If the market anticipates the reversing nature of abnormal working capital accruals, then the reported magnitude of earnings surprises that contain abnormal accruals will differ from the underlying magnitude that is priced by the market. We expect the market's perception of this difference to affect the ERCs associated with earnings surprises that contain abnormal accruals. We test our predictions using an abnormal accruals measure that captures the difference between reported working capital and a proxy for the market's expectations of the level of working capital required to support current sales levels. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find higher ERCs when abnormal accruals suppress the magnitude of earnings surprises, and lower ERCs when abnormal accruals exaggerate the magnitude of earnings surprises. We also find results consistent with analysts predictably considering the reversing implications of abnormal accruals in revising future earnings forecasts. These findings are consistent with market participants anticipating the reversing implications of abnormal accruals. However, analysis of subsequent stock returns provides evidence that market participants do not fully impound the pricing implications of abnormal accruals at the earnings announcement date.
Information relevance advisory services offer growth opportunities for accountants in CPA firms, but we know little about the types of knowledge needed to provide high-quality advice. In a two-stage experiment, accountants with different management and public accounting experiences (that we suggest lead to different types of knowledge) receive task information in alternative formats, and develop relevant information for a client's decision. We find that participants are more likely to choose an appropriate problem representation when they receive an appropriate task format or when they have more management or public accounting experience (stage one). Also, when participants choose an appropriate problem representation, more management accounting experience improves their development of relevant information, but more public accounting experience does not (stage two). Our results suggest that tailored task presentation and domain experience that facilitates acquisition of multiple knowledge types improve accountants' information relevance advice.
This study shows experimentally that when individuals use information on intangibles expenditures to predict future profits, expensing (vs. capitalizing) the expenditures significantly reduces the accuracy, consistency, consensus, and self-insight of individuals' subjective profit predictions. The experimental design allows us to eliminate several competing explanations for this apparent fixation on accounting. Subjects do not base their judgments on a nai¨ve prior belief that expensing precludes effects on future profits; a preexperiment question shows that subjects expect intangibles expenditures will affect future profits even when expensed. Moreover, subjects do not lack, or fail to use, data that would allow them to learn the exact expenditure-profit relation. They receive data on intangibles expenditures and profits as a basis for learning, and in some respects the learning is quite successful even when intangibles are expensed; subjects' profit predictions accurately reflect the mean and standard deviation of actual profits. Nevertheless, consistent with psychological theories of learning, subjects do not learn the exact magnitude of the effect of intangibles on future profits as well when the intangibles are expensed. Although the mean of their predictions is accurate, they do not discriminate well between cases with high and low actual profits. In consequence, their prediction accuracy, consistency, consensus, and self-insight are lower when intangibles are expensed. Thus, in this case, learning does not mitigate fixation on accounting, because accounting affects the learning process itself.
This paper introduces a model in which the firm's returns depend on trading volume when the firm defers disclosure, because market makers use volume to draw inferences about better-informed investors' private information on firm value. In addition, we show that a firm's commitment to a policy of timely disclosure of a broader range of outcomes dampens the slope coefficient on volume in a Taylor expansion of the log of the absolute value of returns on volume. The reason for this is that when a firm commits to a policy of timely disclosure of a broader range of outcomes, the deferral of a report indicates that the outcome is extreme. This heightens adverse selection. In turn, this makes informed trade more costly and hence less likely, thereby rendering returns less dependent on trading volume as a source of information about firm value. This result predicts that firms committing to more disclosure should experience a smaller slope coefficient on trading volume. Thus, the slope coefficient offers a potential tool for measuring the economic consequences of shifts in disclosure regimes.
We examine the future sales implications of product quality measures for 11 plants of a manufacturing group in a Fortune 500 firm. Our results indicate that both financial quality measures, such as external failure costs incurred due to product failures at customer sites, and nonfinancial quality measures, such as defect rates and on-time deliveries, are leading indicators of future sales. While changes in defects and on-time deliveries affect sales in the subsequent quarter, changes in external failure costs are negatively associated with sales two and three quarters hence. Corroborating popular claims about the importance of external failure costs, we find that a $1 increase in external failure costs is associated with a cumulative sales decrease of $26, or approximately $10.40 in lost profits.
This study examines how auditors' job performance is affected by the interaction between individual auditors' locus of control and the extent to which the employing audit firm uses a structured audit technology. We distributed an instrument that measures locus of control (“internal” vs. “external”) and other key constructs to staff- and senior-level auditors from the two most structured and the two least structured (then) Big 6 accounting firms. Results indicate that supervisor-assessed job performance is positively associated with the “fit” between individual auditors' locus of control and the employing firm's audit structure. Specifically, auditors who have an internal locus of control perform at a higher level at unstructured than at structured firms, on average, while auditors who have an external locus of control perform better at structured than at unstructured firms. These findings are relevant to audit firms and individual auditors seeking a match between personal and firm characteristics, and to firms seeking to determine the potential impact of audit reengineering that may alter the level of structure in their audit approaches.
We develop a theory of the relation between biases in financial reporting and managers' incentives to issue timely voluntary disclosures. We find that firms with relatively more conservative accounting are less likely to make timely voluntary disclosures than firms with less conservative accounting. Therefore, price is more timely in reflecting the news of firms with less conservative accounting. Prior research has assumed that the timeliness by which news is impounded in price is uncorrelated with the nature of accounting earnings and has ascribed a concave earnings-return relation to the accounting system reporting bad news on a more timely basis than good news. In our theory, a concave relation is not necessarily attributable to a difference in the way the accounting system reports good vs. bad news. Rather, our prediction stems from how biases in mandatory financial reports determine which firms optimally choose to make voluntary preemptive disclosures and which do not. Hence, our theory provides an alternative explanation for the empirical findings and cautions against interpreting them as evidence that accounting is conservative. Finally, we identify means of empirically distinguishing between the alternative explanations.
Although nonprofit organizations are generally exempt from income taxation, they pay taxes on profits from activities unrelated to their primary exempt purpose. Congress intended this tax on unrelated business activities to prevent unfair competition with for-profit businesses and to raise revenue. In the aggregate, nonprofits report annual losses on their taxable activities of more than $1 billion on $4 billion of revenues. In contrast, they report aggregate profits of over $50 billion on their tax-exempt activities. Analysis of a database of confidential tax returns suggests that medical and educational nonprofits allocate expenses from their tax-exempt to their taxable activities to reduce their tax liabilities, although unfortunately it is not possible to determine the extent to which these allocations represent noncompliance with tax laws. In contrast, I find no evidence that charitable nonprofits engage in tax-motivated allocation behavior.
The Accounting Review200176(2), 221-244open access
Prior research suggests that the earnings expectations of a segment of the market can be described by the seasonal random-walk model. Prior research also provides evidence that less wealthy and less informed investors tend to make smaller trades (small traders) than wealthier and betterinformed investors (large traders). I hypothesize that it is the earnings expectations of small traders that are associated with predictions from the seasonal random-walk model. By directly analyzing the trading activities of small and large traders, this study provides evidence that is largely consistent with the hypotheses. Specifically, small traders' trading response around earnings announcements is increasing in the magnitude of seasonal random-walk forecast errors, even after controlling for absolute analyst forecast errors, contemporaneous price changes, and market-wide trading. Supplementary analysis reveals that this effect is largely confined to firms with relatively impoverished information environments (i.e., smaller firms and firms with little to moderate analyst following).