Abstract This study investigates whether the net deferred tax liabilities disclosed under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109, Accounting for Income Taxes (SFAS No. 109) provides additional value-relevant information over the disclosure required by Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 11, Accounting for Income Taxes (APS No. 11). Evidence suggests that SEAS No. 109 data represent value-relevant information above and beyond APB No. 11. Additionally, evidence indicates that the changes made by SFAS No. 109-the separate recognition of deferred tax assets, the creation of valuation allowances for deferred tax assets and the adjustment of deferred tax accounts for enacted tax rate changes-each provide value-relevant firm data. These results suggest that SFAS No. 109 increased the value-relevance of deferred tax amounts in financial statements.

[This study investigates whether the net deferred tax liabilities disclosed under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109, Accounting for Income Taxes (SFAS No. 109) provides additional value-relevant information over the disclosure required by Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 11, Accounting for Income Taxes (APB No. 11). Evidence suggests that SFAS No. 109 data represent value-relevant information above and beyond APB No. 11. Additionally, evidence indicates that the changes made by SFAS No. 109-the separate recognition of deferred tax assets, the creation of valuation allowances for deferred tax assets and the adjustment of deferred tax accounts for enacted tax rate changes-each provide value-relevant firm data. These results suggest that SFAS No. 109 increased the value-relevance of deferred tax amounts in financial statements.]

[This paper examines the voluntary disclosure of nonproprietary information using the model of uncertain information endowment developed by Dye (1985) and Farrell (1986), and extended by Jung and Kwon (1988). The paper focuses on a broad family of functions relating the probability of information acquisition to ex post information quality. The paper shows that for each function there is some region that displays a negative relation between ex ante information quality and the frequency of disclosure. In addition, a sub-family of functions is identified for which ex ante information quality and the frequency of disclosure are negatively related everywhere. These results indicate that the economic intuition that higher informational asymmetry is accompanied by more voluntary disclosure is not generally true.]

Abstract This study investigates the separate and joint effects of prior knowledge and accountability on performance in the information search phase of a tax research task. An experiment is reported in which 63 tax professionals performed a computer-based tax research task. The results indicate that increases in effort duration, which are partly attributable to the accountability manipulation, improved search effectiveness regardless of the level of prior knowledge. In addition, after controlling for the effect of effort duration, accountability had an incremental positive effect on performance among the more knowledgeable professionals. These results suggest that effort can substitute for knowledge in performing information search tasks, but this substitution does not appear to be complete. The results also support the hypothesis that the effect of accountability on performance depends upon the level of knowledge, which suggests that certain aspects of effort and knowledge act as complements in improving performance.

[This study investigates the separate and joint effects of prior knowledge and accountability on performance in the information search phase of a tax research task. An experiment is reported in which 63 tax professionals performed a computer-based tax research task. The results indicate that increases in effort duration, which are partly attributable to the accountability manipulation, improved search effectiveness regardless of the level of prior knowledge. In addition, after controlling for the effect of effort duration, accountability had an incremental positive effect on performance among the more knowledgeable professionals. These results suggest that effort can substitute for knowledge in performing information search tasks, but this substitution does not appear to be complete. The results also support the hypothesis that the effect of accountability on performance depends upon the level of knowledge, which suggests that certain aspects of effort and knowledge act as complements in improving performance.]

[This paper considers how time pressure and knowledge separately and jointly affect tax researchers' ability to locate relevant authority. Tax professionals and graduate tax students participated in a computer interactive experiment in which subjects selected relevant key words relating to a partnership tax issue. The results indicate that declarative and procedural knowledge enhance tax researchers' ability to select relevant key words in a time-restricted task. The most significant finding is that subjects with procedural knowledge responded more positively to time pressure than did subjects without such knowledge, thereby demonstrating an interaction between time pressure and knowledge.]

Abstract Reviews the book `The Role of the Accountant in Strategic Planning: A Model for the 1990s,' by Crispin Simon.

[One of the most common decisions facing an internal auditor is choosing which line items to investigate. An extensive literature (Dworin and Grimlund 1984; Leslie et al. 1980; Menzefricke 1984; Teitlebaum and Robinson 1975) deals with the statistical and decision-theoretic aspects of his choice. This paper expands on previous work by adding a strategic source of errors: dishonest employees. It addresses the question of how the presence of strategic errors affects the relationship between the auditor's testing strategy and item value. I show that incorporating strategic errors can lead to audit strategies similar to Physical Units and Dollar Units Sampling. I highlight the assumptions driving the results by contrasting a firm's (or internal auditor's) use of an optional test in four stylized models of accounts receivable. The first model examines the firm's behavior when faced with non-strategic (statistical) billing errors. In this model the accounting system generates random errors that result in over- or underbilling customers. The firm can use a costly, imperfect test to remove errors before the bills are sent out. In this nonstrategic model the firm randomizes and tests an item if and only if the benefit is greater than the cost. Because the amount of billing error is unrelated to the item value, there is no clear link between the firm's testing decision and the value of the line item. The second billing model adds the possible existence of dishonest employees who can steal from line items. A dishonest employee makes two decisions. He decides whether to steal from the line item, and, if he steals, he chooses the amount of the theft. A dishonest employee would steal the entire item if he were certain that the firm would never test that item. The dishonest employee's behavior forces the firm to consider the value of the item in determining the region of untested items. Specifically, low value items are never tested. As in many strategic models, the interaction with dishonest employees may lead to randomization. In particular, the randomized testing strategy can look like Stratified Physical Units Attributes Sampling (Leslie et al. 1980). The firm sorts items into different groups and each item in a group has the same probability of being tested. The third model contains only the statistical errors of incorrectly adding or deleting a sales discount, a percentage of the item value. Since the testing gain is directly related to the value of the line item, the firm's strategy depends on an item's value. The firm always tests high value items, and never tests low value items. The fourth model adds potentially dishonest employees who can provide unearned sales discounts to their confederates. In this model the firm stratifies items into three groups. It never investigates small items, always investigates large items, and randomizes over intermediate value items with probabilities roughly proportionate to the value of the item. This procedure is similar to a common audit procedure, Dollar Unit Cell Width Sampling (Leslie et al. 1980).]

