Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines accounting and nonaccounting factors behind accounting losses over a 50-year period. Using multivariate time-series analysis, we report evidence that the annual percentage of losses for U.S. firms is significantly related to accounting conservatism, Compustat coverage of small firms, real firm performance as measured by cash flows from operations, and business cycle factors. We further find that nonaccounting factors tend to play the dominant role in explaining accounting losses over our sample period. Our results are robust to alternative definitions of macroeconomic productivity, as well as to varying model specifications. Our findings contribute to the literature on accounting losses and accounting conservatism and have implications for the use of accounting loss information in numerous settings.

Errors in estimated product costs lead firms to win business that is unprofitable, because firms are more likely to win business when underestimated product costs lead them to bid below actual cost (Cooper et al. 1992; Hilton 2005). Feedback from repeated competitive bidding markets can teach people to bid well above estimated costs to avoid this winner's curse (Kagel 1995; Kagel and Levin 2002). We present experimental evidence that such learning is substantially hampered by sellers' sense of responsibility for the costs. This effect is consistent with psychological evidence that people tend to attribute bad outcomes to environmental factors out of their control, such as cost-estimation errors, and attribute good outcomes to their own skills, such as their ability to choose effective cost-management initiatives (Miller and Ross 1975; Zuckerman 1979). The results suggest that responsibility structures that combine pricing and production decisions may have unexpected drawbacks.

Prior studies suggest that venture capitalists (VCs) play a monitoring role. We predict and find that IPO-year abnormal accruals are lower in the presence of VCs for a sample of 2,630 IPO firms during 1983–2001. Our findings are robust to controls for the endogenous choice of VC financing. We consistently find that the VC effect holds even when controlling for IPO lock-up provisions, VC partial cashing out subsequent to the IPO, and alternative proxies for earnings management. In addition, our findings do not support the claims of critics that VCs inflated earnings during the Internet IPO bubble. Finally, we provide some evidence that the lower earnings management associated with VC monitoring partially explains the superior post-IPO returns of VC-backed firms.

Recent corporate governance reforms that require audit committees to pre-approve audit and nonaudit services increase audit committees' accountability to third parties for actual auditor independence and audit quality. Other SEC reforms mandate the disclosure of fees for auditor-provided services and are aimed at influencing investors' perceptions of auditor independence. These fee disclosures also reveal audit committees' pre-approval decisions, enhancing public accountability. Thus, audit committees may be less willing to hire auditors for nonaudit services to avoid fee disclosures, even when joint provision improves audit quality. One hundred experienced corporate directors, responding as audit committee members or investors, participated in an experiment in which we manipulated the effect of the auditor's provision of nonaudit services on audit quality and the fee disclosure requirement. We find that audit committee members are more likely to recommend joint provision if audit quality improves, consistent with investors' preferences. However, unlike investors, committee members are more reluctant to recommend joint provision when public disclosures are required, even at the expense of audit quality. These findings offer evidence about an indirect effect of recent reforms.

We investigate whether the positive associations between discretionary accrual proxies and beating earnings benchmarks hold for comparisons of groups segregated at other points in the distributions of earnings, earnings changes, and analystsbased unexpected earnings. We refer to these points as “pseudo” targets. Results suggest that the positive association between discretionary accruals and beating the profit benchmark extends to pseudo targets throughout the earnings distribution. We find similar results for the earnings change distribution. In contrast, we find few positive associations between discretionary accruals and beating pseudo targets derived from analysts-based unexpected earnings. We develop an additional analysis that accounts for the systematic association between discretionary accruals and earnings and earnings changes. Results suggest that the positive association between discretionary accruals and earnings intensifies around the actual profit benchmark (i.e., where earnings management incentives may be more pronounced). We find similar effects around the actual earnings increase benchmark. However, analogous patterns exist for cash flows around the profit and earnings increase benchmarks. In sum, we are unable to eliminate other plausible explanations for the associations between discretionary accruals and beating the profit and earnings increase benchmarks.

