Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT We investigate the relation between tax rates and pretax returns by showing how implicit tax, tax incidence, and tax capitalization change in response to a tax rate change. We examine these issues in the context of both financial assets and real investments made by corporations in a competitive equilibrium in which all investments earn the same after-tax rate of return. Results show that the pretax return increases in the statutory tax rate due to an explicit tax rate effect and decreases due to a cost of capital effect; the net effect is ambiguous. In contrast, the implicit tax rate is weakly increasing in the statutory tax rate. We also relate our findings to the empirical literature on the effects of taxes on pretax returns. JEL Classifications: H22; H25.

ABSTRACT We examine firm disclosure choice during the initial public offering (IPO) roadshow presentation to understand the informativeness of a management presentation designed to attract investors. Although firms submit a comprehensive registration filing during the IPO, managers also prepare a roadshow presentation, which is shorter and typically allows managers more autonomy to select the information released and how it is discussed. We find that IPO roadshows have significantly more positive, less negative, and less uncertain language than the SEC filing. Using machine learning to classify roadshow sentences into five major topics from the registration statement, we find that roadshows differ in both the topics selected and the language used within each topic. We then examine the predictive ability of the roadshow language, finding that roadshow language predicts future accounting performance, whereas filing language does not. These results highlight the informational role of management presentations, despite the flexibility they grant managers. JEL Classifications: M41; G10; M13.

ABSTRACT The Securities and Exchange Commission permits companies to redact proprietary information from material contract filings, so long as the redacted information (1) would cause competitive harm if disclosed, and (2) the information is legally immaterial. Because these joint criteria are inherently contradictory, we examine whether legally immaterial redacted information is economically material to investors. We find that firms’ stock price discovery process is significantly slower and insider trading is significantly greater after companies file redacted contracts compared to nonredacted contracts. We then examine the impact of the 2019 FAST Act, which reduced the SEC’s oversight of redacted contracts. Companies redact more frequently and insider trading (but not speed of stock price discovery) is more pronounced after the FAST Act. Taken together, these findings suggest that at least some redacted information is economically material to investors and that reducing SEC oversight of redacted information may not be in investors’ best interests. JEL Classifications: M41.

ABSTRACT We examine the effect of large audit firms’ internal inspection programs, an important monitoring mechanism, on auditor effort and financial reporting quality. Internal inspections are often predictable, and engagement teams concentrate their effort on audits ultimately selected for inspections. The extra effort increases the likelihood of a favorable inspection rating. We find some evidence of improvement in financial reporting quality in the inspection year, suggesting that internal inspections are effective in deterring auditor shirking. Upon receiving a favorable rating, the engagement team reverts audit effort back to the preinspection level. However, if the rating is unfavorable, the team increases effort on future engagements of the client. This higher effort improves the client’s financial reporting quality if the internal inspection program is not deemed deficient by the PCAOB. Collectively, the results highlight the importance of an effective internal inspection program in improving financial reporting quality. JEL Classifications: M41; M42.

ABSTRACT We develop a model in which accounting information and prudential regulation interact to affect banks’ incentives to originate loans. Prudential regulators impose capital requirements to prevent banks from taking excessive risk. However, regulators cannot commit to ex ante efficient intervention and, instead, respond to ex post accounting information. We show that capital requirements and accounting measurement are substitutes when considered separately. By contrast, when considered jointly, accounting measurement and capital requirements are complementary tools that affect the level and efficiency of credit decisions. Comparative statics link capital requirements, quality of accounting information, and regulatory intervention to credit market conditions. An upshot of our analysis is that by appropriately optimizing the information from expected loss models, prudential regulators may design looser capital requirements to spur more bank lending. JEL Classifications: G21; G28; M41; M48.

ABSTRACT Despite regulators’ allegations that digital technology giants misuse their market power to earn abnormal profits, there is a dearth of systematic work on (1) whether digital-tech firms in general, and tech giants in particular, earn excess profits or (2) whether their abnormal profitability, if any, is due to market power. We use two alternative measures of economic profitability in addition to accounting rate of return (ARR): internal rate of return (IRR), which equates current investments to their long-term payback, and return on invested capital (ROIC), whose numerator (profits) and denominator (invested capital) are adjusted for capitalized intangibles. Inferences based on IRRs differ from those based on ARRs and ROICs. IRRs show that the digital-tech sector is now the best-performing sector, and its gap between profitability and cost of capital has increased over time. We are unable to separate the contribution of market power and innovation to digital tech’s high IRRs. JEL Classifications: D43; L1; M21; M41.

ABSTRACT We study the optimal information system in a debt contracting setting in which managers can engage in value destroying risk-shifting behavior. The information system issues early-warning signals that allow lenders to take corrective actions such as liquidating unprofitable projects. When managers are empire builders, the optimal system exhibits a conservative bias that leads to excessive early-warning signals and excessive project liquidations relative to first best. In contrast, when managers have a strong preference for a quiet life, the optimal system exhibits a liberal bias that leads to insufficient early-warning signals and excessive project continuations. The broad intuition is that excessive liquidations (continuations) impose costs on managers who have a preference for empire building (a quiet life), and these costs are more severe when managers take excessive risks. The bias in the information system therefore permits managers to commit not to engage in risk shifting and facilitates debt financing. JEL Classifications: G30; G32; M40; M41.

ABSTRACT Prior studies show that comment letters released by the Securities and Exchange Commission provide information on firms’ financial reporting quality and can have adverse value implications about the firms. We examine whether short sellers front-run comment letter disclosures and take short positions based on the economic implications of the letters. We find that short interest increases before comment letter disclosures and that the increase is positively associated with the severity of the letters. We also find evidence suggesting that short sellers obtain private information through social connections with corporate insiders. Finally, we document a negative but delayed market reaction to the disclosure of severe comment letters. These results suggest that front running the comment letter disclosure is not the optimal trading strategy for short sellers. Short sellers can gain similar profits, and bear less risk, if they put off increasing their short positions until after the disclosure. JEL Classifications: G32; M40.

ABSTRACT Regulatory economics suggests that one benefit of public enforcement is the deterrence of improper conduct. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) design, we investigate whether a deterrence effect follows the revelation of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) enforcement. We find that large audit firm offices improve audit quality following enforcement naming another office within their firm while small firm offices improve following enforcement of local small firm competitors, with these responses varying by enforcement type. To understand potential mechanisms for the geographic deterrence effect, we examine the first occurrence of a revoked PCAOB registration within a market and find that results are stronger if there is greater news coverage or if nonsanctioned firms are in closer proximity to the sanctioned auditor. Supplemental tests reveal that results are stronger when nonsanctioned auditor clients are similar to the sanctioned firm’s clientele. Our findings suggest a positive but varied deterrence effect following PCAOB enforcement. JEL Classifications: G38; M42; M48.