Abstract One of the most common decisions facing an internal auditor is choosing which line items to investigate. An extensive literature (Dworin and Grimlund 1984; Leslie et al. 1980; Menz& fricke 1984; Teitlebaum and Robinson 1975) deals with the statistical and decision-theoretic aspects of his choice. This paper expands on previous work by adding a strategic source of errors: dishonest employees. It addresses the question of how the presence of strategic errors affects the relationship between the auditor's testing strategy and item value. I show that incorporating strategic errors can lead to audit strategies similar to Physical Units and Dollar Units Sampling. I highlight the assumptions driving the results by contrasting a firm's (or internal auditor's) use of an optional test in four stylized models of accounts receivable. The first model examines the firm's behavior when faced with nonstrategic (statistical) billing errors. In this model the accounting system generates random errors that result in over- or underbilling customers. The firm can use a costly, imperfect test to remove errors before the bills are sent out. In this nonstrategic model the firm randomizes and tests an item if and only if the benefit is greater than the cost. Because the amount of billing error is unrelated to the item value, there is no clear link between the firm's testing decision and the value of the line item. The second billing model adds the possible existence of dishonest employees who can steal from line items. A dishonest employee makes two decisions. He decides whether to steal from the line item, and, if he steals, he chooses the amount of the theft. A dishonest employee would steal the entire item if he were certain that the firm would never test that item. The dishonest employee's behavior forces the firm to consider the value of the item in determining the region of untested items. Specifically, low value items are never tested. As in many strategic models, the interaction with dishonest employees may lead to randomization. In particular, the randomized testing strategy can look like Stratified Physical Units Attributes Sampling (Leslie et alt 1980). The firm sorts items into different groups and each item in a group has the same probability of being tested. The third model contains only the statistical errors of incorrectly adding or deleting a sales discount, a percentage of the item value. Since the testing gain is directly related to the value of the line item, the firm's strategy depends on an item's value. The firm always tests high value items, and never tests low value items. The fourth model adds potentially dishonest employees who can pros vide unearned sales discounts to their confederates. In this model the firm stratifies items into three groups. It never investigates small items, always investigates large items, and randomizes over intermediate value items with probabilities roughly proportionate to the value of the item. This procedure is similar to a common audit procedure, Dollar Unit Cell Width Sampling (Leslie et al. 1980).

[The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) relies increasingly on its ability to detect taxpayer noncompliance without engaging in a comprehensive individual audit. The IRS's compliance initiative, Compliance 2000, emphasizes the targeting of noncompliant taxpayers rather than relying on random audits to enforce the tax laws. For example, the IRS uses a model developed from the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) to help it choose which returns to audit. The treatment of losses from tax shelter partnerships presents a difficult compliance problem for the IRS. It is not evident from the face of either the partnership return or the partner's return whether the losses from the partnership can be legitimately deducted. A plausible audit strategy is for the IRS to develop models that can predict when an individual is improperly deducting a loss. The tax shelter disclosure rules in I.R.C. section 6111 and section 6112 provide information to the IRS that helps it detect taxpayers investing in abusive tax shelters. Previous work has modeled tax compliance as a game between a wealth-maximizing taxpayer and a tax enforcement agency trying to maximize government revenues, net of audit costs (Graetz et al. 1986; Reinganum and Wilde 1986; Beck and Jung 1989). In these papers, the IRS uses the taxpayer's declaration of income when it decides whether to audit that taxpayer. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of information that helps the IRS predict tax evasion on the strategic choices made by the taxpayer and the IRS. The information has a direct effect by giving the IRS information that can improve its audit decision. It also has an indirect effect by changing the taxpayer's incentives to engage in tax evasion, which in turn changes the IRS's incentives to audit taxpayers. The optimal level of information acquisition is also examined. The analysis yields four important results regarding the effect of information on tax compliance. First, it can induce an increase in tax evasion. Second, it has no effect on the expected level of gross government revenues. Third, it can increase expected audit costs. Fourth, the optimal level of investment in information acquisition does not vary monotonically with tax rates, penalty rates, audit costs, or the amount of loss deducted by the taxpayer.]