Knowledge that Transforms

Using brokerage mergers and closures as two sources of exogenous shock to analyst coverage, this study explores the causal effect of analyst coverage on ex ante expected crash risk as captured by the options implied volatility smirk. We find a significant increase in a firm's ex ante expected crash risk subsequent to an exogenous drop in analyst coverage; this positive effect is stronger for firms initially receiving less coverage. Further, we find analysts' ability matters to investors' assessment of future crash risk. Specifically, we find the impact is more pronounced for the coverage terminations of analysts with more firm-specific or general experience, with greater access to resources, or whose prior forecasts are more accurate than those of their peers. Overall, our results suggest that investors in the options market do recognize analysts as important information intermediaries and monitors and, thus, that analyst coverage influences the underlying stock's expected crash risk.

This study examines the effect of restrictions on managers' outside employment opportunities on voluntary corporate disclosure. The recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by courts in the U.S. states in which the firms are headquartered places greater restrictions on their managers from joining or forming a rival company. We find that, on average, the IDD adoption increases the asymmetric withholding of bad news. We further show that the IDD adoption increases the asymmetric withholding of bad news relative to good news for firms whose managers are mainly concerned about losing their current job. However, an opposite effect is observed for firms whose managers are mainly interested in seeking promotion elsewhere. Furthermore, these effects are less pronounced for firms subject to greater monitoring of their disclosure policy. These results suggest that managers' career concerns affect corporate disclosure policy, and the effect varies with the type of career concerns.

We examine how the adoption of executive stock ownership guidelines affects debtholder wealth. We find that guideline adoption is associated with lower loan spreads, fewer collateral requirements, and fewer other restrictive covenants. The results are robust to using an instrumental variables approach. We further find that guideline adoption has a negative effect on bond yield spreads and that after the adoption, firms' risk-taking incentives are lower. These results suggest that guideline adoption benefits debtholders by lowering agency costs of debt. However, we also find that adoption of ownership guidelines is associated with a significant increase in stock prices, and that firms are more likely to increase financial reporting quality in the post-adoption period, indicating that guideline adoption incentivizes managers to improve firm fundamentals, benefiting both shareholders and debtholders.

We propose a model to study how auditing standards affect audit quality. We posit that both auditors' incentives and expertise are relevant for audit effectiveness. Auditing standards are useful in mitigating the auditors' possible misalignment of interest with investors. However, auditing standards also restrict auditors' exercise of professional judgment, which, in turn, leads to compliance mentality and reduces auditors' incentives to become competent in the first place. We identify the conditions under which stricter auditing standards increase or decrease audit quality. Moreover, stricter auditing standards always increase audit fees, but can benefit auditors at firms' expense. The model also generates many testable empirical predictions.

We measure two dimensions of SOX 404 audit quality: (1) whether auditors identify and report material weaknesses (MWs) in a timely fashion, and (2) on identifying MWs, whether auditors identify misstatements arising from MWs in a timely fashion. We find that audit practice-offices with a large base of SOX 404(b) clients and those with a long history of conducting control evaluations for that client are more likely (1) to identify and report MWs in a timely manner (i.e., before resulting restatements come to light), and conditional on identifying MWs, (2) to detect MW-related misstatements in a timely manner (i.e., before the misstatements become restatements). Audit office industry expertise also matters, but only to timely MW reporting. Our results inform on the drivers of variation in SOX 404 audit quality, and highlight the key role that auditors play in identifying internal control weaknesses and assessing their impact on financial statement reliability.

Managers express growing concern over media coverage of corporate taxes, yet no large-sample empirical study examines this phenomenon. As a first step to fill this void, we identify factors associated with the likelihood and negative tone of media tax coverage and examine firms' tax avoidance behavior following media tax coverage. We find the likelihood of media tax coverage is greater for firms with GAAP effective tax rates below the top U.S. statutory rate of 35 percent and for firms with greater visibility. The degree of negative tone is increasing in cash tax avoidance and firm size. We also find evidence of more frequent and more negative tax coverage during economic recessions. We find no evidence that firms reduce their tax avoidance following media coverage. Although our analyses are subject to limitations, our results suggest the media may not have the same influence over corporate tax policy as other external stakeholders. JEL Classifications: H25; H26; H20; M41; G39. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the paper.

Using a large sample of multinational corporations (MNCs), we examine the location of earnings management within the firm. We posit and find that MNCs manage their consolidated earnings through an orchestrated reporting strategy across subsidiaries over which they exert significant influence. Specifically, we find that headquarters' influence on subsidiary earnings management increases with the degree of subsidiary integration and the extent of earnings management opportunities. Most importantly, we provide evidence that MNCs exploit regulatory arbitrage opportunities arising from cross-country differences in institutional quality. We document that, in response to exogenous improvements in the quality of their home-country institutions, MNCs rebalance their reporting strategies by clustering earnings management in subsidiaries from countries with more lenient regulations. Taken together, our findings yield important insights on the drivers of earnings management location within the firm and highlight the need for better cross-country coordination in regulatory design.