between Roth and tax-deferred investor behaviors, but do not entirely close the gap on their own. In combination, reframing goals and prompting future tax estimations encourage tax-deferred account holders to invest in risky assets to the same degree as Roth investors only when paired with performance feedback.

This study examines how the source and nature of reporting standards jointly influence compliance with those standards. More specifically, I examine how decision makers' identification with the source of the standards moderates compliance with different types of standards. Type refers to whether the accounting standard is descriptive or injunctive (i.e., prescriptive). Source refers to the entity promulgating the accounting standards. I conduct three experiments in which participants face a direct trade-off between reporting aggressively to maximize their personal wealth and reporting conservatively to adhere to a standard. I find that identification with the source causes less aggressive reporting for an injunctive standard, but when a standard is descriptive, identification has no effect or an opposite effect. When identification with the source is low, descriptive standards tend to work well compared to injunctive standards. With injunctive standards, persuasive factors, such as identification, likely influence financial managers' aggressive reporting behavior.

We explore the role of investor relations (IR) in debt markets. Using earnings announcements as a laboratory, we examine whether, when, and to what extent IR departments help credit investors assimilate information. We find that the presence of IR decreases (increases) the negative (positive) impact on CDS spreads stemming from bad (good) earnings news, suggesting that IR efforts improve information precision and reduce transparency risk. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that IR matters more when uncertainty is high and creditors are concerned about the credit risk implications of firm performance. We also find that IR firms receive higher credit ratings and fewer covenants when issuing bonds, and CDS markets react less negatively when IR firms' bond ratings are downgraded below investment grade. Because firms choose their IR activities, we show that our inferences are robust to multiple methods of addressing endogeneity. Overall, we find that IR departments are influential in debt markets.

I investigate whether organizations can use the “power of the employee” to reduce managers' opportunistic behavior toward others. I predict that revealing this behavior to employees makes managers less inclined to act opportunistically. Employees' knowledge has a stronger impact on reducing managers' opportunistic behavior when managers have discretion over employee rewards versus when they do not. I further predict that the effect of employee-based control depends on whether managers are other-interested versus self-interested. Revealing manager actions alone is sufficient to reduce other-interested managers' opportunism, even when they lack discretion over employee rewards. Revealing manager actions alone has no discernible influence on self-interested managers' opportunism, but pairing this action with granting them discretion over employee compensation does reduce their opportunism. Results of two experiments support my predictions, and these results have important implications. By relying on the power of the employee, organizations can induce (even selfish) managers to act less opportunistically.

We examine whether management forecast errors (MFEs), which are traditionally interpreted as backward-looking indicators of how well forecasts preempted earnings announcements, also operate as forward-looking measures that aid with predicting future earnings. This possibility arises if an MFE represents unrealized revenues or expenses a manager originally anticipated to occur in the forecast period but that ultimately occur in subsequent periods. Consistent with this possibility, we document that optimistic MFEs contain incremental information over current earnings for predicting future earnings realizations. This finding does not extend to pessimistic MFEs, consistent with such errors reflecting expectations management. The predictive information in optimistic MFEs is negatively related to managers' incentives to intentionally bias the forecast and is positively related to managerial ability. Analysts' post-earnings announcement forecasts for the subsequent period overestimate the future realization of MFEs, but such overestimation is less severe when managers issue timely post-earnings announcement forecast revisions for subsequent periods. Data Availability: Data used in this study are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

We hypothesize that one way accounting practices spread is through law firm connections. We investigate this prediction by examining companies that avoided reporting compensation expense by engaging in stock option backdating. We hypothesize that executives engaged in backdating because they were desensitized to its inappropriateness when they learned through their legal counsel that other companies were engaging in this practice. We identify backdating companies through backdating-related restatements of earnings. Using network analysis, we find that backdating companies are highly connected with other backdating companies via shared law firms. Logistic regressions reveal that the odds of a company backdating are 53 to 88 percent higher when its law firm has another client that backdates, and that law firm connections are incremental to board interlocks and geographic location. Finally, law firms with backdating clients have more other clients with “lucky” grants, suggesting that backdating spread to other companies, but only some restated.

Social ties between mutual funds and the companies in which they invest (investees) can both facilitate information transfers and encourage favoritism. Using the investment choices of mutual funds in China, we compare investment performance of holdings in companies that are socially connected to mutual funds versus those that are not. We find that funds allocate more investment to connected investees' stocks, especially when a fund is weakly monitored. This overweighting is greater in times of poor investee performance, when the benefits of additional investment to the connected investees are high. Weakly monitored funds' preference for connected stocks hurts the returns of these funds, yielding a 6.6 percent lower annualized risk-adjusted return, relative to closely monitored funds. These results suggest that, absent sufficient monitoring, agency conflicts generated by social networks can dominate the information advantages of these networks.

We investigate whether and how a “critical audit matter” (CAM) disclosure affects managers' real operating decisions in two contexts (issuing a loan that decreases versus increases the average risk profile of loan portfolios, or choosing to hedge versus speculate on commodity risk). We expect that a CAM disclosure increases disclosure costs and implies expanded auditor support for both types of activities, but we expect implied auditor support to be valued more highly for risk-increasing than for risk-decreasing activities. As a result, we predict that a CAM disclosure decreases managers' risk-decreasing activities (due to increased disclosure costs) more than managers' risk-increasing activities (as the implied auditor support counteracts the increased disclosure costs). We find evidence consistent with our prediction across multiple experiments. Our study sheds light on the unintended consequences of a CAM disclosure and provides insight to relevant parties as the new standard goes into effect.