Knowledge that Transforms

This paper develops a multiperiod principal-agent model in which a manager must be given incentives to undertake investments and to exert personally costly effort. Investments are “soft” (e.g., intangible assets) and therefore entail measurement errors for the accounting system as it seeks to separate investments from operating expenditures. This separation is of no concern to the stock market, which draws on its own information about future cash flows resulting from current investments. The firm's stock price, however, reflects all value-relevant information, parts of which are not incentive relevant. Optimal incentive provisions must combine “forward-looking” market information with “backward-looking” accounting information. Under certain conditions, optimal performance measures can be expressed as a weighted average of economic value added (residual income) and market value added.

Protection of outside investors depends on the detection and punishment of resource diversion by corporate insiders, including managers and controlling shareholders. We focus on the role played in investor protection by self-interested auditors operating in a competitive audit market. In our setting, auditors represent the mechanism whereby detection of diversion occurs. We show that markets with relatively greater auditor penalties for audit failures and greater insider penalties for detected resource diversion have larger total investment levels, a higher proportion of the firm held by outsiders, higher audit resource investment, higher audit fees, and higher expected investment returns.

Adopting management accounting systems are important events in the life of young and growing companies. Using a sample of 78 startup companies, we document cross-sectional differences in the adoption of operating budgets as well as seven other management accounting systems. We find that our proxies for agency costs, perceived benefits and costs, company scale, and top management style explain cross-sectional differences in the time-to-adoption of budgets. In particular, the presence of venture capital, CEO experience, presence of a financial manager, number of employees, and the CEO beliefs about management planning systems are associated with this adoption decision. We further investigate the effect of hiring a financial manager as an endogenous variable. In the first stage of a two-stage model, we find that CEO experience, the presence of venture capital funds, CEO beliefs about management accounting systems, and number of employees are associated with crosssectional variation in this hiring decision. When treating this decision as endogenous, time-to-hiring a financial manager is unrelated to operating budget adoption. The paper also examines the association between the time-to-adoption of operating budgets and company performance. We find a significant increase in the number of employees of the company around the adoption of operating budgets; moreover, faster adoption of operating budgets is associated with faster growing companies. We extend the findings to additional management accounting systems including: cash budgets, variance analysis, operating expense approval policies, capital expenditure approval policies, product profitability, customer profitability, and customer acquisition costs. The influence of industry (biotechnology, information technology, or non-tech) is examined in each stage of the research.

This paper examines the conditions under which the market responds to disclosures of significant increases in short selling, and whether proxies for earnings expectations and alternative information sources help explain this response. Our sample is based on firms that experience abnormal short interest increases (“short spikes”) during 1989–1998. We find that the mean abnormal return around short spike announcements is significantly more negative for firms with low analyst following, consistent with short sellers providing perceived value when there are limited alternative sources of guidance available. For firms with high analyst following we find the market response is dependent on earnings levels, consistent with investors viewing a short interest increase as providing information about the sustainability of earnings. Additional analyses reveal that these inferences are not affected by measures of firms' earnings quality or by the relative size of the short spike. We infer from our analyses that the information content of short interest disclosures is conditional on both the firms' existing information environment and expectations of future performance as conveyed by prior earnings. This inference is consistent with short sellers' role as information intermediaries covering the lower tail of earnings expectations.

Many auditors use an audit methodology that requires a strategic risk assessment of their client's business model as a first step for assessing audit risks. This study examines whether the holistic perspective that auditors acquire in making a strategic risk assessment influences the extent to which they adjust account-level risk assessments when they encounter changes in accounts that are inconsistent with information about client operations. Based on halo theory from the performance evaluation literature, we hypothesize that auditors who (1) perform (do not perform) strategic assessment, and (2) develop favorable (unfavorable) strategic risk assessments, are less (more) likely to adjust account-level risk assessments for inconsistent fluctuations. Data from two laboratory experiments using experienced auditors support both hypotheses. Findings suggest that the halo effect generated during strategic assessment influences judgment by altering auditor tolerance for inconsistent fluctuations.