In this paper, I extend the organizational design literature by examining how the delegation choice is affected by the ability to resolve the incentive problem caused by this delegation. Based on the seminal papers by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994), I argue that the ability to resolve the incentive problem depends on the contractibility of financial performance measures versus nonfinancial performance measures, where the contractibility depends on the performance measure properties sensitivity, precision, and verifiability. The empirical results show that, if financial performance measures are “good” (“poor”) incentive measures, i.e., high (low) on sensitivity, precision, and verifiability, then using these measures for incentive purposes increases (decreases) delegation. Overall, the results are consistent with the argument that firms design their decision-making process around the quality of contractible performance measures.

In this paper we investigate the reputational penalties to managers of firms announcing earnings restatements. More specifically, we examine management turnover and the subsequent employment of displaced managers at firms announcing earnings restatements during 1997 or 1998. In contrast to prior research (Beneish 1999; Agrawal et al. 1999), which does not find increased turnover following GAAP violations or revelation of corporate fraud, we find that 60 percent of restating firms experience a turnover of at least one top manager within 24 months of the restatement compared to 35 percent among age-, size-, and industry-matched firms. Moreover, the subsequent employment prospects of the displaced managers of restatement firms are poorer than those of the displaced managers of control firms. Our results hold after controlling for firm performance, bankruptcy, and other determinants of management turnover, and suggest that both corporate boards and the external labor market impose significant penalties on managers for violating GAAP. Also, in light of resource constraints at the SEC, our findings are encouraging as they suggest that private penalties for GAAP violations are severe and may serve as partial substitutes for public enforcement of GAAP violations.

We examine whether nonprofit organizations understate fundraising expenses in their publicly available financial statements. A large body of anecdotal evidence notes that an inexplicable number of nonprofits report zero fundraising expenses. We provide empirical evidence that the zero fundraising expense phenomenon is at least partly due to inappropriate reporting. We then examine to what extent these misreported expenses are the result of managerial incentives. Prior research finds an association between reported expenses and managerial compensation as well as the level of donations received. Using these findings we construct two incentive variables and find a positive association between misreporting behavior and managerial incentives. Our results also suggest that the use of an outside accountant reduces the probability that a nonprofit will misreport expenses, consistent with the use of an outside paid accountant increasing the reliability and usefulness of nonprofit financial reports. Finally, we find that SOP 98-2 reduced the probability that a nonprofit will misreport fundraising expenses.

In this study we report the results of an experiment that examines how relatively sophisticated financial statement users interpret management stock option compensation disclosures under SFAS No. 123 and SFAS No. 123R. We predict and find that mandated income statement recognition, as required under SFAS No. 123R, leads to higher user assessments of reliability than either voluntary income statement recognition or voluntary footnote disclosure, options allowed under SFAS No. 123. Users view voluntary footnote disclosure as the least reliable reporting alternative. We also examine the amount users invest in response to these accounting treatments, and find that users invest more in a firm when management chooses income statement recognition than when management chooses footnote disclosure. We find no difference in investment amounts between mandated recognition and either voluntary recognition or footnote disclosure. Finally, although we find that these results are insensitive to whether management explicitly disavows the reliability of stock option expense, we present evidence that, in side-by-side comparisons, where one firm disavows and the other does not, disavowals may affect user judgments and decisions.

Using 1997–1999 annual performance evaluation data of 214 postal stores in Korea, we find that financial performance improves following the implementation of an incentive plan that includes relative performance measures, and that under this incentive plan, the degree of common uncertainty is positively associated with store profitability. We also find evidence that the incentive effect of the plan is mitigated in stores at which the employees' perceived unfairness is likely to be high. Finally, we find that the net benefits of introducing the incentive plan may be conditional on the degree of common uncertainty, which appears to be inversely related to the perceived unfairness attributable to the introduction of the contract with relative performance measures.