Knowledge that Transforms

A simplified audit setting is used to illustrate the crucial nature of strategic interactions in audit planning and in assessing audit risk. Unlike single-person decisiontheoretic models which essentially represent games against nature, the model developed here allows a prospective audit to influence the behavior of the auditee. We reformulate the problem in a game-theoretic framework with rational players which (1) encompasses strategic factors for both the auditor and auditee, (2) is consistent with behavioral hypotheses regarding the effect of an audit, and (3) is consistent with certain audit phenomena such as randomized strategies. An illustration is provided which demonstrates several points. First, both the auditor and the auditee may frequently use a randomized strategy. Second, the auditor's strategy depends on the interaction between the accounting control system and the auditee's actions. In addition, the use of traditional single-person decision theory may frequently cause errors in estimating audit risk because it fails to consider audit influences on the auditee. Settings in which decision theory may serve as an adequate model simplification are also considered.

The objective of this study is to examine how certain contextual factors in auditor-client conflicts affect the perceived ability of auditors to resist client pressure. A review of the literature resulted in the identification of four factors hypothesized to affect sophisticated financial statement users' perceptions of audit conflict outcomes: nature of conflict issue, client's financial condition, provision of MAS by the audit firm, and the degree of competition in the audit services market. A full-factorial, repeated measures ANOVA experiment was conducted using senior loan officers as subjects. The results indicate that a client in good financial condition is perceived as being more likely to obtain its preferred outcome to an audit conflict than a client in poor financial condition. Clients are also viewed as being more likely to obtain their preferred resolution to a conflict when the conflict issue is not dealt with precisely by the technical standards.

This study examines the motivations for failing firms to change auditors. Some of the factors that could influence auditor switching include audit qualifications, reporting disputes, management changes, audit fees, and insurance needs. Annual reports, 10-Ks, and proxy statements were used to gather data for a sample of 132 failing (bankrupt) firms and a matched-pair sample of nonfailing firms. The investigation's findings strongly supported our prior expectations that failing firms have a greater tendency to switch auditors than do healthier firms. Other findings revealed that neither audit qualifications nor management changes were statistically associated with auditor displacement in failing firms. Failing firms that changed auditors did display a preference to move to a different class of CPA firms. Also, size did not appear to matter with respect to the observed auditor switching among the failing firms, although it appeared to have some effect among control firms. Overall, our study's major findings suggest a definite need to control for the presence of financial distress in studies on auditor switching.

[This paper uses discriminant analysis as a foundation for an admissions policy for accounting majors. The discriminant model is capable of correctly classifying students into Accept/Reject groups with a statistical accuracy of 78 percent using only three characteristics-grade-point average at 45 semester hours, grade in college mathematics, and grade in English composition. The model, more importantly, correctly classifies 90 percent of those students who, according to the model's criterion, should be rejected. Alternatively, the model is capable of identifying the same percent of those students who perform exceedingly well in accounting. This technique, together with a review and appeal procedure, provides a method of restricting enrollment while still meeting today's demand for quality accounting students.]

[The study on perceptions of quality of accounting journals by Howard and Nikolai [1983] is extended to include respondents from the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand. There are highly significant correlations between the perceptions of faculty in these three countries. There is also a high correlation with the earlier U.S. study, though the ranking of a few journals is markedly different.]

[It is uncommon for non-discretionary accounting changes to increase reported income. An earlier study by Harrison [1977] concluded that the stock market reacted favorably to such changes. This study reexamines the market's reaction to a change from the cost to the equity method of accounting for long-term investments. Evidence is found to support the view that earnings adjustments precipitated by the change contained new information. However, no market reaction was detected in weeks containing public announcements leading up to and including the Accounting Principles Board's adoption of the change.]

[Although many firms now prepare a cash-based statement of changes in financial position, reported "funds from operations" is typically a measurement of working capital. The statement reader wishing to determine cash flow from operations must use a series of indirect adjustments to do so. Our purpose in this paper is to identify the inherent difficulties the reader encounters when using this indirect method to convert reported funds from operations to a cash flow amount. We demonstrate how the indirect method will in fact not equal actual cash flow from operations because of numerous conceptual and practical problems encountered when applying the necessary adjustments. We develop illustrations of these problems, and we show how cash flow from operations calculated by the indirect method is, at best, an estimate of actual cash provided by operations.]

[This study examines the motivations for failing firms to change auditors. Some of the factors that could influence auditor switching include audit qualifications, reporting disputes, management changes, audit fees, and insurance needs. Annual reports, 10-Ks, and proxy statements were used to gather data for a sample of 132 failing (bankrupt) firms and a matched-pair sample of nonfailing firms. The investigation's findings strongly supported our prior expectations that failing firms have a greater tendency to switch auditors than do healthier firms. Other findings revealed that neither audit qualifications nor management changes were statistically associated with auditor displacement in failing firms. Failing firms that changed auditors did display a preference to move to a different class of CPA firms. Also, size did not appear to matter with respect to the observed auditor switching among the failing firms, although it appeared to have some effect among control firms. Overall, our study's major findings suggest a definite need to control for the presence of financial distress in studies on auditor switching.]

[The accuracy of forecasts of one-year-ahead current cost earnings using four component models is examined. ASR 190 data for 1976 to 1978 and FAS 33 data for 1979 to 1981 are used in calculating current cost earnings for a sample of 129 firms. The component forecasting models also incorporate forecasts of certain components of historical cost net income developed by Value Line financial analysts. The forecast accuracy of the component models is compared to four benchmark models. A component model that incorporates analysts' forecasts of sales and changes in (historical cost) margins provides the most accurate forecasts for the aggregate sample and for two subsamples. It also provides similar or more accurate forecasts than the other models in eight of the nine industries examined. Thus, researchers may consider using this model when examining the incremental information content of current cost earnings vis-a-vis that of historical cost earnings.]

[This paper investigates the relationship between sampling risks and audit consequences under error and audit value projection testing approaches. The latter approach typically is presented in auditing textbooks in connection with classical variables sampling, while the former approach is shown to underlie both dollar-unit sampling methods (in which an upper precision limit for monetary error is computed) and statistical compliance testing methods. In particular, we demonstrate analytically that error projection approaches implicitly test null hypotheses which effectively are equivalent to an alternative hypothesis underlying audit value projection. We also present outcome matrices to identify the effect of such hypothesis interchange on the audit consequences of sampling risks, and thus provide a basis for clarifying sampling risk discussions in textbooks and the recently issued Audit and Accounting Guide: Audit Sampling.]