I extend prior research on the information content of conference calls by examining whether they accelerate analysts' and investors' responses to the future implications of currently announced earnings. I find that the initiation of conference calls is associated with a significant reduction in the serial correlation in analyst forecast errors, a measure of initial analyst underreaction. I also find that the initiation of conference calls is associated with significant reductions in two measures of initial investor underreaction: (1) post-earnings announcement drift and (2) the proportion of the total market reaction to firms' earnings announcements that is “delayed” (i.e., that is attributable to post-earnings announcement drift). The reduction in post-earnings announcement drift surrounding conference call initiation is concentrated in the set of sample firms where drift is most severe (i.e., the smallest, least heavily traded sample firms) while the largest, most heavily traded sample firms do not exhibit significant drift either before or after conference call initiation. Robustness tests, including analyses of matched samples of nonconference call firms, indicate that the results are not driven by general increases in analyst and investor sophistication over time or by contemporaneous increases in the information and trading environments of conference call initiators.

Analysts and the managers of firms they track have both come under fire in recent years. In particular, managers are accused of using earnings guidance to exert undue influence on analyst forecasts. This paper analyzes optimal incentive contracts that take into account the interaction between analysts and firm managers. In our setting, biased earnings guidance is a natural consequence of contract design. The bias serves to create enough uncertainty so as to motivate the analyst and, thus, may not necessarily be the scourge suggested by conventional wisdom.

Negotiations are a pervasive feature of the audit process (e.g., the resolution of proposed audit adjustments and disclosures). The results of such negotiations are of great importance to the capital markets, the client, and the auditor. The purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of three promising, pragmatic intervention methods for enhancing auditor negotiation performance: a role-playing intervention—assuming the client's position in a mock negotiation; a passive intervention—explicitly considering the client's interests and options; and a practice intervention—engaging in a mock negotiation prior to the client negotiation. We posit that the role-playing intervention will improve negotiation results, because this approach requires direct experience in considering and arguing the client's position and more cognitive effort in obtaining an understanding of the counterpart's position, a critical factor identified in the negotiation literature for successful performance. Forty-five audit managers and partners were provided a realistic case based on an actual scenario involving the potential writedown of inventory due to obsolescence. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups (role-playing, passive, or practice) and asked to negotiate the issue with a confederate playing the role of the CFO. Auditor conservatism and a large actual subsequent writedown suggest that a significant adjustment is warranted. The results indicate that the role-playing intervention method led to an enhanced negotiation outcome (greater writedown) compared to the passive and practice groups. Process improvements on a number of dimensions were also found, particularly for the role-playing group compared to the practice group.

Employment relationships provide fertile ground for both employee and employer opportunism. Employers worry about whether employees will devote sufficient effort to work, and employees are concerned about whether employers will compensate them appropriately. In this paper, we examine whether employer discretion over the size of the total employee compensation pool and the allocation of this pool among employees influences employee and employer opportunism. The results of our experiment indicate that firm output and employees' compensation are greater when the employer does not have discretion over total employee compensation, but does have discretion over the allocation of total compensation. We find that the employer's residual profit increases with discretion over the allocation of compensation among employees; however, we find no effect on residual profit of the employer's discretion over the total amount of employee compensation. Our results suggest that firms benefit from a compensation contract that establishes total employee compensation as a predetermined function of public, aggregate measures such as accounting income, but provides the employer at least some discretion to allocate this compensation using private information. However, our results caution that employees and employers may not have similar preferences for the degree of employer discretion over the determination of total employee compensation.

Managers, investors, and researchers have a compelling interest in identifying a reliable empirical proxy for firm-specific cost of equity capital (r). In theory, deducing r is possible if the market's future cash flow forecast and current stock price are observable. Practically, deducing r is dependent on the ability to estimate the market's forecasted terminal value. We evaluate five methods of deducing firm-specific r (labeled rDIVPREM, rGLSPREM, rGORPREM, rOJNPREM, and rPEGPREM) that deal with this conundrum differently. The extent to which the estimates are associated with firm risk in a stable and meaningful manner is the basis for our assessment. We find that the rDIVPREM and rPEGPREM estimates are consistently and predictably related to risk, while the alternatives are not. Based on these results, we conclude that rDIVPREM and rPEGPREM dominate the alternatives.