Knowledge that Transforms

In this paper, we examine specific process gains and losses arising from the review process by considering the interaction between attributes of the preparer and attributes of the reviewer. Specifically, we investigate determinants of reviewers' performance in the presence of potential stylization attempts by audit workpaper preparers. We assess whether reviewers' detection of conclusion errors and documentation errors depends on three factors: nature of the preparer's stylization (by way of the preparer's differential emphasis on conclusion and documentation errors), auditor rank, and the reviewer's sensitivity to such stylization attempts. Our results show that, depending on the reviewers' stylization sensitivity, their cognitive templates can both facilitate and interfere with reviewers' effectiveness in responding to these stylization attempts, resulting in both potential gains and losses from the review process. Our paper identifies conditions related to whether and how reviewers can provide adaptive responses to stylization attempts, and demonstrates that conclusions about rankrelated performance differences in the review process should consider complex interactions between attributes of the reviewer and the preparer. Implications are discussed.

Applying a real-options-based valuation approach, we develop and test a model that addresses the incremental value relevance of segment data beyond firmlevel accounting data. Prior studies (e.g., Zhang 2000; Biddle et al. 2001) show that equity valuation requires accounting data (in part) because accounting provides signals that guide capital investments underlying value creation. In this study, we establish that the usefulness of segment data beyond aggregate data relates to heterogeneity of investment opportunities across segments, caused by divergences of segment profitability and growth potential. Empirical results are consistent with the model's predictions. We also assess the magnitude of the valuation impact of segment information relative to that of firm-level information.

This study examines how different types of performance measures were weighted in a subjective balanced scorecard bonus plan adopted by a major financial services firm. Drawing upon economic and psychological studies on performance evaluation and compensation criteria, we develop hypotheses regarding the weights placed on different types of measures. We find that the subjectivity in the scorecard plan allowed superiors to reduce the “balance” in bonus awards by placing most of the weight on financial measures, to incorporate factors other than the scorecard measures in performance evaluations, to change evaluation criteria from quarter to quarter, to ignore measures that were predictive of future financial performance, and to weight measures that were not predictive of desired results. This evidence suggests that psychology-based explanations may be equally or more relevant than economicsbased explanations in explaining the firm's measurement practices. The high level of subjectivity in the balanced scorecard plan led many branch managers to complain about favoritism in bonus awards and uncertainty in the criteria being used to determine rewards. The system ultimately was abandoned in favor of a formulaic bonus plan based solely on revenues.

This paper considers an agency model in which a firm's manager receives private information about an investment project. The manager has unique skills that are essential for implementing the project, and he can pursue the project inside the firm or as an outside venture on his own. The firm's owner thus faces a potential managerial retention problem, where the severity of the retention problem depends on the project's outside viability. My analysis shows that if the managerial retention problem is not too severe, the owner can delegate the investment decision to the manager and use a residua-lincome-based bonus contract to give the manager incentives to work hard and make appropriate investment decisions. If the retention problem is severe, however, then the owner must use an option-based compensation contract to retain the manager and provide him with appropriate incentives. I also establish that as the managerial retention problem becomes more severe, the owner reduces the rate of return, or hurdle rate, required to approve the investment project. These results predict that new-economy firms, in which managerial expertise is critical and yet mobile, are more likely to (1) include stock options in their managers' compensation contracts, and (2) apply lower hurdle rates for approving capital investments.

In this paper, we present the results of an experiment that investigates the effects of two contextual features—the availability of authoritative guidance and the effectiveness of the client's audit committee—on auditors' perceived outcome of auditor-client negotiations concerning an audit adjustment that affects the client's ability to meet analysts' forecasts. Results show that auditors' perceived negotiation outcome is jointly influenced by authoritative guidance availability and audit committee effectiveness. Specifically, authoritative guidance availability has a greater effect on auditors' perceived negotiation outcome in the absence of an effective audit committee than in its presence. We also find that concessionary moves by the client increase auditors' propensity to concede to the client's preferred position.

In this study we examine the long-run effects of unexpected firm performance on CEO compensation. We find that unexpectedly good accounting performance is initially associated with increases in CEO pay. However, this initial effect soon reverses, and is followed by lower CEO pay in later years. Overall, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good accounting performance is not significantly different from zero. In contrast, unexpectedly good stock price performance is associated with increases in CEO pay for several years. Thus, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good stock price performance is positive and significant.

We model managers' equilibrium strategies for voluntarily disclosing information about their firm's risk. We consider a multifirm setting in which the variance of each firm's future cash flow is uncertain. A manager can disclose, at a cost, this variance before offering the firm for sale in a competitive stock market with risk-averse investors. In our partial disclosure equilibrium, managers voluntarily disclose if their firm has a low variance of future cash flows, but withhold the information if their firm has highly variable future cash flows. We establish how the manager's discretionary risk disclosure affects the firm's share price, expected stock returns, and beta, within the framework of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. We show that whereas one manager's discretionary disclosure of his firm's risk does not affect other firms' share prices, it does affect the other firms' betas. Also, we demonstrate that a disclosing firm has lower risk premium and beta ex post than a nondisclosing firm. Finally, we show that ex ante, the expected risk premium and expected beta of each firm are higher under a mandatory risk disclosure regime than in the partial disclosure equilibrium that arises under a voluntary disclosure regime.

This study examines changes in auditor risk assessments and sample size decisions based on information gathered from three large accounting firms for audits during 1994 and 1999. The five-year interval between data collection periods allows us to measure changes in risk assessments and sample sizes between the two periods. Auditors relied on controls and assessed inherent risk below the maximum on most audits, and were more likely to do so in the later period, consistent with a trend of lower risk assessment levels. Average sample sizes declined between 1994 and 1999 for the firms that had larger sample sizes in the earlier period. Overall, we find a significant relationship between inherent risk assessments and sample sizes, but this relationship is stronger in the earlier period and is not significant for all firms, especially in the later period. We find limited evidence of a relationship between control risk and sample sizes.

This paper identifies tax and nontax factors that influence commercial banks' conversion from taxable C-corporation to nontaxable S-corporation from 1997 to 1999, after a 1996 tax-law change allowed banks to convert to S-corporations for the first time. We find that banks are more likely to convert when conversion saves dividend taxes, avoids alternative minimum taxes, and minimizes state income taxes. Banks are less likely to convert when conversion restricts access to equity capital, nullifies corporate tax loss carryforwards, and creates potential penalty taxes on unrealized gains existing at the conversion date. Banks with significant deferred tax assets are less likely to convert, presumably because the write-off of deferred taxes at conversion decreases regulatory capital and exposes the bank to costly regulatory intervention. We also investigate the strategic choices banks make before converting to S-corporations. Converting banks alter their capital structures, deliberately sell appreciated assets, and strategically set dividends to augment net conversion benefits.

The purpose of this study is to highlight issues of interest to researchers employing the I/B/E/S earnings and forecast data. I/B/E/S has traditionally provided per share data on a split-adjusted basis, rounded to the nearest penny. In doing so, per share amounts are comparable over time. However, because not all prior forecasts and earnings per share amounts divide precisely to a penny, adjusting for stock splits and rounding to the nearest penny can cause a loss of information. Researchers are prohibited in many cases from determining the amounts actually reported in prior years, leading to misclassified observations. We obtain actual (unadjusted) earnings and forecast data from I/B/E/S and compare results to those generated using the a djusted I/B/E/S data. We replicate prior studies and find that conclusions are affected when using the actual I/B/E/S data.