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Auditors' Incentives and Their Application of Financial Accounting Standards.

The Accounting Review 1996 71(1), 43-59
Abstract We report on an experiment in which experienced auditors (1) determine whether to allow a client to adopt an aggressive reporting method when the auditors have an incentive to do so, and (2) justify aggressive reporting by their interpretations of financial accounting standards. In the experiment, the appropriate reporting method depends upon whether an amount can be "reasonably estimated" as that term is used in an applicable accounting standard. The accounting standard relevant to determining the appropriate reporting method was manipulated between subjects (thus varying whether judging that an amount can be reasonably estimated would justify an aggressive or conservative method), as was engagement risk. The results indicate that the auditors responded to moderate engagement risk by permitting the aggressive reporting method and justified their choice with aggressive interpretations of accounting standards. When faced with high engagement risk, the auditors responded by requiring conservative reporting and justified their choice with conservative interpretations of accounting standards.

U.S. Income Tax Transfer Pricing Rules For Intangibles as Approximations of Arm's Length Pricing.

The Accounting Review 1996 71(1), 61-80 open access
Abstract Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) have an incentive to shift income to lowertaxed jurisdictions. On July 1,1994, the Treasury Department issued intercompany transfer pricing regulations to mitigate such transfer of income resulting from the use of intangibles. The regulations give three alternative methods--(1) Comparable Uncontrolled Transactions (CUT), (2) Comparable Profit Method (CPM) and (3) Profit Split--to tax the intangibles. However, each of these three methods introduces incentives to the MNEs to alter resource allocations in comparison with a full-information optimum. In this paper, we examine the resource allocation changes under each method. The policy alternative to the use of such approximating measures is an increased attempt at direct valuation.

Stewardship Value of Earnings Components: Additional Evidence on the Determinants of Executive Compensation.

The Accounting Review 1996 71(1), 1-22
Abstract This paper investigates the role of components of earnings in CEO compensation contracts, it argues that shareholders will use components of earnings as additional performance measures whenever the components provide information, over and above earnings, about managerial decisions. Results indicate that earnings and cash flow measures together have a better association with cash compensation paid to CEOs of U.S. companies than aggregate earnings alone. The evidence also suggests that current accruals and cash flows from operations are aggregated for performance evaluation. Stewardship value measures are able to explain some of the cross-sectional variation in the weights attached to earnings and working capital from operations. Significant variation in the use of cash flow measures and contract efficiency is detected between the early (1970 to 1979) and late (1980-1988) halves of the sample period.